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PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION THEORY AND
VIEWS OF THE HUMAN PERSON

Gerald L. Zandstra, Ph.D.
Western Michigan University, 2007
Public administrative theory, despite its reach into American life, lacks broad
agreement about its field of inquiry, its underlying presuppositions, and its purpose.
Theorists such as Herbert Storing, Stephen Bailey, Richard Stillman, David Hart,
Vincent Ostrom, William Dunn, Bahman Fozouni, Mark Rutgers, Michael Harmon
and others have observed and lamented these shortcomings. Without well-developed
theory, the objectives of public administration are a moving target.
This project does not attempt to resolve this deficiency. Instead, it is intended
to address a primary question pertaining to public administration’s core principles:
what is the nature of the human person? The line of argumentation is not that public
administration theorists do not have an operative view of human nature. Rather, it is
proposed that all theories of public administration begin with some assumptions about
human beings which can be termed operational anthropologies.
No attempt is made to consider all possible aspects of human nature. Only
two are examined:

the classically defined virtues of prudence and justice.

A

definition of each is provided followed by an examination of the theories of Frederick
Taylor, Herbert Simon, Frederick Mosher, Vincent Ostrom, and Amitai Etzioni. The
goal is to determine what each author believes to be true of human nature as
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determined by an examination of their most prominent book.
The project ends with a call for additional research to be done into the major
theorists’ views of the human person. It also calls for those currently working in
public administrative theory to clarify their anthropological assumptions as an
important part of their theorizing.
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PREFACE

My interest in the nature of human persons has been part of my journey
throughout my entire academic and professional life.

It began with theological

studies at Calvin Seminary. One of the first considerations in doing theology proper
is the nature of the human person. Making use of sacred texts, philosophy, history,
biology, sociology, theological tradition, and other disciplines, budding theologians
are taught to come to some conclusions about what human beings are and are not as
well are what they can and cannot do. Capacity and possibility are taken just as
seriously as are origin and telos. The Westminster Catechism is a good demonstration
of the seriousness with which theologians think about human beings.

The first

question asks, “What is the chief end of man?”
After serving as a pastor and teaching a bit in a seminary, I moved on to a
think-tank on economics, theology, and ethics and eventually taught global economics
courses in an MBA program. In studying economics, it quickly became clear that the
consideration given to anthropology in economics is just as serious as it is in
theology. The first economists were philosophers and, in many cases, theologians.
While modem economics is more often associated with charts, graphs, and
complicated mathematics, the science originally was more interested in how human
beings make use of their resources and provide for themselves and their families.

iii
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Thinking about the nature of the human person and examining operating assumptions
are pivotal to understanding economic theory and practice.
When I came to thinking about public administration and began to read its
history and some of its chief theorists, I was struck by two things:

a sense of

wandering or uncertainty in its theoretical basis and a suspicion that the cause might
be an inattentiveness to assumptions about the nature of human beings. The more I
read, the more I realized that, while others in the field had the same sense of
wandering, few were working to address it or attempt to get at some of the core
reasons for it. It is my hope that this project is at least a first step, albeit a wobbly
one, toward clarity in anthropological assumptions.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....................................................................................

ii

PREFACE..............................................................................................................

iii

LIST OF FIGURES................................................................................................

vii

CHAPTER
I. THE CONTINUING INTELLECTUAL CRISIS IN PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION.................................................................................

1

An Overview of Public Administration Theory.................................

1

The Need for Theory..........................................................................

6

Anthropology Matters.........................................................................

10

H. CREATING AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK.....................

30

Narrowing the Anthropological Focus...............................................

30

Creating a Framework........................................................................

32

Possible Combinations.......................................................................

46

m . TESTING MAJOR THEORISTS.................................................................

79

Choosing Theorists and Their Books.................................................

79

Frederick Taylor’s The Principles o f Scientific Management............

83

Herbert Simon’s Administrative Behavior.........................................

122

Frederick Mosher’s Democracy and the Public Service....................

163

Vincent Ostrom’s The Intellectual Crisis in American Public
Administration.................................................................................... 186
Amitai Etzioni’s The Spirit of Community: Rights,
Responsibilities, and the Communitarian Agenda............................. 220
v

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table of Contents—continued

CHAPTER
IV. CONCLUSIONS.......................................................................................... 247
BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................................................................................. 254

vi

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

LIST OF FIGURES

1.

High Prudence/High Justice.........................................................................

56

2.

Low Prudence/High Justice..........................................................................

62

3.

High Prudence/Low Justice.........................................................................

65

4.

Low Prudence/Low Justice..........................................................................

74

5.

No Prudence/No Justice...............................................................................

78

6.

Frederick Taylor........................................................................................... 121

7.

Herbert Simon.............................................................................................. 163

8.

Frederick Mosher......................................................................................... 185

9.

Vincent Ostrom............................................................................................ 219

10.

Amitai Etzioni.............................................................................................. 246

vii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1

CHAPTER I

THE CONTINUING INTELLECTUAL CRISIS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

An Overview of Public Administration Theory

Public administration theory is a young field of inquiry in the United States
despite the hefty role public administrators play in the lives of citizens. Trillions of
dollars in taxes and fees are collected and dispersed by every level of government,
most with a great deal of discretion by public administrators and civil servants.
Public administrators have input into and often control over the military, postal
services, parks, foreign policy, trade agreements, education, transportation, police and
fire services, water and waste management, neighborhood planning, construction, and
a host of other areas that affect virtually every part of American life. Little in
American society is untouched by civil servants.
It would be reasonable for most citizens to expect public administrative theory
to be highly developed because of its deep reach into American life. A theoretical
construct of public administration would seemingly be important as a reference point
for guiding and evaluating public administration. This has not been the case.
The first written work of significance on public administration in the United
States is Woodrow Wilson’s The Study o f Administration, written in 1886 during his
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tenure as a professor at Princeton University. It was merely a start, despite being
written after the United States celebrated its 100th birthday.
Since that time, public administrative theory has moved forward and back
again with different theorists rising to prominence for brief periods of time, only to be
followed by their decline. Rather than one theory building on another, what occurred
more often was one theory obliterating an earlier one. Studying public administration
theory and its history is frustrating. There is little sense of an accumulation of
knowledge or the specification of theory in which portions of a theory are pruned
away and others with greater explanatory power take their place.
Theorists began to notice this trend in the 1960s, a short seven decades from
the Wilsonian genesis of American public administrative theory. In 1965, Herbert
Storing wrote an article on the theory and work of Leonard White in which he opined:
As an intellectual discipline, the field of public administration lacks much,
including an account of its historical development, a comprehensive statement
in terms of its underlying principles, an exact definition of its central concepts,
a penetrating analysis of its foundations in psychology and sociology, and an
interpretive account of its role in the structure of government and life. (p. 39)
Of course, the same can be said, to some degree, of many fields of inquiry.
Storing’s comment indicates that he desired a single, unifying construct upon which
all theorists would agree. What is more typical among theorists, regardless of the
field, is competing schools of thought whose theoretical foundations have been
examined, defended, and critiqued. Theoretical development is more typically like

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

3

evolutionary development where one theory builds on another. Rarely is a theory
completely destroyed. Rather, one theory tends to morph into another with some still
clinging to the old model and others pushing to eradicate it and move on to higher and
more nuanced understandings of human or other realities.
Given that theorizing about the role, nature, and substance of public
administration in the United States is still a young science, it is more like an
adolescent than a mature adult (Frederickson and Smith, 2003). It is a series of starts,
fits, failures and do-overs. Perhaps it is true that the more mature sciences are able to
prune and add to the knowledge of their fields of inquiry without the lack of roots
noticed by Storing. Heeding his call for a more theoretical, in-depth, historical
examination of public administration should have led to at least some degree of
clarity. Unfortunately, it did not.
In 1968, a group of young public administrative theorists gathered at what
would eventually be known as the Minnowbrooke I Conference. Their goal,
according to Richard Stillman (1999), was “to make a bold synoptic approach to the
discipline of public administration” (p.l). It is important to pay careful attention to
Stillman’s use of the word synoptic. Technically, taking a synoptic approach to
something means that the group would take a similar view of the entire field of public
administration. It is a perspectival word in that it refers to something viewed through
a common eye. Those gathered at Minnowbrooke had a desire to gain some
consensus and come to common and broad agreement about their field of inquiry and
some of its underlying presuppositions.
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Did idealism dominate those gathered at Minnowbrooke? Perhaps. Even
skilled scientists studying innate objects can disagree as to what they see in their
microscopes or telescopes. A search for a single, unifying or synoptic perspective in
public administration theory might not have been either possible or desirable. A brief
glimpse at the history of thought in virtually all fields of inquiry, from astronomy to
zoology, demonstrates that when everyone sees things the same, their theory is likely
to be deeply flawed.
Were the goals of Minnowbrooke I met? It seems they were not. In 1972,
David K. Hart stated in Public Administration Review, “It is now time for a
generation of ‘public administration philosophers’ who will address themselves to the
resolution of extremely difficult normative questions that plague nearly every book
and article [written on public administration]” (p. 617). The most serious problem
facing public administrative theorists and practioners, according to Hart, was the
“absence of such metaphysical speculation” (p. 617).
Hart was not alone in his desire to raise the level of discourse in discussions
on finding some unifying theory that would act to solidify the practice of public
administration. Vincent Ostrom extended the critique in his 1974 book, The
Intellectual Crisis o f Public Administration. William Dunn and Bahman Fozouni
(1976), writing three years after Hart and two years after Ostrom, noted that
“Administrative theory is conveyed today as a chaotic array of fragmented
assumptions, vacuous prescriptions, and disorganized beliefs about public
organizations” (p. 5). What was missing was a focus on foundational issues.
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The 1980s and 1990s held promise. The call for reflection on the nature of
public administration had been put forth in previous decades. Perhaps the building of
a coherent theory or series of competing theories for public administration would pick
up steam in the 1980s and 1990s. It does not appear that this is what occurred. Many
books focusing on public administration were written in this period. However,
producing books and gaining understanding is not necessarily the same thing, as the
writer of Proverbs points out.
A second Minnowbrooke conference was held in 1988. It was hoped that those
attending would form a series of questions which might lead to the development of a
core theory or series of theories. Again, the conference seems to have disappointed
those who attended. Richard Stillman (1999) writes of one person who attended
Minnowbrooke I and Minnowbrooke II and asked why public administration theory
must “personify ‘the trek in the continual wilderness?”’ (p. 3). Reflecting on this
comment and on the field as a whole, Stillman summarizes the current state of
thought and theory of public administration with the following questions: “Why does
the field seem so malleable? so impermanent? so impossible to pin down? and
seemingly recast in any direction according to personal whim? More fundamentally,
after two decades and more of wrestling with public administration theory, why are
we no closer to defining what ‘it’ is?” (p. 3).
Why is this the case? Why the unwillingness or inability to ask foundational
questions about the true nature and core principles of public administration?
Theodore Lowi (1992) believes it was intentional:
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From out of the beginnings in the 1890s, where the writing was legalistic,
formalistic, conceptually barren and largely devoid of what would today be
called empirical data, the founders of [American public administration theory]
were committed to political realism, which meant facts, the here and now, and
the exposure of the gap between the formal institutions and the realities, (p. 1)
To prove his point, Lowi tells the story of James Bryce who, in 1909, advised the
members of the American Political Science Association to “Keep close to the facts.
Never lose yourself in abstraction.. . . The fact is the first thing. Make sure of it” (p.
1).
The genesis period of public administration theory focused on facts. By the
1960s, it became clear to theorists that facts were not enough. Two national
conferences had not clarified the foundational questions. The comments of Richard
Stillman in 1999 and the fact that Ostrom’s book is still in print and an updated
version was produced in 1989 are indicators that little progress has been made in the
development of generally agreed upon underlying principles.

The Need for Theory

It is possible to assert that a unifying theory of public administration simply is
not needed. It may be that theory either does not matter much to the practice of public
administration in general or, more specifically, in the American context. Richard
Stillman’s theory (1999) of “chinking-in” refers to filling in the spaces between logs
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in a log home. There is nothing systematic about it. American public administration
simply responds to needs that arise. It is not proactive. It is not by design. It does not
consider what ought to be done. Rather, it looks at what needs doing and can be
accomplished in the most efficacious fashion. Pragmatism reigns and normative
questions are discarded.
While this approach does make for a public administration structure that is
flexible, dynamic, and responsive to new challenges, it also calls into question the
legitimacy of public administration as a science guided by core principles. It can also
result in constant tinkering with the policies and programs the government offers to
its citizens. One “reinventing government” scheme is quickly followed by another
with little thought given to how government ought to function. Furthermore, it avoids
the heavy academic lifting of developing a theory or series of competing theories that
would form the intellectual skeleton of public administration.
Vincent Ostrom (in Sabatier, 2002) rejects the argument that theory and core
principles are unimportant. Rather, he writes:
All analysts of microbehavior use an implicit or explicit theory or model of the
actors in a situation and thus about the matter of joint results that may be
produced. The analysts make assumptions about how and what participants
value; what resources, information, and beliefs they have; what their
information-processing capabilities are; and what internal mechanisms they
use to decide upon strategies, (p. 44)
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In other words, the lack of a coherent theory is not caused by the lack of a
need for one nor because such theories don’t already exist. They do exist, insists
Ostrom, and are operative in various schools of thought. The only issue is whether
they are explicit or implicit. If explicit, they can be debated, compared, contrasted,
and challenged. Here the potential for finding some common ground exists. Left
implicit, they are unexamined and lack the discipline that can only come from
critique. Mark Rutgers agrees.
The reality is that metaphysical theory is present in all schools
of public administrative thought. Even more importantly, it is
necessary that the metaphysical assumptions be named, critiqued, and
examined. He writes (1995), it is theory that determines what the
study is about. This in fact is an insight common to administrative
discourse over the centuries. Again and again the study is regarded as
striving for practical relevance, and therefore in need of theoretical
foundations. It is always theory that provides the basis for identifying
or constituting the subject matter. If it is not consciously studied or
learned theory, then it will be some sort of unreflected, everyday
notion, (p. 70)
Whether studied or not, the theory exists.
This research project asserts that the reason there is so little agreement or
clarity on the underlying assumptions in public administrative theory is that theorists
begin with the wrong questions. Hart, quoted above, claims a lack of willingness to
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examine the metaphysical issues embedded in public administration theory is the
cause of theoretical consensus. The first foundational issue to be addressed ought to
be the nature of the human person. According to Stillman (1999), theorists have “an
inherent ambivalence toward the nature of mankind, even a reluctance to deal directly
with the topic of human nature” (pp. 36-37). Instead, the focus is on the pragmatic,
the numbers, and the results.
Little progress will be made toward a deeper understanding of government and
public administration until those who study and theorize about it demonstrate a
renewed interest in anthropology or the nature of the persons in public administration
and those for whom they are administering. All theories of bureaucracy, political
science, economics, sociology, and psychology begin with some assumptions about
the nature of the human person. All theories in each of these fields have operational
anthropologies. Those with gravitas make them clear at the beginning of their
theorizing. It is time that public administration theorists focused their attention on
this important discussion.
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Anthropology Matters

There are many wonders, but none more wondrous than human beings. Sophocles
The real nature o f man is the totality o f social relations. Karl Marx
What is man, that thou art mindful o f him? Psalm 8, KJV

The Need for Anthropology

Paradigms are the grids through which human beings consider and reflect
upon their existence. They are determinative in that they enable people to frame what
they experience as well as interpretive in that they determine what meaning these
experiences might have. Paradigms are operative in understanding the past and
present, forecasting into the future, and bringing such forecasts into reality. Policies
and procedures in every human organization and every person working in an
organization have some paradigmatic structure through which they view and attempt
to control their world. Because they are also future oriented, such paradigms are
determinative of what people believe will happen in the lives of individuals and in
society as a whole.
Michael Hackman and Craig Johnson (2000) refer to this as the “Pygmalion
Effect” (p. 251). Prince Pygmalion is a figure from Greek mythology who “creates a
statue of a beautiful woman he named Galatea. After the figure was complete, he fell
in love with his creation. The god Venus took pity on the poor prince and brought
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Galatea to life” (p. 252). The lesson, according to Hackman and Johnson, is that
human expectations often bring about reality. The concept is parallel to that of the
self-fulfilling prophecy in which people live up to the expectations they and others
have of them. Those expected to do well frequently actually do well. Those expected
and expecting to fail often do fail.
These paradigms or perspectives on reality of the past and of the future are, at
their core, belief systems and, according to Stevenson (1987), “assert a certain
authority” (p. 7). Paradigms are not merely theoretical. Rather, they are actionoriented. As Stevenson points out, they are “based on a theory of human nature
which somehow suggests a course of action” (p 9).
Once paradigms are believed as fact, writes Thayer (1980), “we accept them,
our actions implying that we actually prefer them. Obeying orders from superiors is
one example, assuming greed an unchangeable ‘fact of human nature’ is another,
politics and economics assume man is and should be greedy. Once accepted, then
facts are indistinguishable from values” (p. 91). The connection between paradigm,
values, and every day decisions is clear. Of course, it is true that human beings
frequently act in a manner inconsistent with their paradigms, their stated beliefs, and
their values. But even this is an anthropological assumption about the nature of the
human person in relationship to his or her stated values, which not only explains past
behavior but also has some predictive capability as to future behavior.
Paradigms of the human person are at the bedrock of human understanding.
What is a human being? Stevenson (1987) comments:
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This is surely one of the most important questions of all. For so much else

depends on our view of human nature. The meaning and purpose of human
life, what we ought to do, and what we can hope to achieve—all these are
fundamentally affected by whatever we think is the ‘real’ or ‘true’ nature of
man. (p. 3)
It is helpful to consider a sampling of intellectual fields as well as those
thinkers whose theories have dominated them at one point or another in history.
More significantly, it is vital to give serious thought to the kinds of questions that
these leading theorists in their fields were asking about themselves, their fellow
human beings, and the world in which they lived.
Economics is more than how economies work. Digging deeper into its history
and theory, economics is about goods, services, and how capital flows to meet the
needs of human beings. At its core, though, it is about the nature of the human
person. From the theologians of the School of Salamanca in the 16th century to the
philosophy of Adam Smith and Karl Marx, from the theories of John Maynard
Keynes to those of Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig von Mises, the study of economics is,
at its core, about the nature and makeup of the human actor.
Philosophy, political theory, mathematics, cosmology, theology, sociology,
psychology, medicine, art, literature, and virtually every other form of human inquiry
begin with some version of a basic anthropological understanding. For Freud, the
human person is primarily sexual. For Skinner, human beings are more akin to
machines responding to stimuli. Aristotle, Rousseau, Mills, Locke, and Martin
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Luther all have core beliefs about human beings, political order, human rights, and the
structure of society. Theologians from Augustine to Aquinas, from Calvin to
Schleiermacher have detailed theories about the nature of the human person, most
using this as the launching pad for their theological structures.
Painters and poets—whether realists, modernists, postmodernists,
abstractionists or members of some other school—operate with certain assumptions
about human beings and their society. Cosmologists and physicists, from Newton to
Copernicus, from Galileo to Sagan hold certain beliefs about the meaning, location,
and relationship of human existence to the rest of the cosmos. Sociologists like Max
Weber held core assumptions not only about individual human beings, but also about
how they worked, played, competed, and socialized with each other.
Are there theories about various approaches to the question of human nature
and how they theoretically and operationally function? Douglas McGregor is wellknown in social science for his theoretical work on the nature of the human person
(Hill, 1997) and serves as an example of why paradigmatic belief systems about the
nature of the human person result in profoundly different approaches to public
administration and management in general. He contrasted what he termed ‘Theory
X” and ‘Theory Y” views of human nature. According to Hill, “Theory X . . .
assumes that people are generally lazy, dislike work, avoid responsibility, and require
external stimulus to perform tasks adequately” (p. 151). Obviously, such a
paradigmatic understanding of human nature is going to have a profound impact on
management and administration systems at every level of society. A generous supply
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and application of both carrots and sticks is going to be necessary to get people to do

what needs doing in any organization. Left on their own, people will demonstrate
little creativity, ambition, or drive. They will place their own security above all
others’ needs.
In contrast to this paradigmatic view of persons, McGregor developed what he
termed a “Theory Y” perspective on human nature. Those holding to this conception
of the human person believe that on their own, people tend to be creative, innovative,
responsibility-seekers who can direct their own affairs (p. 151). In this view, work is
natural. Good decisions are common and most often made with little interference
from others. Such an understanding of human nature will result in a vastly different
form of management style than that of those who are proponents of Theory X.
Perhaps some gentle nudging is needed by those in positions of authority to get people
moving in the right direction. Carrots and sticks are not only unnecessary but would
likely interfere with the more decentralized approach of letting people make their own
decisions, believing that they will come to the correct ones on their own.
While McGregor’s two theories are simplistic, his work points out the need to
be clear about operating anthropological assumptions in organizations. Theory X
would lead to one type of public administration model. Theory Y would lead to quite
a different model not only in how public administrators work with one another but
also in how they relate to the general public and politicians in their everyday
activities.
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Kelly Clark and Anne Poortenga (2003) expand on McGregor’s two extremes
to provide a fuller range of possibilities how a particular understanding of the human
person might influence political and administrative theory as well as their practice:
If you think human beings are basically and irredeemably selfish, you might
opt for the moral views of Thrasymachus, the Sophists, or Hobbes. If you
suppose that humans are initially selfish yet capable of obtaining the divine
grace necessary for moral transformation, you may embrace the views of
Augustine, Aquinas, Kant, or Kierkegaard. If you conclude that our finer
nature can be trained by proper education for virtuous activity and selfless
pursuits or for contemplation, you may prefer the moral teachings of Plato and
Aristotle. If you judge that human beings are by nature good and social, you
may prefer the views of Marx. And if you believe that humans are animal-like
in their need for power and dominion, or godlike in their need for creative
self-expression, you may find the moral views of Homer, Nietzsche, or Sartre
attractive, (p. 2-3)
Public administration theorists focused on productivity, statistics, efficiency,
and effectiveness might be tempted to simply ignore such fundamental philosophical
questions and move to practical solutions, but they do so at their own peril. Questions
of human nature are essential and must be addressed and clarified prior to the
development of any system of public administration. Theorists’ unwillingness to
examine such questions directly contributes to the view of public administration that
it lacks scientific and philosophical weight. As Robert Behn (1995) points out, “any
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field of science is defined by the big questions it asks” (p. 314). Public administration
theorists are not asking enough big questions.
Because public administration is so concretely human-focused on both
individuals and groups, clear and concise theories of human nature ought to be of
central concern. Campbell (1981) claims that “it is impossible to conceive of a theory
of society without a conception of human nature” (p. 18) and that “basic to all social
theory is its view of man, or theory of human nature” (p. 19). This is true not only of
public administration theory but also of all social and political science. Madison’s
question in The Federalist Papers is instructive to all who contemplate the role of
government in society: “What is government itself but the greatest of all reflections
on human nature?” (as quoted in Diggins, 1984, p. 27). Stephen Monsma (1974)
echoes Madison’s point when he writes:
More basic to politics than laws and constitutions is man himself. It is, in the
final analysis, men who write laws and constitutions, and men for whom laws
and constitutions are written.. . . The nature and purposes—and
shortcomings—of man’s political life grow out of the nature and purposes—
and shortcomings—of man himself, (p. 11)
Why is this the case? Because, as Leslie Stevenson (1987) points out,
“Different views about human nature lead naturally to different conclusions about
what we ought to do and how we ought to do it” (p. 4). It is important to note that
Stevenson emphasizes both the content of what human beings ought to do and the
process of how they ought to do it. Anthropology contains within it some claim about
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not only what kind of beings humans are, but also a normative expression of oughtness. There exists in all anthropological assumptions a compulsion toward something
or away from something. These “somethings” will be determined by the operative
anthropology of those who theorize about human beings, government, and society as a
whole. Making implicit anthropological assumptions explicit enables theorists to
compare and evaluate various anthropological paradigms but also to be explicit about
how one in particular might lead to certain practical applications while another might
lead to a completely opposite set of applications.
At its core, reflection on anthropological presuppositions is an exercise soaked
in practicality. Kapiec (1983) points out:
The contemporary explosion of anthropocentrism was caused not so much by
a desire on the part of thinking as by, above all, practical reasons. The most
complete picture possible of man proves to be indispensable particularly for
theology, ethics, pedagogy, politics, and medicine. This seems to demand that
the philosophy of man not limit itself to speculative investigations, but realize
the fullest possible integrating vision of human nature and, in the course of
doing so, take advantage of the findings of particular sciences, (p. 363)
In other words, anthropological reflection is not a leftover for philosophers to chew
on when the practicality of all things has been concluded. It is the first and most
necessary move. It is normative from the beginning of every inquiry. It will shape
and mold all conclusions, plans, ideas, and strategies. What is believed to be true of
human persons forms the questions, directs theorists into fields of investigations,
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colors the data attained, influences how data is summarized, and directs the
conclusions. Because this is the case, it is necessary to be clear about operational
anthropological assumptions for, as Mark Rutgers (1995) points out, “there is no
value-free, objective perception of reality that is at the basis of our knowledge” (p.
68 ).

The need for clarity on and debate over operative anthropological assumptions
exists and must be brought to the forefront if public administrative theory is going to
move beyond its current status.

Anthropology and Public Administration Theory

Michael Harmon (1981) summarizes the need for anthropological clarity when
he writes:
Beliefs about human nature are central to the development of theories of
public administration, as well as to all other social science. In order to provide
the foundation for developing and integrating epistemology with a descriptive
and normative theory, these beliefs should be ontologically grounded rather
than selected for reason of convenience, (p. 25)
The important question to ask at this point is whether public administration
theorists have met the ontological and epistemological challenge of creating such
descriptive and normative theories. It should not be assumed that such theorists have
been operating without anthropological theories. They have, as will become clear in
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chapter 3. The question is whether theorists have been explicit in naming and
defending their operational anthropological theory.
In 1949, Stephen Bailey noticed and lamented that public administration
theorists had not done the necessary ontological reflecting but could actually learn to
do so from a variety of non-scholarly pursuits:
Whether we care to admit it or not, many novelists, poets, and playwrights,
some painters and musicians, and even a few literary critics have a far deeper
insight into political man, or more accurately into man in a political or
administrative context, than all but a thimbleful of political scientists and
public administration experts, (p. 51)
Bailey’s comment comes in the midst of a review of a novel in Public Administration
Review. He further opines, “It may be that the time has come when we in political
science could with advantage spend fewer hours reading the annual report of the CAB
and more hours reading Homer and Tolstoy” (p. 51). He concludes by calling his
colleagues and students to read the book he is reviewing, a novel entitled An Affair of
the Heart:
It is hoped that many students of political science will read the book and read
it carefully. Until we in political science are able to bring to our research
something of the sensitivity of the novelist, the poet, or the playwright, and are
able to apply our science to encompass the product of that sensitivity, we must
talk humbly about the adequacy of our theory. Until that great day comes, we
can learn a lot about ‘human nature in administration’ and ‘the differentiated
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continuum of policy’ from our artistic and literary colleagues. They have
more of ultimate truth by the tail than have we. (p. 53)
Have public administration theorists ignored the question of the nature of the
human person altogether? Not entirely. The most common approach has been to
uncritically borrow anthropologies operative in other disciplines. According to
Ostrom (1973), this has meant the development of a “science of administration
informed by a theory of bureaucracy, a political science informed by a theory of the
state, and an economics informed by a theory of the market” (p. xvii). It is important
to note that each theory of bureaucracy, politics, and economics has its own theory of
the nature of the human person.
For example, in economics, the Marxist theory of economics considers human
beings primarily from a materialistic perspective set within a social context. As Karl
Marx wrote, “the real nature of man is the totality of social relations” (as quoted in
Stevenson, 1987, p. 4). A proponent of the free market system is more likely to view
the human person primarily as a rational individual, motivated by self-interest.
Clearly, administrative theories based on such divergent conceptions of the human
person are going to vastly differ. Before either system can be adopted by the field of
public administration, their competing anthropological perspectives must be
considered and subjected to criticism.
A public administration theory that borrows heavily from Max Weber’s work
is going to conceive of bureaucracy as the solution to many of the problems of
modem society. Society’s problems are caused by disorder and will be solved by
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order. Public administration theorists will emphasize clarity in lines of authority and
communication up and down the chain of command. What matters is that everyone
knows their place. The key to effectiveness is knowing which task belongs to which
person or category of persons. As government grows, bureaucracy expands.
Normative questions about how persons fit into such a structure or whether or not
such a structure reflects the nature of the people involved are not actually considered
important. What matters is how the machine fits together, with each part doing its
proper role. But what if this is not the way humans work best together? What if
some people need more than what being a part of an extensive bureaucracy can offer?
Caldwell (1980) wonders if the “apparent human tendency to develop large,
impersonal, centralized bureaucracies to cope with social needs could be a
monumental error compounded by man’s understanding of his innate needs and
limitations” (p. 2).
Public administrative theory which holds efficiency and effectiveness as its
primary objectives tend to be built on a cost-benefit analysis structure in which the
humanness of the system or whether or not it contributes to human dignity are lesser
considerations. The nature and makeup of the human persons in the system does not
much matter. The focus is primarily on the creation of and meeting established and
clear goals and objectives in the quickest and most cost-effective manner possible.
Administration, then, becomes a matter of numbers, record-keeping, and
productivity. While perhaps at first attractive because of its orderliness, something is
missing in such a system. As Lynton Caldwell (1980) writes, “Once empirically
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testable methodology replaces moral philosophy as the basis for ascertaining the
propriety of social behavior and political action, the old metes and bounds of
constitutional order become questionable” (p. 5). Matters of legality, ethics, and a
basic sense of common good and common evil are pushed to the side. What is being
done does not matter as much as whether it is being done with efficiency and
effectiveness. Those who refer to people whose focus is said to be rearranging the
deck chairs on the Titanic are expressing exactly this concern—that while orderliness
matters, it is not the chief human good and, in some instances, a waste of time and
resources.
Caldwell believes that this bureaucratic approach is the cause of much of the
frustration with and within public administration. He asks:
Why do so many people regard the problem-solving record of modem
government to be impressive for its failures? And why have historical
bureaucracies, intended to strengthen social planning and control, so often
become obstructive burdens to social vitality, swelling to inordinate size
during the declining years of political systems? Does recourse to bureaucratic
government follow from a misreading of human nature and the conditions
conducive to human cooperation? (p. 1)
Caldwell believes that it does. Francis Neumann (1996) takes the argument
further. The focus on bureaucracy is more than a failure to bring about good results.
It is more than simply bad structure. Driving deeper, Neumann asks if “the greatest
questions that can be found within the field of public management concern the
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efficiency and effectiveness of the delivery system, what does that say about the
character of the field?” (p. 411).
In answering his own question, Neumann asserts that this is indeed the core of
the problem in public administration theory. He wants to get to the “real big
questions” (p. 411). His conclusion, though, still does not get to the core of the issue.
He gets very close but stops a level or two below where he needs to be. He does not
ask about the nature of the human person. Rather, he focuses on the nature of
organizations and asks questions about how such organizations relate to their
environment and what it means to manage a public organization. The assumption is
that persons operate primarily within organizations and no thought is directed to how
they might operate prior to or apart from them or even whether his organizational
human might be merely one side of a more complex reality that is the human person.
The result of such adoptive strategies for public administration theorists is that
the anthropological assumptions built into the bureaucratic, government, and
economic theoretical choices have not been examined with a critical eye. Such
bedrock philosophical and epistemological assumptions have a powerful, albeit
unexamined, influence on the conclusions drawn by theorists who adopt them. As
Simon (1973) states, “There is nothing about social and human phenomena that
permits us to devise and test social designs without the corresponding foundation of
descriptive knowledge about human and social behavior” (p. 351). To take his
comment one step further, it is also necessary to devise and test various descriptions
of human behavior which serve as the foundations for social design, for as Mieczylaw
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Krapiec (1983) writes, “The structure of the community must correspond to the
structure of man” (p. 260). Without a theory of the human person, it is impossible to
discuss what is the good for human beings, leaving public administration subject to a
host of temporary pressures.
William Scott and David Hart (1973) do not believe better processes will
bring about greater efficiencies. Rather, Scott and Hart submit that the central issue is
a lack of philosophical reflection on the “innate moral nature of man” (p. 416). Their
observation is,
made on the grounds that: (1) an administrative elite performs the functions of
leadership in advanced societies, and (2) this elite subscribes to a metaphysic
that influences its decision and its behavior in the management of technology
in complex organizations, but (3) this administrative metaphysic is
unarticulated, and, therefore, is unexamined. This, the crisis in administration,
is the neglect of metaphysical speculation, (p. 416)
Why has such metaphysical speculation been neglected despite its centrality to
the endeavor of public administration? The authors list two reasons. First,
administrators primarily concern themselves with “matters of expediency” (p. 416).
Second, they are far more comfortable with paradigms built on “technical and
economic rationality” (p. 416). Public administrators do not want to be evaluated by
any other criteria, especially that which is metaphysical in nature because such an
approach “is condemned as a wasteful excursion into mysticism” (p. 417).
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In an age where numbers too often tell the story and quantitative is generally
believed to be superior to qualitative, it is little wonder that public administrative
theorists default to considerations of effectiveness and efficiencies, especially when
those who hold elected political office are primarily concerned about results and
getting the most for the taxpayer’s money or for their own political careers. In the
relatively closed loop of developing governmental annual budgets, congressional
hearings, incrementalism, pork barrel spending, set-asides, log-rolling, blame-shifting
in the extreme sport of bipartisan politics, it is too much to ask that those who
practice public administration also be those who theorize about it. The theorists must
lead. Lest the pragmatic tendency to focus only on results and ignore theory presents
too great a temptation, it is important to remember that Karl Marx’s writings were
mostly produced in near isolation in a London library and are still largely unread by
proponents and opponents alike. And yet, they have had profound influence on the
shape and form of human existence around the world for more than 100 years.
Despite this unwillingness or unease in asking the big questions, Scott and
Hart believe that “administrative theorists have an image of man’s moral nature.
Imbedded in their writings are moral assumptions which are seldom recognized by
them as the foundations of theory and practice” and yet influence “every one of his
prescriptions for organizational design, managerial style, and social goals” (p. 418).
In other words, formative and primary perspectives on human nature are part and
parcel of every theorist. And yet, despite the strength of the view held and their
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influence on the development of theory, these perspectives are simply accepted as fact
without investigation or even the acknowledgement of their existence.

Difficulties in Anthropological Clarity

Scott and Hart might have added a third cause of the unwillingness of theorists
to address the metaphysical questions about the nature of the human person in public
administrative theory: such speculation is difficult. It is cumulative and not solved
once and for all. It is a body of knowledge that grows, goes in strange directions, and
directly touches on who and what human beings were, are, and are becoming. Getting
the answer “right” isn’t necessarily the goal. As the quote from Sophocles makes
clear at the beginning of this section, human beings are wondrous things. Wondrous
things are not quickly or easily understood, for if they were, the wonder would cease.
Francis Neumann (1996) points out that “among scientific disciplines the big
questions are never really completely answered. The big questions, by their very
nature, are multifaceted and extend into dimensions of which we are never fully
cognizant at any one time” (p. 412). Few public administration theorists are trained in
metaphysics or philosophy in general. Their concern is more often for the betterment
of society or addressing a particular social need or phenomenon. Why spend time
speculating about the nature of the person in poverty when in reality what is needed is
some kind of poverty alleviation program? On the surface, this certainly seems both
rational and humane. But beneath the surface are operating a myriad of assumptions
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about the person in poverty, the person who wants to help, what kind of program
would be most likely to help, and the most appropriate person or level of society to
provide assistance. Without examination, such programs can and sometimes do have
a series of unintended consequences which result in the impoverishment of another or
in deepening poverty for the person of first concern. It is these unexamined
anthropological assumptions that most often bring about consequences that few
consider when putting in place a new program.
The difficulty of clarifying anthropological assumptions is compounded by the
fact that there will likely be competing sets of assumptions that, in many cases, will
be diametrically opposed to one another. Michael Novak (1991) points out that
theorists:
must deal with humans as they are. Yet remarkably different hypotheses are
entertained about human beings. Who are we? What may we hope? What
ought we to do? These, Immanuel Kant suggests, are the perennial questions
behind political economy. Every system . . . represents at least an implicit
answer to them. Each system allows only so much scope to individuals. Each
favors some instinct in the human breast and penalizes others. Each embodies
a conviction about the most dangerous evils, which need to be watched or
carefully repressed, (p. 82)
Anthropological assumptions, so formative in public administration theories,
assert different sets of operational beliefs about the nature of the human person.
Consensus is not likely. In some sense, the project of attempting to express and
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discuss such perspectives seems inherently dangerous. It means moving past
speculation about what public administrators do. It moves into the realm speculating
about what public administrators and, more generally, the public itself actually are.
No longer is the question merely “What can be done?” or “How can what is being
done be accomplished with greater efficiency and effectiveness?” The question
becomes “What ought we do?” What is consistent with the nature of the human
person?
As Stevenson (1987) points out, such questions are difficult because their
answers “assert something about the nature of all men, at any time and in any place.
And these world views claim not only assent but also action; if one really believes in
a theory, one must accept that it has implications for one’s way of life” (p. 7). Are
theorists comfortable with making their assumptions about human beings explicit? If
anthropological assumptions are taken to their logical conclusions, will the results be
embarrassing or barbaric or too idealistic? Such questions are not easily answered.
Nevertheless, public administrative theorists must be clear about what they believe to
be true about what they perceive about reality because, as Rutgers (1995) points out,
“there is no value-free, objective perception of reality that is at the basis of our
knowledge” (p. 68).
The task is daunting and what follows is merely a first attempt to create a
framework for evaluation. It is not intended to create new anthropological categories.
This project is less ambitious and only seeks to name what already has been and
provide one possible means of comparing past, current, and potential future theories
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of administration. It does not attempt to cover every potential human trait but instead
considers only two: the classical virtues of prudence and justice.
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CHAPTER D

CREATING AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

“An intellectual construct is like a pair o f spectacles. We see and order events in the
world by looking through our spectacles and by using intellectual constructs to form
pictures in our mind’s ‘eye’—an intellectual vision. We are apt to neglect a critical
examination o f the spectacles or the constructs themselves.” Vincent Ostrom
“Poor man wanna be rich,
Rich man wanna be king
And the king ain’t satisfied
Until he rules everything”
Bruce Springsteen

Narrowing the Anthropological Focus
Philosophical anthropology is a broad category. For the purposes of this
project, the focus is narrowed and a number of issues inherent to the general field will
not be considered. This project will focus neither on the origin nor on the telos of
human beings. It will not include any attempt to define human happiness or where
human beings fit into the broader scope of life or non-life on this planet or anywhere
else. It will not consider the ontological makeup of human beings or questions on the
existence of the soul.
This project will focus on how theorists believe human beings function as
individuals and in social settings on the scales of the classically defined virtues of

prudence and justice. The questions addressed will be those pertaining to human
nature and its tendencies. Such matters are naturally tied to theories of society and
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governance as well as to human capabilities and inclinations. To address such
questions, it is important that the operating assumptions be made clear at the
beginning. The basic approach will be that of Aristotle which asserts that human
beings have the capacity to make choices and that they have the ability to consider
both the options available to them and the consequences of their choices prior to the
act of choosing. Aristotle assumes that each human person chooses and acts for what
that person believes to be good. It is assumed that no one chooses evil because it is
evil, with the possible exception of persons who might qualify as sociopaths.
Furthermore, it will be assumed that the exercise of the will depends on a
knowledge of the good in the concrete and the possession of a character that permits
the consistent pursuit of the good. The framework will be built on the concepts of the
virtues of prudence, defined as the recognition of the good and the development of
methods for achieving it, and justice, defined as the decision to pursue the good as it
is identified by prudence. These two scales will provide the overarching structure on
which key components of anthropological assumptions are identified and will be
further defined below.
One further factor will be considered. The framework will attempt to judge
whether a particular public administration theorist is consistent in the application of
the virtues of prudence and justice. Campbell (1981) is helpful in pointing out that a
“theory must not contradict itself by asserting or denying in one place what it denies
or asserts in another” (p. 45) The goal is to determine if theorists believe that their
assumptions are operational for everyone or if different sets of people fall along
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different places on the continuum. More specifically, a public administration theorist
might assume that the public, in general, is neither prudent nor just, leading to
particular ways of structuring society through government intervention. However, the
same theorist might assume that within the field of public administration, people are
generally both prudent and just. This will lead to one approach for those who are
served by public administrators and a completely different approach to those who
work as public administrators.
It must be acknowledged that when the scales are further developed and
applied to specific theorists, complete categorization will not typical. It is more likely
that theorists will tend toward one quadrant or another. It is also important to note
that some theorists will have a stronger, more developed, or more readily apparent
anthropology than other theorists. The goal is not to address which theorist has the
right anthropology. Rather, the goal is to provide a functional scale that can be used
to compare the operational anthropology of one theorist to that of another within the
narrow categories of prudence and justice.
Creating a Framework

The Prudence/Imprudence Scale

Aristotle defines prudence (phronesis) as follows:
Those whom we call prudent deliberate well about what is good and
advantageous to themselves and about life as a whole. One doesn't deliberate
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about things which are unchanging or which are not in one's power to do___

Prudence is a disposition with true reason and ability for actions concerning
human goods.. . . Practical wisdom or prudence is a true disposition toward
action, by the aid of a right rule with regard to things good and bad for men
(i.e., it is the power of right deliberation about things good for oneself).
Practical wisdom is the quality of seeing what is good for oneself, or one's
group in regard to any question, but it is not concerned with how particular
things are made or how particular states, like health or strength, are produced,
for these are among the objects of art.. . . In its particular manifestations,
practical wisdom is the dominant element in such disciplines as political
science, economics and household management, physical training, etc. (trans.
by Oswald, 1962, Book 6, Section 5)
What, then, is imprudence? It is the opposite of prudence. It lacks
reason and deliberation, thinking little about either the options available or the
possible consequences to others. It is shortsightedness. It has no concern for others or
obligations one might bear toward them. It does not take into consideration the
common good. Imprudence does not spend time reflecting about whether something
better might exist or be worth working toward. It is choosing a course of action based
on emotion and passion that has not subjected to the constraints of reason.
For human beings to be prudent, according to Aristotle, they must have
reason. The exercise of phronesis involves choice-making, “analysis of particulars in
determining the best response to each specific situation,” takes “into account the
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wholeness of human nature” and addresses “matters of the public good” (Hariman,
2003, p. 3). None of these are possible without the ability to be reasonable.
Rationality, according to Mieczylaw Krapiec (1983), is the ability to know, to
choose, to form thoughts and concepts, and to make judgments (p. 32). Irrationality,
then, is a lack of the ability to know, to form thoughts and concepts, and to make
judgments. The first question germane to this project is whether prudence is a
common trait among human beings with a few exceptions or whether imprudence is
to be generally assumed among human beings with a few exceptions.
Reason is required to reflect on current conditions, draw the conclusion that
something better exists, and devise a plan to bring into reality what is determined to
be better than current conditions. Of course, there will be differences of opinion as to
what is “better” and for whom:
Prudence is the mode of reasoning about contingent matters in order to select
the best course of action. Contingent events cannot be known with certainty,
and actions are intelligible only with regard to some idea of what is good. As
both such matters are always subject to dispute, they can be resolved rationally
only through deliberation—that is, through reciprocal exposition, comparison,
and evaluation of arguments that represent competing perspectives or
purposes. (Hariman, 2003, p. 4)
Much in recent public administrative theory has narrowed the definition of
rationality and, in doing so, has severely limited the percentage of people who can be
said to be truly rational and, therefore, prudent. As Adams (1992) points out, “Our
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culture of modernity has as one of its chief constitutes technical rationality, Technical
rationality is a way of thinking and living that emphasizes the scientific-analytical
mindset and the belief in technological progress” (p. 63).
Hariman (2003) points out the two sides of this development. The benefit has
been increased efficiency and effectiveness:
Whether known as Fordism, Taylorism, modernism, bureaucratization, or any
of several other labels, modem social engineering has long been recognized to
be a boon to human life, capable of large-scale disasters, and unstoppable.
Through the application of modem scientific rationality to the management of
all material and human resources, both governmental and corporate
organizations have achieved exponential increases in productivity and
comprehensive investment within all areas of human life. From water to labor,
industry to agriculture, architecture to urban design, and through every
practice subject to accounting procedures, mapping, zoning, and a host of
related technologies, the public space and common resources that once were
the domain of politics have been remade in the image of a rational world, (p.
7)
The negative side is what such a conception does to the understanding of the
place and purpose of human beings. The approach that emphasizes efficiency and
effectiveness:
defines political actors as self-interested power maximizers, constrained by_
their resources for effective action to that end and regulated by their
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perceptions of others’ capacity to affect them in return. Political analysis
consists in assessing all of the means for action according to calculations of
gain and risk. By giving priority to material and especially coercive
capabilities, and being suspicious of verbal statements, one can objectively
determine the best possible course of action for survival in a world of force
and fraud. (Hariman, p. 9)
There is no consideration of what is a good life and what is not.
Logical positivism—or what Frederickson and Smith (2003) call the
behavioral position—has become the order of the day. While technical rationality and
the scientific or behavioral method are useful, this approach elevates one form of
reason and disregards “intuitive guesses, judgment, and wisdom” (p. 9). Michael
Spicer (1997) provides a useful overview of the role of logical positivism which:
has manifested itself in a variety of ways including an emphasis on behavioral
social science in the 1950s and 1960s. This was followed by an emphasis on
policy analysis, cost-benefit analysis, management science, and systems
analysis in the 1960s and 1970s. While this faith in the development of an
empirical science of public administration is perhaps somewhat diminished
nowadays, it remains an important element in the thinking of mainstream
public administration. Its strength in the field, for example, is evidenced by
repeated calls over the past decade or so for more rigorous empirical and
quantitative research in public administration, (p. 19)
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In this limited way of thinking about rationality:
All managerial tools assume the objective nature of organizational reality; in
other words, there is an underlying belief that human situations can be
explained and predicted through the application of the concepts and
procedures of a technical and functional framework. Individuals’ subjective
ideas are supposed to be related to the functional requirements of a model or
theory. Anything that does not fit into this objective framework tends to be
ignored. (Jun and Gross, 1996, p. 112)
Such thinking leads to a firm belief in technical rationality done primarily by
specialists who have observed, quantified, tested, and submitted their findings to their
fellow specialists for review, using a language not accessible or comprehensible to
most people outside their field. The ability to reason gained from experience,
background, novels, art, or familial training have no place at the table. Because such
groundings for rationality are dismissed as invalid for determining policy and its
application, the gulf between public administration specialists and the populations
they serve is wide.
Spicer (1997) points to the influence of Hume on the thinking of Herbert
Simon as an example:
Humean ideas have . . . had an impact on public administration writing.
Particularly important here is the work of Herbert Simon because of his role in
advancing logical positivism in public administration and the social sciences.
Simon strongly embraced the positivist idea that the only meaningful scientific
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statements about the world are ‘statements about the observable world and the

way in which it operates, (p. 241)
“Drawing on logical positivism,” writes Spicer, “Simon and others
strengthened the belief among many that public administration could and would
become a true science by following empiricist principles” (p. 243).
If rationality is narrowed to technical rationality, then prudence is limited to a
handful of experts who understand and practice the scientific method. Recognizing
the good can be achieved only by those who can apply the scientific method. Of
course, this means that those who are unfamiliar with or untrained in the application
of the scientific method are not capable of prudence because of their irrationality.
They will not recognize what the good and, therefore, will not be able to choose it.
There are at least two ways of considering irrationality. The first is that of
theorists like Hart (1972) who points out:
Study after study has demonstrated that the common man is not the rational,
self-motivating, and thoughtful democrat of the Jeffersonian dream. Rather,
the picture that emerges is of a lethargic, irrational, and prejudiced individual
who neither understands nor is particularly committed to democratic
principles, (p. 610)
There is some irony in the fact that Hart cites studies, and not experience, to
demonstrate the point that people generally lack the ability to act in a reasonable
fashion.
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The second is a less negative understanding of human nature that accounts for
emotion and passion. Akhlaque Haque (1997) uses as an example the thinking of
Edmund Burke:
He distrusted reason because he believed human nature, tradition and received
values, as part of “natural order” are always a better guide to practical action.
He understood that human beings are not purely rational creatures, and that
their passions, instincts and prejudices always play a vital role in their
reasonable action. Therefore, for all practical purposes using pure reason to
understand social and human behavior would be inappropriate and misleading.
Burke noted that, ‘politics ought to be adjusted, not to human reasonings, but
to human nature: of which the reason is but a part, and by no means the
greatest part.’ Burke, therefore, believed that human reason is inherently
limited and the possibility of error and uncertainty should always be in the
minds of a prudent observer, (p. 258)
It is exactly this dichotomy between rationality and irrationality that
introduces inconsistency into the understanding of human nature and capability. Such
an approach creates a situation in which those in public administration are the only
ones capable of rational choice because they are the only ones capable of putting their
assumptions in scientifically acceptable language, developing models, gathering data,
testing the model, and reporting their results. In this sense, the public has one kind of
human nature (irrational and, therefore, operating with false prudence because of a
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lack of technical rationality) while public administrators themselves have another
(rational, and, therefore, prudent through technical rationality).
Barry Karl (1977) believes that this has led to the development of a elitism or
classism which did not serve American society well in the twentieth century. He
attributed the genesis of elitism to Woodrow Wilson and “his generation of
Progressive leaders” who “ were trying to create a British-like, upper-middle class
elite, to put themselves in control of it, and to co-opt others into it as a means of
stabilizing the wildly growing American society of the late nineteenth century” (p. 29)
Karl believes this led to a confrontation between the proponents of what he calls
“class leadership” and those he refers to as advocates of “mass democracy” (p. 28).
Prudence, according to Aristotle, is not merely self-interested in that it
reasonably considers only what is best for the individual doing the considering. His
definition is explicit that “life as a whole” must be a part of the deliberating process in
prudence and that what is good for “one’s group” must be measured as much as what
is good for one’s self
Hariman (2003) agrees in his description of prudence classically defined:
“prudence is the determination of what is good for both the individual and others” (p.
2). Prudence is not merely mulling over the needs of the self, but also weighing the
obligations the person has toward others: “Prudence represents the ideal of the
individual and the society advancing together rather than at the expense of each other”
(p. 8).
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It will also be important to watch for language in theorists that indicate
another variation. It may be that some theorists believe the public in general is neither
prudent nor foolish. Prudence, in this way of thinking, is gained through education,
specialization, and the application of the scientific method to decisions and choices
that will be made among public administrators. While not denigrating the public by
holding it in general as foolish, this version still retains a limited role of the public in
decision-making, at least until they are better informed and educated.
Before considering the nature of justice and then beginning to map out the
available options for how prudence and justice might be used to access and then
evaluate the operative philosophical anthropology in some of the leading public
administrative theorists, it should be admitted that the consideration of prudence in
the field, both as it operates in the general public and among public administrators
specifically, will not be easy. As Hariman points out:
If willing to consider prudence, moreover, we have to grant that it immediately
runs afoul of basic criteria of modem rationality: prudence antedates the factvalue distinction; it is difficult to quantify; it is largely retrospective; it is
necessarily parochial; it is prescriptive; it is too general; it focuses too much
on individual personality; it can be a stalking horse for political advocacy, (p.
6)
There is some truth in this. Measuring prudence is not a simple task. It does
not acclimate itself easily to pie charts or bar graphs. Those accustomed to and
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comfortable with seeing the world through quantitative eyes might find the exercise to
be the cause of some degree of discomfort. Hariman explains why:
There is no cogito, no controlled experiment, no phenomenological method,
no falsification rule. Worse yet, there is no hierarchy of decision rules.
Contrary to the rational organization of a philosophical investigation or
scientific research program, prudential knowledge is organized more in the
manner of a crossword puzzle: one may begin at any point, will work with a
hodgepodge of deeply enculturated cues, will have to integrate both formal
constraints and factual knowledge from an enormous social field, and should
know when to quit. (p. 11)
Because something causes discomfort or does not fit into what is broadly
considered to be the normal realm of public administrative theory, however, does not
necessarily mean it should be ignored. It is important to recall the comments of some
public administrative theorists who see a gap that has yet to be filled. Storing decries
the lack of comprehensive statements relating to the underlying principles of public
administration. Stillman refers to the exercise of theorizing about public
administration as a continual trek in the wilderness. Hart bemoans both the
fragmented assumptions of public administrative theory as well as the absence of
metaphysical speculation that occurs within it. Ostrom speaks of an intellectual crisis.
Perhaps the place to begin to address the crisis and find the way in the wilderness is to
focus on the metaphysical speculation as to the nature of the human person, prudence,
and justice.
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The Just/Uniust Scale

The key question for the just/unjust scale is not one of knowledge but rather
one of volition. Knowing the good, will most people commit themselves to doing it?
Aristotle’s definition is helpful: ‘The commonly accepted opinion with respect to
justice is that it is a disposition to be just, to do what is just, and to wish what is just”
(trans. by Oswald, 1962, Book 5, Section 1).
Although prudence, as mentioned above, begins to consider the matter of
others and social responsibility, it is justice where such consideration finds its natural
home. As Aquinas (trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 1947) wrote:
Now the proper matter of justice consists of those things that belong to our
intercourse with other men.. . . Hence the act of justice in relation to its proper
matter and object is indicated in the words, “Rendering to each one his right,’
since, as Isidore says, ‘a man is said to be just because he respects the rights
[jus] of others.” (Second Part of the Second Part, Question 58, Article 1)
Because of the social concerns of justice, it is a natural area of inquiry for
those committed to theorizing about public administration. How does the individual
relate to the whole? How does the whole relate to the individual? Who will
adjudicate in the inevitable conflicts between the individual’s demand and the
requirements of the whole? Whose concern is first? Is neutrality to be assumed on
the part of the adjudicator or could it be that even those who adjudicate must deal
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with the demands of their own self-interest versus the obligations they bear to others
and their society? All of these are important questions that pertain to justice.
What, then, is a view of the human person who posits that most or all persons
are unjust? It is the opposite of justice. It is thinking, acting and living only for self
(and perhaps a small circle of family members or friends). It lacks an eye for or an
interest in seeing the rights, claims, and needs of others. To those who hold an
anthropological perspective that emphasizes injustice, human beings are generally
irresponsible. Even if such a thing as “the common good” existed, it would not hold
much sway over individuals for, as Campbell (1981) points out, in this way of
thinking, “only individuals matter: the interests, wishes, and happiness of individuals
are what count in the determination of moral and political priorities” (p. 37).
Most theorists who lean into this camp, as will be seen, do not actually assert
that all human beings are unjust. If this were the case, it would make an argument in
favor of no government because it would be better to give no one power over another.
Rather, in this way of thinking, only the vast majority are unjust. There are a small
number of people who are just and must infuse justice into social systems. Hume’s
comment on lawful government is a solid example: “When we [philosophers] assert
that all lawful government arises from the consent of the people, we certainly do them
a great deal more honour than they deserve, or even expect and desire from us” (p.
478). Who is the “us” and who is the “they”?
McGregor’s Theory X person (Hill, 1997) is also illuminating. According to
those who hold such views:
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1. The average human being has an inherent dislike of work and will avoid it
if he can;
2. Because of this human tendency characteristic of dislike of work, most
people must be coerced, controlled, directed, threatened with punishment to
get them to put forth the adequate effort toward the achievement of
organizational objectives;
3. The average human being prefers to be directed, wishes to avoid
responsibility, has relatively little ambition, wants security above all;
4. In its basic conceptions of managing human resources . . . management
appears to have concluded that the average human being in permanently
arrested in his development in early adolescence, (pp. 34-35)
Even if people appear to be just—that is, concerned about what is good with
an eye for others—it is only a cover for their real intentions. What appears to be
cooperation is actually coercion. Manipulation, not justice, instructs individuals as to
how they live in society. There is power, will, and competition. All else is just an
illusion. In this Darwinian perspective, “cooperation is merely a way of maximizing
value as alliances and coalitions form to defeat environmental forces” (Campbell,
1981, p. 38). Dennard (1996) is even more colorful in her description: “from a
Darwinian perspective, we might see life in the jungle [bureaucratic or otherwise] as
‘red in tooth and claw’ as Tennyson did. Creatures devour each other; not everything
survives” (p. 497).
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Is human nature naturally inclined to know what is good (prudence) and then
to do what is good (justice)? The implications for public administration are practical
and profound as the possible combinations of prudence and justice demonstrate.

Possible Combinations
High Prudence/High Justice
In practical terms, where a public administrative theorist believes most people
fall on the continuum of prudent/foolish and just/unjust will have a profound
influence on the kinds of policies and practices developed. If theorists assume people
are generally prudent and just, then government and public administration specifically
will prescribe filling in any holes in knowledge or justice that might exist in a society
because of limited imperfections.
In this conception, the role of public administrators within their organization
and in their relationships with the public will be generally limited. It might involve
itself with raising up people who have both of these virtues through public education
or other means. It might also become involved in protecting the public from a small
minority of people who will not acknowledge what is prudent or, despite the
knowledge, choose what is not good. The role of government in general and public
administrators specifically might be to gather the people of communities together to
frame issues and make decisions. Citizen participation would be the mantra and
would determine both the goals to be set and the means to achieve them.
Communication would be multi-directional and open. Those making decisions would
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be more like facilitators than decision-makers. Sticks and carrots would be rarely
used because most human beings know the good and do it, motivated more by their
morals than by materialism.
Gordon Clapp serves as an example. He began working in the Tennessee
Valley Authority (TVA) as an office boy and was eventually named chair by the
United States Senate in 1946. Harry Case (1964) describes him as follows:
In short, Clapp respected the other fellow; he expected the other fellow to
know why he was there and what he was doing there, and he expected him to
behave responsibly, intelligently and energetically. This in itself is almost an
entire theory of administration. He himself was confident that this was based
on sound assumptions about human nature: ‘The message is this: a high level
of performance in the public service requires an administrative environment
where courage, honesty, and dignity are assumed to be the common rule . . .
and where a tough and persistent faith in one’s fellow men will survive the
consequences of mistakes, disputes, and even the perfidies of the occasional
renegade or the cheap tasteless character.’ (p. 88)
Clapp’s optimism in the people with whom he worked is seen in his
understanding of his role as chairman, which was “freeing the people in an
organization to do the job of which of they are capable: to create the conditions
which encourage the employees to grow and develop” (p. 89). He believed, according
to Case:
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Too many experts see human beings as units of energy to be manipulated by
devious means or enticed by extrinsic favors and rewards. Successful
administration carefully prepares the site quietly, without ceremony puts the
key foundation stones in place—a faith in the feasibility of the enterprise and a
faith in one’s associates—and builds upon it an organization held together in a
framework with ample tolerances for individual difference, growth, and
dignity, (p. 91)
Did Gordon Clapp believe that human beings tend toward both prudence and
justice? It is clear that he did believe that, at least, about those with whom he worked.
It is not known what he might have thought of the people who actually lived in the
Tennessee Valley, but it is possible that he could have had a radically different
opinion of them.
David Hart (1972), in describing those calling for more citizen participation,
wrote that they did so from a specific anthropological perspective in which the citizen
is:
capable of handling all of the requirements; he will invariably participate
when given the opportunity; he receives his greatest satisfactions from
participation; he and his fellow participants will arrive at a consensus in the
resolution of policy matters; and, most important, he understands that his full
human potential can only be realized through participation, (p. 604)
In fact, says Stephen Bailey, “Because of the ultimate capacity of American
citizens to make wise, fundamental value choices, attempts to induce them into
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making superficial technical choices are ill-advised” (as quoted in Frederickson,
1982, p. 503). An operational anthropology that holds to a theory that human beings
are neither generally prudent nor just will backfire.
At the core of this anthropological perspective, write Roy Kaplan and Curt
Tausky (1977), “is the belief that man is basically good, infinitely malleable, and
capable of perfectibility, and therefore organizational goals and individual interests
should be compatible. Humanist approaches stress the importance of developing
meaningful work routines which afford workers an opportunity for decision making”
(p. 171).
McGregor’s Theory Y human being is most descriptive of this approach. The
following assumptions are made about most people:
1. The expenditure of physical and mental effort in work is as natural as play
or rest;
2. External control and the threat of punishment are not the only means for
bringing about effort toward organizational objectives. Man will exercise
self-direction and self-control in the service of objectives to which he is
committed;
3. Commitment to objectives is a function of the rewards associated with their
achievement;
4. The average human being learns, under proper conditions, not only to
accept but to seek responsibility;
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5. The capacity to exercise a relatively high degree of imagination, ingenuity
and creativity is widely, not narrowly, distributed in the population;
6. Under the conditions of modem industrial life, the intellectual potentialities
of the average human being are only partially utilized. (Hill, 1997, pp. 47-48)
According to Hayek, at the base of such a perspective is “the respect for the
individual man qua man, that is, the recognition of his own views and tastes as
supreme in his own sphere, however narrowly that may be circumscribed, and the
belief that it is desirable that men should develop their own individual gifts and
bents” (p. 17). In this construct, conflict is “only a surface matter” (Campbell, 1981,
p. 39). The reality is that there are large areas of agreement or consensus “on basic
values and the prime models of social organization” (p. 39).
Order, rather than being imposed on society, occurs with little planning by a
centralized and empowered body. It occurs as a result of individuals who exercise
their reason to both know and do what is prudent and just. Fragmentation is not the
natural order of things. Instead, wholeness and interrelatedness are the normal for, as
Dennard (1996) writes, “social interdependence exists before interests, goals, and
even thought” (p. 496). This is an interesting comment regarding thought because it
makes unnecessary the exercise of reason within determining what is prudent and
what is just. Such things are simply known as they are part and parcel of human
nature. No rational process is required for its genesis.
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If such assumptions are true, the exercise of authority and especially coercion
are unnecessary most of the time. Human beings are naturally entrepreneurial and
will provide for themselves and for others:
Public administrators must learn to support democracy as it occurs rather than
planning for it as something that might occur once conditions have been
perfected. Self-organization . . . implies that change is easier than
administrators have been trained to believe. Perhaps classical management
theory, concerned as it is with imposing order instead of discovering it in
relationships, has always bucked the natural system in this way. (Dennard,
1996, p. 500)
What is needed is participatory decision-making and only when decisions need
to be made at a group or community level. It should be possible and even likely that
individual interests and organizational goals be compatible and complimentary. This
would be the norm. Incompatibility would be abnormality with causation usually laid
at the feet of the organization rather than the individual.
David Hart (1972), in discussing participatory democracy, writes:
Implicit in the assumption that through full citizen participation a universal
sense of commonality will be discovered, which will (1) cause all men to view
one another as brothers, and (2) be the source of all laws and organizations.
This will, of course, eliminate conflict, for when citizens disagree they can
look inward to that common core and will know what they ought to do. (p.
613)
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If conflict does exist, the problem is not to be found in some general fault
common among human beings. Instead, “conflict is unnatural and indicates
institutional illnesses” rather than anthropological ones (Scott, 1983, p. 187). While
the source of such altruism is not the primary focus, Hal Rainey and Paula Steinbauer
(1999) attribute it to the evolutionary process which has “fostered in human beings
motives and attitudes conducive to communal and collective behavior, including trust,
reciprocity, and identification with organizations” (p. 24).
Community and society, then, are not restraining forces where coercive
powers are collected to hold back the natural false prudence and injustice that would
occur without them. Instead, community becomes that “which will enable not only
the creation of objective values that surpass the potentiality of particular individuals,
but also is a guarantee of an internal, personal development of particular individuals”
(Krapiec, 1983, p. 244). It is “a gathering, a bond of categorical relations, binding
human persons so that they can develop, in the most possible, comprehensive manner,
the dynamism of their personality for the purpose of fulfilling the common good of
every human person” (p. 251). Without community, “man would not be able to
develop his personal potentialities” (p. 330).
Some historical evaluation is useful. The bloodiest century in modem times
has only recently ended, threatening some of the optimism inherent in the high,
prudence/high justice scale. Technological knowledge and expertise were employed
in a fashion that was neither prudent nor just but was, in many instances, highly
efficient and effective in its destructive ability. From Stalin’s Soviet Union to Hitler’s
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Germany, from Pol Pot’s Cambodia to racism, classism, genderism, and a host of
other social ills and destructive patterns of behavior, it can be difficult to square the
thoughts of advocates of the theory that human nature is generally prudent and just
with humanity’s most recent history.
On the other hand, according to the 1997 United Nations Human Development
report, “poverty has fallen more in the past 50 years than in the previous 500”
(Friedman, 2000, p. 350). Comparing 1960 to 1995, the progress in only 35 years is
remarkable. Globally, people were livingl6 years longer in 1995 than in 1960. It is
important to remember that it took developed countries over 100 years to accomplish
this. Infant mortality rates dropped with 90% of children being immunized against
TB, diphtheria, polio, and measles.
Prior to the Industrial Revolution, poverty was the norm for human history.
While poverty is still rampant globally, there are encouraging signs: rising literacy
levels, rising caloric intake and fat intake, better and more available health care, and a
drop in child labor rates from 20% in 1980 to 8% inl997 (Rosenberg & Birdzell Jr. as
quoted in Heath, 2003, p. 10). Furthermore:
The move from poverty to wealth is, in a social sense, an advance in material
well-being. It is not adequately captured in statistics of gross national product,
national income, or real wages. Death has always been the ultimate threat, and
the move from poverty to wealth is first of all a move away from death. Its
first indicators are statistics on life expectancy, death rates, and infant
mortality. Famine and hunger are next on the list: again the move from
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poverty to wealth is a move from famine and hunger, as indicated statistically
by a declining incidence of malnutrition and its related diseases. Plague is the
next of the ancient afflictions, and it may be taken as symbolic of all fatal or
disabling diseases; the move away from them is another move from poverty to
wealth.. . . A life of poverty is a life in which survival is the first and almost
the only order of business, in which housing is so crowded as to make privacy
unknown, and in which choices are narrowly restricted. The move to wealth is
a move toward greater possibilities of privacy and individual choice, (p. 13)
Voting and political rights have expanded in the United States and around the
world from what they were only 100 years ago. In 1975, only 8% of counties had
free-markets which allowed for private ownership and the relatively free flow of
goods and services. By 1997, that percentage had increased to 28% (Friedman, 2000,
p. 9).
To whom the destruction or the advancement of the last 100 years should be
attributed remains to be seen. Those who advocate for a high degree of prudence and
justice spread across humanity would likely argue that as freedom increased and
tyranny and central control decreased, the natural outcome was the social, medical,
and economic benefits mentioned above. They could also make the connection
between tyranny and destruction in some of the more monstrous regimes around the
world, arguing that control in the hands of a few leads to the destruction of the many.
Stephen Bailey argues that “Because of the ultimate capacity of American citizens to
make wise, fundamental value choices, attempts to induce them into making
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superficial technical choices are ill-advised” (Frederickson, 1982, p. 503). Wilcox
(1969) paints a more vivid picture of the high prudence/high justice understanding of
the individual and the organization: ‘The basic conception of this social hierarchy is
simple: Man is good. Hierarchy is evil. If man in organization is evil, hierarchy is at
the root of his devilry” (p. 54). Attempts at control are the problem and freedom is
the solution.
This paradigm both confirms and denies recent history. The question for this
project is not whether this operational anthropological perspective is the correct one.
That is for others to decide. Instead, the focus is on creating a framework regarding
the distribution of prudence and justice in human nature. The diagnosis is that there is
little in human society that needs to be administered or controlled because the natural
tendency is for people to control and administer themselves through the application of
the pmdence and justice that is inherently with them. The prescription is a minimalist
government and public administrative sector with the general population as heavily
involved in decision-making and implementation as possible. The prognosis for
human society, then, is excellent as long as control and, ultimately, tyranny is reduced
or eventually eliminated. The view of the human person, in this construct, is this:
He is capable of handling all of the requirements; he will invariably participate
when given the opportunity; he receives his greatest satisfactions from
participation; he and his fellow participants will arrive at a consensus in the
resolution of policy matters; and, most important, he understands that his full
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human potential can only be realized through participation. (Hart, 1972, p.
604)
In the graph below, the proponents of a high degree of prudence and justice
widely distributed across the human population would be in the upper right hand
quadrant.

High Prudence/High Justice

Justice
Figure 1. High Prudence/High Justice
Low Prudence/High Justice

Changing the assumptions changes the focus and role of government and

public administration. Suppose a public administration theorist believes that, in
general, human beings are just in that they tend to do the good when they know and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

57

can identify what is good and what is not good. The diagnosis of the public
administration theorist is that the moral component is not what is lacking. Rather,
what is missing is prudence or wisdom or perhaps knowledge. The prescription, then,
follows quite naturally. Sticks and carrots are not, overall, the primary means of
getting people to do what is good. However, the public tends to lack knowledge of
what is good and what is not good. To rectify this situation, public administration’s
prescription would naturally be to provide or teach information that is unattainable to
the general public. Once the public knows the good, they will do it with little
encouragement or threat.
The source of the knowledge needed to do what is good will not come from
culture or familial relationships or experience. In the past, perhaps the source of
pmdence might have been from a type of Aristotelian philosopher king. One wise
person or group of persons decided what ought to be done. In the modem era,
however, the source of pmdence has become the scientific method for public
administrative theorists. It is no longer normative reasoning that asks questions about
what ought to be done. Instead, it is instrumental reason that is more concerned with
what is most efficient and effective. As Adams (1992) points out, “Instrumental
reason is the narrow application of human reason solely in the service of instrumental
aims. Until the modem era, reason was conceived as a process incorporating ethical
and normative concerns as well as the consideration of merely instrumental aims” (p.
366). But this is no longer the case. Simon goes so far as to conclude that, “reason is
wholly instrumental. It cannot tell us where to go; at best it can tell us how to get
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there. It is a gun for hire that can be employed in the service of whatever goals we
have, good or bad” (p. 3).
In the public administrative sector, the “ought” question seems quite beside
the point and are rarely considered. It is political leaders who make the decisions
about what ought to be done through the creation of public policies with input from
its various actors. Public administration’s contribution is not to the why or what
questions. Rather, its contribution is focused on how things ought to be done. The
end is created by policy. The means is the arena of the public administrator and it is
all about instrumental reason, which White and Adams (1995) define as:
The coordination of means to ends in the domains of thought and action.
Thinking is rational to the extent that it follows the rules of deductive
inference to calculate the correct means to a given end. Action is rational
when it follows a prescribed set of rules to coordinate means to given ends...
. This type of reasoning is particularly useful when technique is paramount—
finding the one best way of accomplishing something, (pp. 2-3)
The public administrative sector, then, exists to discover the single best means
for doing what it is told. The political realm where decisions are made regarding
what is to be done is completely separate from the public administrative sector in
which discoveries are made as to how things are best to be accomplished. In this way,
the public administrative theorist and researcher provides the structure and means for
prudent living, trusting that others have already decided what is prudent and what is
not. The bureaucracy and rules under which the people in culture live provide them
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with guideposts to do what is just. They are not freely choosing between various
options of what is and what is not prudent. They are much more focused on doing
what is right as determined by others than they are on considering what is right. This
structure provides safety and security for citizens. It often provides incentives and
disincentives to citizens for following the law or regulation. There is no free or self
actualized individual. Instead, what ought to be done is determined by lawmakers and
how it ought to be done is determined by public administrators. Citizens under this
construction, in general, are believed to be generally just in that they tend to follow
the laws and the procedures set for them without a significant amount of coercion.
While some small percentage of the population may be designated as a criminal
element, most people do what the laws and procedures dictate most of the time. Most
people are concerned about their neighborhood, their community, their state, and their
county and will act in accordance with those concerns as long as they are told the best
means for such actions.
In this construction of the prudence and justice scale, government is expansive
and pervasive both politically in creating the laws and regulations and in public
administration which seeks to carry out the laws and regulations. To enable people to
know what the right thing to do is, regulations and laws must cover as much societal
territory as possible. The emphasis is not so much on government as authority, which
wields power, control, and threat. Rather, it is on technical bureaucracy that builds
mechanisms to lessen the effect of individual human influence and extend
predictability and control. The chief concern, then, is knowing the rules. Education
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and dispersing information will be king and queen. Hierarchy and rules, instead of
being disdained, are welcomed and embraced. Data, modeling and econometrics,
with the emphasis on certainly above the 95th percentile, are what matter. Thinking is
linear and precise. Chaos is minimized. Cause and effect are measured and
manipulated by some for the advantage of all. Researchers and technical experts
transcend their own biases and values and maintain objectivity. Dynamic complexity
and theories of chaos do not describe what is at the core of human society. These are
simply words for situations that scientific approaches have not yet mastered. Put
coldly, it is necessary to “alter social phenomenon by intervening in the causal
process in such a way as to obtain more desirable outcomes” (Campbell, 1981, p. 41).
Determinism is a necessary foundation in the low prudence/high justice
construct. It is the theory “that every event is cause. This entails the view that
whatever happens has to happen and cannot happen otherwise unless the events and
conditions which cause it are different” (Campbell, 1981, p. 234). It
rests on three fundamental assumptions: reality is made up of discrete
categories; the relations between things and events are linear; and by using
appropriate tools science can know the nature of things and their relations
precisely and in their entirety. (Marcol, 1996, p. 317)
Events, then, can be changed by altering causation. Predictability is high
because of modeling and the use of complicated statistical analysis. The more math,
the better. There is little room for unintended consequences. Determinism aims
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toward simplicity rather than complexity and known-ness rather than randomness. It
is unlikely that the same cause will not evoke the same response in most people.
Organized humanity is that which will be both prudent and just. It is a place of
rules and procedures, of set sequences and known outcomes. It is secure, rational,
predictable, and optimistic. Adams (1992) describes the sanguinity at the opening of
the previous century:
What could have been more plausible than to apply technical rationality to the
social world in order to achieve science-like precision and objectivity?
Frederick Taylor found a ready audience for the notion of scientific
management during the Progressive Era. Technical rationality became the
vehicle of hope in the social and political world and created a wave that before
World War n prompted new professionals, managers, behaviorists, social
scientists, and industrial psychologists toward a world view in which human
conditions appeared as problems fit for engineering solutions, (p. 366)
According to White (1989), this engineering approach has led to the
development of a “bias within the public administration literature for centrism and
control and a wariness of diffused authority” (p. 525). As an example, she quotes
Richard Stillman’s com nm ti that Public Choice Theory or other populist concepts
will lead to “an enfeebled, even nonexistent state that may have serviced the
eighteenth-century needs of America, but one finds little to recommend it for dealing
with the awesome tasks faced by this nation at the end of the twentieth century and
beyond” (p. 525).
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Richard Stillman’s fear is instructive in that it reveals his core belief that the
average person will have no idea (no prudence) in understanding or addressing the
complexities that face modem citizens in the United States. White (1989) concludes,
“Traditional public administration theory emphasizes that public institutions are the
principle vehicles for expressing common and public concerns. Weakening them by
diffusing authority means that important issues are ignored” (p. 525). Without a
strong public administrative sector, it is the knowing that will be lacking.

Low Prudence/High Justice

Justice
Figure 2. Low Prudence/High Justice
High Prudence/Low Justice

An additional variation of the scales would be that those working in the field
of public administration and the public at large generally know what is good. The
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problem is not knowledge or the ability to determine what is prudent. Instead, what
people in general lack is the willingness to commit themselves to doing what is good.
In this diagnosis, more information will not bring about what theorists might believe
to be good. Rather, what should be prescribed is a structure focused on justice where
people are encouraged through reward to do what is generally accepted as good and
threatened with punishment to avoid what is considered not good. Everyone knows
that smoking is not prudent, but millions still smoke. Everyone knows that, generally
speaking, wearing a seatbelt while driving is more prudent than not wearing a
seatbelt, but many people either forget or refuse to buckle up. Earning a living and
avoiding sloth are generally agreed to be wise and productive approaches to life, but
many decide to avoid work and embrace the deadly sin of slothfulness.
This is one version of the nanny state. Individuals, families, and fraternal or
economic relationships are not what drive people to do the right thing. Instead, the
government takes a more direct, a more hands-on role. Centralized decision-making is
one chief characteristic.
It is a culture of sticks and carrots. Most people realize that charitable work is
good and that those who are more materially fortunate bear some level of
responsibility for those who are less materially fortunate. Unfortunately, not enough
is done to assist them. The government can use the carrot of tax incentives for
particular kinds of charitable work or the stick of the Internal Revenue Service to
collect money which various government agencies then dole out to those in need. The
question is not whether most people agree that charitable work is good. The issue is
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whether they will do it. In the high prudence/low justice construct, the role of public
administrators is to carry out or coerce citizens to carry out what is widely accepted as
good.
Lane Davis might cross over into other categories, but he at least allows for
citizens to choose those who will control them:
Responsible government refers primarily to the accountability of a creative
and active governing elite to those who have been the objects of its policies.
The citizen has only a minimal involvement as a creative actor in what he
judges. He must necessarily judge governors, their records, and their
promises, largely as a passive object of the action of others. To the extent that
this notion of responsibility is accepted and the citizens are considered
primarily as objects rather than as creative actors, they must be considered as
essentially irresponsible. (Hart, 1972, p. 611)
Note that judgment or prudence in selecting those who will focus on action is
believed to be acceptable in this construct. Expecting the general public to be active
is simply asking too much of them. Instead they choose who will act on their behalf
and in relationship to them.
Consistency is problematic in the high prudence/low justice construct. Barry
Karl (1987) points to Woodrow Wilson and his fellow progressives as examples of
those who “were trying to create a British-like, upper-middle class elite, to put
themselves in control of it, and to co-opt others into it as a means of stabilizing the
wildly growing American society of the late nineteenth century” (p. 29). It is
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administration not merely by knowledge, as in the low prudence/high justice
construct. Rather, it is administration by those who are more morally sensitive to the
needs of society and the demands of justice. This “means that the fate of a democratic
society rests on the moral sensibilities of a comparatively few elites” (Hart, 1972, p.
612). Public administration becomes a class rather than an occupation. Those in it
serve because of a noble obligation they bear to the rest of society, while being
unaffected by the lack of justice that is most prevalent among human beings.
Mass democracy, if justice is narrowly distributed among the masses, is not
likely to succeed simply because of the nature of the human person. Instead, a ruling
class built on a morally superior sense of justice is most likely to succeed.

High Prudence/Low Justice

Justice
Figure 3. High Prudence/Low Justice
Low Prudence/Low Justice
In this variation, human beings are generally neither prudent nor just in their
nature. Ideals are an illusion. People respond to stimuli, not norms. Mass democracy
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is neither desirable nor advisable as it would quickly disintegrate into anarchy. As a
matter of fact, according to Hart (1972):
Some contemporary theorists go so far as to insist that the processes of
democratic policy making must be protected from the masses.. . . In other
words, individual citizens cannot realistically be trusted to govern themselves
and need benevolent, but firm, guidance from an informed and politically
active minority. The participation of individual citizens is reduced to the
inferior role of periodically selecting their political stewards, (p. 611)
In its most extreme version, it is only the government and social pressure
which keep people from tearing each other apart. As Hume puts it, “it is impossible
for the human race to subsist, at least in any comfortable or secure state, without the
protection of government” (as quoted in Spicer, 1997, p. 241). Concepts such as
prudence and justice are not operative nor are they real. Human beings, according to
Nietzche, are “beyond good and evil, whose existence is meaningless, whose
questions about truth are meaningless, and who morality founded on these questions
is a slave morality” (as quoted in Krapiec, 1983, p. 78).
Society is a myth, apart from the control of the government and its public
administrative arm. It is a rejection of the idea that “man lives in union with other
people and this union is necessary for the preservation of being and the creation of
conditions for man’s further development” (Krapiec, 1983, p. 50). Instead, society is
the arena of competition to survive. It is Machiavelli and Nietzche: “Society as some
kind of reality is a fiction; only people exist, of whom some have power and others do
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not (Krapiec, p. 263). Radical individualism is at its core: “Proponents, in fact, have
an almost visceral reaction to any arrangement in which some individuals can tell
others what is good for them or what is in their interest (White, 1989, p. 523). There
is no “common good” because “only individuals matter: the interests, wishes, and
happiness of individuals is what counts in the determination of moral and political
priorities” (Campbell, 1981, p. 37).
Plato’s story of the “Ring of Gyges” is illustrative. The main character, Gyges
of Lydia, is a shepherd. Discovering a cave entrance, Gyges enters and finds the
corpse of a man wearing a ring, which he promptly steals. Wearing the ring, he
discovers that when positioned in a particular way, he becomes invisible. Using his
new-found power, Gyges eventually seduces the queen, murders the king, and takes
over his position.
The point of the story, told to Socrates by Glaucon, is to posit that no one is
actually virtuous. People only act virtuous because it is to their benefit. When virtue
no longer is beneficial, people will lose any moorings of justice and do as they please.
Socrates, of course, disagrees and argues that ethical people will choose justice simply
because it is the just thing to do.
With little sense of justice or prudence, conflict ought not to be avoided.
Instead, it should be embraced and encouraged. According to Ramos (1878),
“Clashes of the personal and the social, the economic and the emotional are part of
the human condition” (p. 552). Attempting to do away with them “will, if successful,
create distorted individuals” (Campbell, 1981, p. 187).
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Differences are resolved by conflict and competition through the use of
domination, coercion, and manipulation. Life is an exercise in building power and
forcing one’s will through economics, politics, religion, or a host of other possible
means. Darwin’s ontology is operative in that cooperation is an apparition employed
to disguise real intentions and maximize future value. At their core, communities are
made up of current or future adversaries, not mutually interested individuals.
Another potential version of this concept is that society is not the arena of
competition and domination because human beings simply are not driven by much at
all. Instead, people are more akin to the two-toed sloth than they are to Superman.
McGregor’s Theory X human being is reality. Apart from controls, the average
human person will not work, prefers to be directed, avoids responsibility, lacks
ambition, and is treading water in a sea of perpetual early adolescence. Most people
neither know what is good nor would they choose it even if they did. What is needed
is the exercise of authority and control by those few who possess “the knowledge and
moral qualities which citizens lack in order to be capable of directly controlling their
lives in the best way possible” (Rojas, 2001, p. 31). Apart from significant structure,
most people would be completely lost. Coercion is not regrettable but is instead the
most common and useful means of administering. It is an authoritarian approach to
leadership. As Hackman and Johnson (2002) point out, “Many authoritarian leaders
believe that followers would not function effectively without direct supervision. The
authoritarian leader generally feels that people left to complete their work on their
own will be unproductive” (p. 34). Those in authoritarian positions set the goals,
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control the discussion, dominate interaction, and make heavy use of carrots and sticks
(p. 38). There is little interest in participatory decision-making because people lack
the prudence and sense of justice required to decide what to do and then actually do it.
Of course, this perception would lead naturally to the conclusion that there
must be inconsistency between those within the field of public administration and
those in the general public. Were this not the case, public administration would
simply not be possible or desirable. If all people had low prudence and a low sense of
justice, society would be Nitzschean in that all of life for every human being would be
an existence made up of merely the will to power.
David Hume’s anthropological perspective (1748) is illustrative. In his
treatise On the Original Contract Hume lands on the side of those who believe that
most people are unjust: “Our primary instincts lead us either to indulge ourselves in
unlimited freedom or to seek dominion over others” (p. 3). According to Hume, it
does not much matter whether someone is prudent, as prudence matters little in the
reality of human social life. In actual practice, people will not do what is prudent
even if they could define it. Rather, they will do what is expedient and beneficial to
them only or what will extend their control over another. Because this is the case,
Hume concludes, “it is impossible for the human race to subsist, at least in any
comfortable or secure state, without the protection of the government” (p. 3). A more
modem expression of this perspective is found in the writings of Leopold Kohl,
whose life spanned most of the twentieth century. According to William Scott
(1983), “Kohl felt that people were essentially rotten and that they would stay that
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way no matter the size of the unit that contained them” (p. 185). His approach,
however, was that “that evil people in small containers do not have the power to
create the same amount of social misery they do in large containers” (p. 185). This
might be described as the Tower of Babel approach to public administration.
Clearly, in this philosophy it matters little whether human beings can define
what is prudent because prudence will not overcome in people who are inherently
unjust and self-centered. Individuals operate on a Rawlsian cost-benefit analysis
where only the self in considered. Hal Rainey and Paula Steinbauer present an
example regarding the nature of motivation in the actions of a civil servant. They ask:
How much is a module manager in a public service center of the Social
Security Administration motivated by a belief that her actions contribute to
something worthwhile and important to the nation as a whole and how much
is she motivated by a belief that sound management of her module will
contribute to the mission of providing income security for the retired people
who have earned it through their contributions to the program? (p. 26)
Adherents of the low prudence/low justice variation would dismiss both
potential answers and claim that the most obvious choice is being ignored: this
woman’s actions are motivated by a desire to get a positive review, maintain or
expand her portion of the budget, and move up the chain of command into a position
of greater power and compensation with more staff and a larger budget. Magnanimity
has nothing to do with it.
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What is required is a heavy-handedness that can only come through the actions
of centralized power, either by offering rewards to those who act against their nature
and threatening punishment for those who act in accord with it. Lawrence Martin
(1997) puts Jeremy Bentham squarely in this camp:
As a reformer, Bentham’s central focus was on political, legal, and social
reform. The central question for Bentham and the utilitarians was: “Who are
the savages and how can they be civilized?” The utilitarian answer was the
creation of the welfare state that would set up a series of rewards and
punishments to regulate human behavior, (p. 274)
Savages are neither prudent nor just and are unlikely to develop either trait. The
focus, then, is control not reorientation, education, or social development.
As evidenced in Bentham’s comment, this approach has built into it an
inconsistency where it is assumed that a handful of elites through some means have
risen above the rottenness inherent in them. If all humans are rotten, there will be no
one to determine that “units” need to be built to contain them nor how large such
units are to be. Human nature would dictate that no one be given centralized power
because it would be used in a fashion consistent with Hume’s concept that people use
what they have to have dominion over others.
But this is not the case. In its most optimistic form, those who have power
through their political or public administrative roles take the position of benevolent
paternalists. They are the trustees. They understand that human nature is generally
neither prudent nor just and so they provide the voice of prudence and justice for
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societies that lack both. Simon, Drucker, and Waldo (1952) notice this dichotomy
and wish that those who hold this position would bring out some of the “underlying
concepts of the social scientists which explain why such a strong tendency towards a
manipulative and purely paternalistic despotism runs through their approach. There is
the fact that so many of them start out from abnormal psychology, with its assumption
that everyone else is ‘maladjusted’” (p. 496).
This perspective includes the nanny state but moves beyond it to what Rojas
(2001) calls the “guardian state” built on “an extraordinarily pessimistic or indeed
destructive view of human nature, a view of mankind which fundamentally permeates
every single measure restricting the liberty of individuals and essentially implying that
people need a guardian so as not to be injured by their own shortcomings or inherent
viciousness” (p. 31). It is built on “three fundamental assertions about human beings”
which include moral weakness making people incapable of “taking charge of their
own lives,” inherent stupidity in that “we would, quite simply, make the wrong
choices, harm ourselves, be far too short-sighted and generally unintelligent in the
choices we made,” and a belief in the human being’s “own malicious egoism, his
viciousness towards his fellow-beings, his lack of any natural sense of solidarity
beyond the narrowest confines of his family” (pp. 32-34). Because this is the case,
“the state has to force goodness upon people” (p. 34).
Government and those who administer it are like the Wizard of Oz, according
to Mulgan (as quoted in Rojas, 2001). He states:
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The dominant idea that has shaped thinking about governments and societies
over the last century is the idea of the machine.. . . Well-oiled, efficient and
measurable, the ideal machine had a clear purpose or function which it carried
out perfectly. Everything could in principle be conceived as a closed system,
consisting of cogs and wheels, instructions and commands with the . . .
government at the top, pulling the requisite levers and engineering the desired
effects, (p. 173)
People don’t really need to understand what is happening to them nor do they need to
have input into the decisions that are being made. They need to do what they are told
(p. 55). As Frederick Taylor allegedly told some of his subjects, “You are not
supposed to think. There are other people paid for thinking around here” (Rojas, p.
57).
Will those who adhere to this perception of human nature be consistent in
their application to all human beings? One of the first heresies of the early Christian
church was Gnosticism. While Gnosticism came to its fullest expression in
Christianity, its roots predated the life of Christ. As its name implies, its focus is on
“knowledge.” A small number of people, through experience or transcendence, gain
secret knowledge. The rest, tied to the material world, are deeply flawed. At its
essence, Gnostics believed that this mystical knowledge lifted a small number of
people out of the flawed morass of all other human beings and elevated them to a
different class of being, unhindered by the ignorance and immorality of typical human
persons. Gnosticism and proponents of the low prudence/low justice perspective
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share this view. If all human beings lack prudence and justice, then these virtues are
unlikely to be found in any human beings. As soon as an exception is made, a
different class of humanity rises above the rest which can claim both prudence and
justice enough to determine the paths of everyone else.
Hill (1997) notices this inconsistency in Taylor’s work, especially as it applies
to the business setting, but the observation is equally applicable to the realm of public
administration. He writes, “By making only line employees accountable, [Taylor]
placed too much confidence in company executives and engineers. They too are
fallible, imperfect beings, capable of making poor economic and moral choices. By
arrogantly ignoring employee input, many companies have gone awry” (p. 155). Such
a perspective, “denigrates the value of human persons. Workers are not oxen who are
trimmed to fit the job” (p. 153). Unless, of course, they are exactly like oxen who
must be fitted to the job by those who are not.

Low Prudence/Low Justice

Justice
Figure 4. Low Prudence/Low Justice

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

75

It Depends

It is, of course, possible to land in the center of the prudence/justice scale or
even completely outside it. Functioning in the center are those who advocate a kind of
determinism in which choice, despite appearances, is either extremely limited or not
actually possible. John Locke is often credited as this perspective’s genesis and
patron saint, as Griffith (1983) points out:
For Locke the origins of ideas are experience, sensation, and reflection;
therefore, morality has a rational basis. All ideas people develop come from
their individual learning, experiences, and growth. This concept separates
Locke’s ideas from Christian and natural law traditions, which held that some
kind of underlying basis for human understanding existed —such as first
principles, God, or natural order—beyond human history and experience, (p.
224)
While Locke might be the Western founding father, similar perspectives are
found in other thinkers. Mencius, the Chinese philosopher who was bom in 372 BCE
and studied under the grandson of Confucius, spent much of his life traveling,
speaking, and teaching. While not a proponent of a blank slate, Mencius
maintains that all people are good at birth, in the sense of being endowed with
tendencies toward benevolence, dutifulness, observation of rites, and wisdom.
But these tendencies need to be preserved and developed; they can be
corrupted by a bad environment or by allowing one’s heart to be overcome by
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lower desires or appetites. An important implication is that everyone, given
the proper environment and with sustained personal effort, can become a sage.
(Abel, 1991, p. 74)
Cooper (1996) if unfamiliar with Mencius, would likely claim himself to be a
disciple upon reading him. Cooper is clear as to his anthropological perspective when
he writes:
I believe that we are bom with both capacities (negative and positive) and the
kinds of relationships we experience in families, associations, workplaces, and
communities help us to become more socially constructive or influence us
toward self-interest, antagonism, and hostility. This anthropological
perspective leads me to see the need for controls of various kinds, the best of
which are self-controls emerging out of both rational and affective
development in social setting. Nevertheless, external restraints such as mles,
and laws are ultimately necessary because, unfortunately, in the world as it is,
self-control of this kind is not universally achieved, (p. 604)
Scott and Hart (1973) refer specifically to newer public administration
theorists who lean heavily toward or fully embrace the amorphous position as to
human nature. They believe:
Proper theory must reflect the fact that what administrators do is contingent
upon environment and technology.. . . We contend that this conviction about
the adaptive potential of administrators (and man is general) has grown out of
the contemporary image of human nature in administration. This image is
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predicated on the belief that man is by nature neither good nor bad, but is by
nature nothing. If man is nothing, he has the potential to be made into
anything. Therefore, man’s institutions must be designed to build him, since
there is nothing in principle about man’s nature that prevents his adaptation to
the various exigencies that the environment presents, (p. 419)
Naturally, those in this camp place their emphasis on education, moral
formation, and the role of community in molding the nature of human beings. People
are bom neither prudent nor imprudent. They are neither just nor unjust. Mencius
would argue that there are, at best, tendencies toward prudence and justice, but they
have little influence in the reality that is the fully grown human being. Rather, people
are more akin to lumps of clay that can be shaped into most anything. Cultures and
societies, therefore, create themselves anew each generation. In this conception, as
Krapiec (1983) points out, human persons are “lost” in their communities because:
Society exerts total control over man’s thoughts, his technical and artistic
ability. The social authority established man’s goals and the mean for
attaining these goals so that, as a result, he is deprived of the possibility of
realizing his personal goals and, thereby, the means which could assure him of
some kind of independence in relation to society, (p. 263)
A second possible perspective from the “it depends” camp comes from those
who would reject determinism and a tabula rasa perspective in which society creates
human persons according to their own images or desires. For them, there is no such
thing as a human nature; there are only individuals and individual choices. While it
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might be possible to predict the behavior of a single person, predictions as to what a
group of people might or might not do are built on faulty logic. H. Roy Kaplan and
Curt Tausky (1977) express something of this perspective when they write,
“Generalizations aimed at nearly encapsulating the motivation of all workers
regardless of occupational levels, classes, or job functions are likely to prove
spurious, and decisions predicated upon them could be conducive to heightening
organizational conflict, rather than its diminution” (p. 178). Kaplan and Tausky seem
to indicate that there might be classes of people about whom some assumptions can
be made. But he rejects the idea that there is a kind of human nature about which
predictions or assumptions can be made. As a matter of fact, the belief in such
assumptions may be the root of all evil, if such a thing exists, rather than its cure. As
far as can be ascertained, there are no serious or unserious theorists holding the belief
that human beings have no nature to discuss.

No Prudence/No Justice

Justice
Figure 5. No Prudence/No Justice
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CHAPTER III

TESTING MAJOR THEORISTS

Choosing Theorists and Their Books

The goal of this project is not to test every important theorist’s writings
against the framework created in chapter two. Rather, it is first to create an
intellectual and philosophical framework focused on the two classically defined
virtues of prudence and justice and then to apply the framework to a select group of
theorists. For each of the leading theorists chosen, the focus will be primarily on their
key book and will not include their articles, lectures, or other written material other
than to occasionally supplement what is found in their book. It is certainly possible
that the authors selected were inconsistent in their operational philosophical
anthropologies or that their views evolved over time, but that is a matter for additional
research. If this model works and is helpful to those conducting research into the
philosophical and historical theories that support the public administrative practices
as they have developed in the United States over the last century, then it can be
expanded and applied in different ways by those doing such research. This model can
also be applied to other theorists who are not considered in this project.
But which theorists and which books should be chosen? Gathering individual
opinions as to which books are “classics” is likely to produce as many choices as
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there are opinions. Rather than conducting a poll of current public administration
theorists, this paper will rely in part on an article written by Frank P. Sherwood in
1990 entitled “The Half-Century’s ‘Great Books’ in Public Administration,” printed
in the Public Administration Review in 1990 upon the 50-year anniversary of the
journal. Obviously, it contains no material written in the last one and a half decades,
which might be perceived as a short-coming for this project, but it does avoid the
designation of the “instant classic” which turns out later to be misapplied after some
time and thought have passed.
In preparing his list of “great books,” Sherwood first argues it is books, rather
than articles, that have been the “critical benchmarks” since 1940 (p. 249).1 He
selected a panel of 20 advisors he believed to be experts in the field of public
administration: “The panel consists entirely of academicians, is very well published,
and the majority of them have been around for most of the 50 years in which the
Review has appeared” (p. 250). He asked them to focus on books and not theorists,
limited their choices to “academic” books, and asked them to consider the “influence”
of the book rather than whether they happened to agree with the author (p. 251). The
books were to have been published in the period from 1940 to 1990.
For the sake of a sense of historical development, this project will focus on
five books, which will be addressed in the order of their appearance. Three of them
find their way into Sherwood’s list while two of them are outside the chronological
1 Because of the limits of considering only material published from 1940 to 1990, two other books will
be included in this project and act as chronological and theoretical bookends. The first is Frederick
Taylor’s Scientific Management. The second and most recent book to be considered is Amitai Etzioni’s
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scope of Sherwood’s limitations. The first will be Frederick Taylor’s Principles o f
Scientific Management, first published in 1911, only four years prior to his death at
age 59. It is chosen because it represents a significant movement, is still in print, and
is frequently referred to in public administrative theory, despite being under 100 pages
in length. It also presents a fairly clear understanding of the nature of the human
person as an example of one mechanistic extreme. Quotes such as “You are not
supposed to think. There are other people paid for thinking around here” certainly
give a window into Taylor’s view on humanity in general (as quoted in Rojas, 2001,
p. 57). He may be the poster child for the homo hierachicus perspective.
The second book to be included in this project, and the overwhelming winner
of Sherwood’s survey, was Herbert Simon’s Administrative Behavior. First published
in 1947 when Simon was only 31 years old, it sold an unimpressive 1,900 copies in its
first 12 months. Its influence, however, has grown over time. By 1990, it had sold
over 150,000 copies, had been translated in 12 languages, and was still in print. The
fourth edition was published in 1997, only four years before Simon’s death. It is the
only book on the list whose author won a Nobel Prize, awarded in 1978. Simon is
“an example of the rational model of organization. A utilitarian decision-making
calculus is at the center of Simon’s view of behavior, and much mischief is caused by
orthodox administration’s acceptance of this narrow, but powerful, explanation of
motivation” (Scott, 1983, p. 185).

Rights and Responsibilities: The Communitarian Agenda. They are included both for the school of

thought they represent and for their leading positions in public administrative theory.
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The third book to be compared to the model is Frederick C. Mosher’s
Democracy and the Public Service, first published in 1968 when Mosher was 52 years
old and had spent his entire life studying public administration. It was number five in
Sherwood’s survey of the most influential books. For the purpose of this project, it
represents some aspects of the thought being discussed during the period in which the
first Minnowbrooke Conference was held. It focuses more on the public servants
within the public administration sector and their place within a democratic political
system.
The fourth book to be considered is Vincent Ostrom’s The Intellectual Crisis
in American Public Administration. Ostrom’s book first appeared in 1973, when
Ostrom was 53 years old and, like Mosher, was steeped in the study of public
administration. The book was released, as Sherwood points out, “at the time
Watergate was unfolding and the Nixon presidency was becoming unglued” (p. 259).
In Sherwood’s survey, even those who rejected public choice theory and describe it as
“morally pernicious” still include it in their list of the most influential books (p. 258).
It is a rejection of the argument for a strong executive and advocates instead for
“multiple decision centers, power diffusion, and a market discipline” (p. 259).
The final book to be considered is Amitai Etzioni’s Rights and Responsibility:
The Communitarian Agenda, first published in 1995 when Etzioni was 66 years old.
While not included on the Sherwood list because it postdates the survey by five years,
it is an important book because it demonstrates further movement away from a strong
executive into the realm of communitarian thought with an emphasis on rights and
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their corresponding responsibilities. Strength is found in the community rather than
in any single individual or the government. This is a complete swing of the pendulum
from what Frederick Taylor would have considered desirable or even advisable.
While Etzioni’s book is the most recent and, therefore, a candidate for the sometimes
mislabeled “instant classic” category, it is now more than 12 years old, time enough
for significant examination and criticism.
The examination of the anthropological assumptions operative in each
theorist’s book will not result in an either/or choice as to whether the authors believe
human beings to be prudent or just. Instead, their thoughts will be along a continuum
of greater and lesser degrees. After each book examined, a conclusion will provide an
overview to determine whether there has been a shift in anthropological assumptions
and consider some potential reasons for whatever shift has taken place. Finally, the
conclusion will suggest possible areas of additional research for consideration by
those interested in moving the theoretical ball further down the field.

Frederick Taylor’s The Principles of Scientific Management

Frederick Taylor’s life revolved around management and engineering done in
the context of industrial work sites. Bright enough to be accepted at Harvard, his
poor sight caused him to drop out of the school and begin a career in industry, starting
as an industrial apprentice in 1873. Five years later, Taylor became a machine shop
laborer at Midvale Steel and was quickly promoted to gang-boss, foreman, and finally
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chief. As he moved up the ranks, he spent much of his effort seeking to improve
efficiency through time-studies. In 1890, he took a position as general manager of the
Manufacturing Investment Company, eventually became a Dartmouth professor, and
ended his career as a consulting engineer to a myriad of industrial firms. His broader
influence came from his time serving as the President of the American Society of
Mechanical Engineers, through his published journal articles, and primarily via the
book for which he is most well-known: The Principles o f Scientific Management.
Several components of his upbringing, education, and career provide clues to
his thinking about the nature of the human person. He was raised in a Quaker
household that valued simplicity, order, and the philosophy of a place for everything
and everything in its place. Self-control and discipline are the hallmarks of the
Quaker faith, which seemed to fit his personality. According to Mary Ellen Papesh,
“Taylor was a compulsive adolescent and was always counting and measuring things
to figure a better way of doing something. At age twelve, he invented a harness for
himself to keep from sleeping on his back, hoping to avoid the nightmares he was
having (undated, p. 1).
His education, after leaving Harvard, focused on engineering. He was
graduated from the Stevens Institute of Technology while simultaneously holding a
full-time job, demonstrating discipline and effective use of his time, something he
would bring to bear in his work in factories throughout his career.
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The focus of his career was efficiency. Repetitive tasks ought to be
categorized, observed, timed, and redesigned to bring about the maximum benefit to
both the workers and the owners. According to Papesh:
Taylor’s work was taking place in a time period when there was much
industrial change happening after the Civil War. National industries grew out
of local trades—steel, glass, textiles, and shoes—and what were small
factories became large plants. Owners of capital became wealthier with mass
production, and workers received little for their efforts. Problems included
carelessness, safety, inefficiencies, and soldiering (worker foot dragging) on
the job. Taylor sought to get past the futile incentive bonuses that management
thought would remedy the problems. He believed that incentive wages were
no solution unless they were combined with efficient tasks that were carefully
planned and easily learned, (p. 2)
The Principles o f Scientific Management was not the work of a theorist sitting
undisturbed in a library or a laboratory. After more than 25 years working in
factories, doing time-studies, and searching constantly for more efficient ways to
produce goods in an industrial setting, Taylor gave lectures that eventually became a
short book extolling what he had learned through trial and error.
It is impossible to know with certainty the effect his upbringing, education,
and career had on his general world and life view and, more specifically, his
understanding of human nature. It is possible to speculate that a fastidious, strict, and
disciplined childhood in combination with a degree in engineering in which things are
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made to fit, and a career spent squeezing efficiency from human labor would tend his
views of human nature toward a rather mechanistic perspective. Waldo (1952)
expresses his suspicion of this perspective when he writes that in Taylor’s lifetime:
Administration absorbed a spirit of cold, scientific self-calculation and
condescending good will toward the employee. Both of these qualities are
clearly evident at the dawn of the movement in the work of Frederick W.
Taylor at Midvale Steel. It is hardly too much to say that Taylor regarded his
laborers essentially as draft animals. Yet he proclaimed piously again and
again that his system of management was designed to benefit the laborer [at
least “the first class man”] as much as management, and there is no reason to
doubt his sincerity. The phrase that best describes the spirit of private
administration at the turn of the century is harsh paternalism, (p. 83)
Whether Waldo’s assessment is accurate or fair is for others to determine. For
the purposes of this examination, it is best to focus attention on Taylor’s written work
to see what can be gleaned from this simple, sometimes troubling, and profound little
book.
Taylor begins his introduction with a reference to President Theodore
Roosevelt who held office from 1901-1909. Taylor believed that Roosevelt’s abiding
legacy would be his conservationist streak expressed in his preservation of some of
America’s natural resources. In speaking of his conservationist agenda, Roosevelt
broadened the topic beyond merely the realm of natural resources and extended it to
the combined resources of the United States when he said, “The conservation of our
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natural resources is only preliminary to the larger question of national efficiency” (p.
1). It was a comment perfectly suited to Taylor’s way of thinking. Taylor uses this as
his launch pad to his true interest in the book: how to make the most of labor within
the industrial setting. “Our larger wastes of human effort, which go on every day
through such of our acts as are blundering, ill-directed, or inefficient, and which Mr.
Roosevelt refers to as a lack of ‘national efficiency,’ are less visible, less tangible, and
are but vaguely appreciated” (p. 5). Clearly he believes what he has learned has
national implications
In some ways, Taylor’s work is a strange inclusion in a project focused on
public administrative theory given that he virtually never addresses the subject. His
focus is industrial engineering and central planning within the context of the factory.
Two factors warrant its inclusion in the discussion of public administrative theory.
The first is that his theory had a profound effect on the practice of government and is
a reflection of the enthusiasm and optimism of the pre-World War I trust in all things
scientific. The second is that despite the book’s rather narrow focus, Taylor clearly
intended that the lessons he learned should be applied to virtually every social and
vocational area of human existence:
This paper was originally prepared for presentation to The American Society
of Mechanical Engineers. The illustrations chosen are such as, it is believed,
will especially appeal to engineers and to managers of industrial and
manufacturing establishments, and also quite as much to all of the men who
are working in these establishments. It is hoped, however, that it will be clear
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to other readers that the same principles can be applied with equal force to all
social activities: to the management of our homes; the management of our
farms; the management of the business of our tradesmen, large and small; of
our churches, our philanthropic institutions, our universities, and our
governmental departments, (pp. 7-8)
Every theorist begins with a diagnosis and Taylor is no exception. The first
problem he identifies is the shortage of what he calls “competent men”: “The search
for better, for more competent men, from the presidents of our great companies down
to our household servants, was never more vigorous than it is now. And more than
ever before is the demand for competent men in excess of the supply” (p. 6). He
believes that industrialization brought with it profound changes not only in the nature
of work but also in the kinds of persons needed to become efficient in manufacturing
and production.
In previous generations under different working conditions, perhaps it was
acceptable to rely on what Taylor refers to as the “great man” or the “competent
man,” but this is no longer the case. He is not content to wait. Such persons must be
developed in light of the changes facing his society.
If the diagnosis is a shortage, then training is the prescription: “It is only when
we fully realize that our duty, as well as our opportunity, lies in systematically
cooperating to train and to make this competent man, instead of in hunting for a man
whom someone else has trained, that we shall be on the road to national efficiency”
(p. 6).
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The introductory section of his book sheds light on his understanding of the
character, ability, and makeup of the human person. On the one hand, he believes that
competency can be taught which means that most human beings have at least the
ability to learn and do as they have been taught. Indeed, as he says, such people must
be created in the industrialized world. Nurture matters. But he is not ready to give up
on the “great man” theory in which certain persons or a class of certain persons are
“bom right.” He does not see this as an either/or proposition. In fact, Taylor argues
that both are needed:
In the future it will be appreciated that our leaders must be trained right as
well as bom right, and that no great man hope to compete with a number of
ordinary men who have been properly organized so as efficiently to cooperate.
In the past the man has been first; in the future the system must be first. This
in no sense, however, implies that great men are not needed. On the contrary,
the first object of any good system must be that of developing first-class men;
and under systematic management the best man rises to the top more certainly
and more rapidly than ever before, (pp. 6-7)
Competency is not common. It is occasionally to be found in those who are
well-born, but even they are in need of training and development in light of the post
industrialization economy and government. There is still a class distinction between
persons, something that he consistently clings to throughout his work. But instead of
class warfare, Taylor is an advocate for class cooperation. Those who are bom well,
by which he means having both genetic superiority and proper childhood formation,
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needed to also be properly trained so that they may lead the charge in bringing the
masses, who are neither, to the level of competency. The goal is to create a system
that in turn creates competency. While not a full repudiation of the “great man”
theory, Taylor’s is a transitional anthropological ideology where great persons are still
needed but cannot be relied on entirely to meet the challenges facing society. As he
points out, one of his chief goals in putting his thoughts on paper is ‘T o try to
convince the reader that the remedy for this inefficiency lies in systematic
management, rather than in searching for some unusual or extraordinary man” (p. 7).
In taking this approach, Taylor’s first concern is neither scientific nor
managerial. It is, rather, social. Class warfare is what he seeks to avoid. He hopes
that by raising the competency, productivity and wages of workers, he will be able to
create a future in which class warfare is not the norm. It is likely that at the root of his
considerations is Marxism, as it had come to expression in Europe and the United
States in his lifetime. It is clear to him that a system of owners versus labor or
management versus workers would not be viable. Those who propose a continual
clash between classes are mistaken:
The majority of these men believe that the fundamental interests of employees
and employers are necessarily antagonistic. Scientific management, on the
contrary, has for its very foundation the firm conviction that the true interests
of the two are one and the same; that prosperity for the employer cannot exist
through a long term of years unless it is accompanied by prosperity for the
employee and vice versa; and that it is possible to give the workman what he
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most wants—high wages, and the employer what he wants a low labor cost—
for his manufactures. It is hoped that some at least of those who do not
sympathize with each of these objects may be led to modify their views; that
some employers, whose attitude toward their workmen has been that of trying
to get the largest amount of work out of them for the smallest possible wages,
may be led to see that a more liberal policy toward their men will pay them
better; and that some of those workmen who begrudge a fair and even a large
profit to their employers, and who feel that all of the fruits of their labor
should belong to them, and that those for whom they work and the capital
invested in the business are entitled to little or nothing, may be led to modify
these views. ( p. 10)
Both employer and employee are part of the same stmggle, but the battle is not
one against the other. Instead, Taylor hopes to connect their mutual concerns in a way
that will be beneficial to each rather than all the benefits going to one or the other. In
his mind, class warfare will not serve the economy or the nation as a whole. As he
writes, “The principal object of management should be to secure the maximum
prosperity for the employer, coupled with the maximum prosperity for each
employee” (p. 9). The concept of “maximum prosperity” means more for Taylor than
just material wages for:
Prosperity for each employee means not only higher wages than are usually
received by men of his class, but, of more importance still, it also means the
development of each man to his state of maximum efficiency, so that he may
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be able to do, generally speaking, the highest grade of work for which his
natural abilities fit him, and it further means giving him, when possible, this
class of work to do. (p. 9)
Such comments, scattered throughout the text, call into question dismissals such as
Waldo’s that Taylor believed laborers were in essence “draft animals” (p. 83).
In Taylor’s conception, do the workers possess either prudence to know what
the right thing to do is or the sense of justice needed to do the right thing? This is
where his anthropological assumptions become clearer, at least regarding the common
worker. He begins with a sports analogy:
Whenever an American workman plays baseball, or an English workman
plays cricket, it is safe to say that he strains every nerve to secure victory for
his side. He does his very best to make the largest possible number of runs.
The universal sentiment is so strong that any man who fails to give out all
there is in him in sport is branded as a ‘quitter,’ and treated with contempt by
those who are around him. (p. 13)
In leisure, laborers are both internally motivated and externally pressured to do their
“very best.” Their natural drive to perform at the highest level possible is reinforced
by their peers.
At their jobs, however, things are entirely different:
When the same workman returns to work on the following day, instead of
using every effort to turn out the largest possible amount of work, in a
majority of the cases this man deliberately plans to do as little as he safely
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can—to turn out far less work than he is well able to do—in many instances to
do not more than one-third to one-half of a proper day’s work. And in fact if
he were to do his best to turn out his largest possible day’s work, he would be
abused by his fellow-workers for so doing, even more than if he had proved
himself a ‘quitter" in sport.’ (p. 13)
The dynamic is completely opposite. Even if motivated to perform to the best
of their abilities, workers will not simply because the possibility of the contempt of
their peers that pressures them to do their best in their leisure conversely slows
production and produces great inefficiency at work. In intentionally under-producing,
laborers fail to meet one of the requirements of just behavior in that they do not give a
full day of work for a full day of pay.
Taylor does not necessarily assign this injustice to the person as much as he
does to the system within which the laborers operate. In other words, most of the
failure is the result of external pressure and not some internal moral weakness. At the
root are a series of faulty premises upon which the laborers operate. They lack the
prudence to know better. Their assumption is that their high productivity would result
in the loss of jobs for others:
The great majority of workmen still believe that if they were to work at their
best speed they would be doing a great injustice to the whole trade by
throwing a lot of men out of work, and yet the history of the development of
each trade shows that each improvement, whether it be the invention of a new
machine or the introduction of a better method, which results in increasing the
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productive capacity of the men in the trade and cheapening the costs, instead
of throwing men out of work make in the end work for more men. (p. 15)
They lack the ability to understand what might appear to them to be counter-intuitive;
that is, that more productivity actually increases work opportunities for others. They
hold this position:
Because they are ignorant of the history of their own trade even, they still
firmly believe, as their fathers did before them, that it is against their best
interests for each man to turn out each day as much work as possible. Under
this fallacious idea a large proportion of the workmen of both countries each
day deliberately work slowly so as to curtail the output. Almost every labor
union has made, or is contemplating making, rules which have for their object
curtailing the output of their members, and those men who have the greatest
influence with the working-people, the labor leaders as well as many people
with philanthropic feelings who are helping them, are daily spreading this
fallacy and at the same time telling them that they are overworked, (p. 17)
Labor unions, in other words, instead of encouraging workers to reach their maximum
productivity, are perpetuating a lie that is neither prudent nor just.
Between the owners and the laborers is a class of persons whose role and
abilities uniquely qualify them to restore prudence and justice:
As engineers and managers, we are more intimately acquainted with these
facts than any other class in the community, and are therefore best fitted to
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lead in a movement to combat this fallacious idea by educating not only the
workmen but the whole of the country as to the true facts, (p. 18)
These are the well-born and naturally gifted whose abilities exceed those of the
common laborer. Managers drive productivity. Their role is to increase the
productivity of both human beings and the machines with which they work for the
benefit of owner and laborer. This they accomplish through proper training of each
employee under their supervision:
The most important object of both the workmen and the management should
be the training and development of each individual in the establishment, so
that he can do [at his fastest pace and with the maximum of efficiency] the
highest class of work for which his natural abilities fit him. (p. 12)
This is a significant theoretical move. The laborers cannot be counted on to
be prudent or just in their work. Even their sense of justice as it pertains to slowing
productivity for the benefit of their fellow laborers is misguided. It is important to
remember that Taylor is not limiting the applications of his theory to industry alone.
He intends that the lessons of Scientific Management will be learned by those in
education, business, religious organizations, and government. The engineers, then,
make up the class of those in society who are to educate all not only on true and right
perspectives but also on the one best way to do everything, discovered through the
application of science to the management of any human endeavor. There is a sense in
which, despite his rejection of Marxism’s class warfare, he embraces the concept of
central planning not only in the workplace but in society as a whole. Even the
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employers operate with a false prudence: “It is impossible in a few words to make it
clear to one not familiar with this problem why it is that the ignorance o f employers
as to the proper time in which work of various kinds should be done makes it for the
interest of the workman to (work to less than their full capacity)” (p. 18). Managers,
then, are the only hope for achieving the kind of national efficiency spoken of by
Roosevelt and embraced by Taylor. The relationships between the three classes are
crisp, clean and logical and, in being so, are consistent with Taylor’s Quaker and
engineering roots. A place for everyone and everyone in their place.
The knowledge of the managerial class cannot be limited to the big picture
alone. Indeed, there is “great gain, both to employers and employees, which results
from the substitution of scientific for rule-of-thumb methods in even the smallest
details of the work of every trade” (p. 24). The scope of implications is not limited to
the field of operational engineers in a manufacturing plant.
Taylor intends that scientific management will revolutionize the world. There
are no limitations to what it can do and no area of economic life that cannot be
improved by it:
Among the various methods and implements used in each element of each
trade there is always one method and one implement which is quicker and
better than any of the rest. And this one best method and best implement can
only be discovered or developed through a scientific study and analysis of all
of the methods and implements in use, together with accurate, minute, motion
and time study, (p. 25)
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Scientific managers are not necessarily experts or even experienced in all the
areas they study. Rather, they observe, measure, time, and design systems for
improvement. In Taylor’s mind, it is only rational that there a single, best way for
everything exists. Discovering it is the realm of the manager and it is a realm to
which very few have access. Managers are the determiners and keepers of both what
is most prudent and just no matter whether the activity is drafting an article, blowing
glass, stocking shelves, working a lathe, or being a bank teller.
If owners are ignorant and therefore cannot understand the complicated
intricacies of labor, the laborers themselves are even less likely to discover the single
best way to do their jobs. The science that underlies each act of each workman is so
great and requires such great thought and planning that the workman who is best
suited to actually doing the work is incapable of fully understanding this science
without the guidance and help of those who are working with him or over him, either
through lack of education or through insufficient mental capacity (pp. 25-26). What
is needed is a professional technocracy of managerial experts whose specialty is not
each individual task of every laborer but rather is studying the tasks and determining
the most efficient means of accomplishing them, making the most of the resources in
time and human capitol so as to eliminate waste.
Statements such as those above can easily be used to support Waldo’s
assertion that Taylor viewed his laborers as draft animals. Some of this is mitigated
by Taylor’s insistence:
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In order that the work may be done in accordance with scientific laws, it is
necessary that there shall be a far more equal division of the responsibility
between the management and the workmen than exists under any of the
ordinary types of management. Those in the management whose duty it is to
develop this science should also guide and help the workman in working
under it, and should assume a much larger share of the responsibility for
results than under usual conditions is assumed by the management, (p. 26)
Furthermore:
The body of this paper will make it clear that, to work according to scientific
laws, the management must take over and perform much of the work which is
now left to the men; almost every act of the workman should be preceded by
one or more preparatory acts of the management which enable him to do his
work better and quicker than he otherwise could. And each man should daily
be taught by and receive the most friendly help from those who are over him,
instead of being, at the one extreme, driven or coerced by his bosses, and at
the other left to his own unaided devices. Close, intimate, personal
cooperation between the management and the men is the essence of modem
scientific or task management, (p. 26)
However, as admirable as it may be for managers to take more responsibility
and assume a more hands-on, relationship-driven role in the work place, Taylor’s
assumption is that the laborer has little or nothing to contribute to this process other
than his or her compliance. They lack the capacity to figure out the single best means
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to accomplish a task on their own, so there is no reason to be harsh or coercive about
it. They have simply run up against the wall of their mental abilities. If properly
shown what to do without deviation and if properly motivated by the combination of
increased wages and the pride of knowing they are producing at the maximum output,
they will give the very best of which they are capable.
Although Waldo’s characterization of Taylor’s system as “paternalism” seems
accurate, Taylor did not believe it was harsh. Instead, he believed that his system of
scientific management for all human tasks reflected the reality of human nature, at
least as it is found among those who are not bom well and inclined to be great
persons. From this perspective, Taylor’s operational anthropology can be said to be
inconsistent in that it is not applicable to all. Nowhere does he discuss the limitations
of ability or motivation of managers. The assumption can be made from his silence
that he believed the scientific managerial class suffered neither from a lack of ability
or motivation At best, he can be said to be a proponent of a viewpoint that holds, in
general, at least among the working class, there is little prudence or justice.
This is confirmed through an examination of his comments as to why workers
do not give their full effort in their work. In the introduction, Taylor lays most of the
blame for this at the feet of previous generations of workers who passed along faulty
reasoning about productivity and job loss, peer pressure to slow, and the ratifying
message of the trade unions. But in discussing some of the underlying principles of
scientific management, he makes it clear that the problem is not merely external.
Rather, “this common tendency” which already exists in each laborer to “take it easy
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is greatly increased by bringing a number of men together” (p. 19). The laziness
naturally found in the human will is fanned into flame in the context of other laborers.
He writes:
This loafing or soldiering proceeds from two causes. First, from the natural
instinct and tendency of men to take it easy, which may be called natural
soldiering. Second, from more intricate second thought and reasoning caused
by their relations with other men, which may be called systematic soldiering.
There is no question that the tendency of the average man is toward working at
a slow, easy gait, and that it is only after a good deal of thought and
observation on his part or as a result of example, conscience, or external
pressure that he takes a more rapid pace. (p. 19)
Does this same tendency exist in the wills of those who are well-born and are,
therefore, the natural inhabitants of the scientific managerial class? Is this inborn
tendency exacerbated when scientific managers are brought together in their
workplaces or social circles? The fact that such questions never seem to occur to him
provide an insight into the answers.
In Taylor’s defense, he does not conceive of every laborer, in his or her natural
state, as the productive equivalent of a two-toed sloth whose inherent laziness is
intensified by the presence of others of like mind and ability:
There are, of course, men of unusual energy, vitality, and ambition who
naturally choose the fastest gait, who set up their own standards, and who
work hard, even though it may be against their best interests. But these few
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uncommon men only serve by forming a contrast to emphasize the tendency of
the average, (p. 19)
For the common masses, the external pressure to soldier and the internal inclination
toward laziness result in an ethical breakdown:
Unfortunately for the character of the workman, soldiering involves a
deliberate attempt to mislead and deceive his employer, and thus upright and
straightforward workmen are compelled to become more or less hypocritical.
The employer is soon looked upon as an antagonist, if not an enemy, and the
mutual confidence which should exist between a leader and his men, the
enthusiasm, the feeling that they are all working for the same end and will
share in the results is entirely lacking, (p. 24)
An inherent lack of moral fortitude becomes full-blown immorality in the context of
modem industrial labor. At its base, soldiering is an injustice because laborers are, in
essence, stealing from their employers with little thought given to what they actually
owe those who have hired them.
This internal ethical weakness is not easily overcome. It is a flaw with deep
roots in the human person; so deep, in fact, that in some hard cases, it simply cannot
be uprooted:
It is not here claimed that any single panacea exists for all of the troubles of
the working-people or of employers. As long as some people are bom lazy or
inefficient, and others are bom greedy and brutal, as long as vice and crime are
with us, just so long will a certain amount of poverty, misery, and unhappiness
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be with us also. No system of management, no single expedient within the
control of any man or any set of men can insure continuous prosperity to either
workmen or employers. Prosperity depends upon so many factors entirely
beyond the control of any one set of men, any state, or even any one country,
that certain periods will inevitably come when both sides must suffer, more or
less. It is claimed, however, that under scientific management the intermediate
periods will be far more prosperous, far happier, and more free from discord
and dissension. And also, that the periods will be fewer, shorter and the
suffering less. And this will be particularly true in any one town, any one
section of the country, or any one state which first substitutes the principles of
scientific management for the rule of thumb, (p. 29)
While not quite a cure-all, Taylor believes that it is a cure-most.
At the core of his conception of human beings in virtually every endeavor is
his commitment to the idea that for every task, there is a single best way. Once this
premise is granted, it is a short leap to the conclusion that through time-studies and
careful attention to every minute detail of even the smallest job is the logical means of
determining it. Taylor does not claim that laborers do not learn on the job or that their
techniques have not evolved and improved over time. He grants that each trade has
advanced in the processes of their craft:
The ingenuity of each generation has developed quicker and better methods
for doing every element of the work in every trade. Thus the methods which
are now in use may in a broad sense be said to be an evolution representing
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the survival of the fittest and best of the ideas which have been developed
since the starting of each trade, (p. 31)
But what evolution has hinted at only comes into fruition through the lens of
the application of science to management. The shortcomings of allowing the slow
evolution of task management are obvious. If the natural resources of work were
being fully utilized for every form of work, Taylor believes it would be logical to find
that each trade had not only discovered it but also codified it. This is not the case:
Only those who are intimately acquainted with each of these trades are fully
aware of the fact that in hardly any element of any trade is there uniformity in
the methods which are used. Instead of having only one way which is
generally accepted as a standard, there are in daily use, say, fifty or a hundred
different ways of doing each element of the work. And a little thought will
make it clear that this must inevitably be the case, since our methods have
been handed down from man to man by word of mouth, or have, in most
cases, been almost unconsciously learned through personal observation.
Practically in no instances have they been codified or systematically analyzed
or described. The ingenuity and experience of each generation of each decade,
even, have without doubt handed over better methods to the next. This mass of
rule-of-thumb or traditional knowledge may be said to be the principal asset or
possession of every tradesman, (pp. 31-32)
Rules of thumb developed by the slowly turning wheels of industrial evolution
are no match for the bright light of science when it shines on labor techniques. This
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should come as little surprise to those who believe that the vast majority of workers
are not particularly intelligent, have a natural inclination to laziness, and work in a
setting which only reinforces what only makes the incline steeper. They lack the
drive to discover the one best way, the prudence to discover it even if they were so
inclined, and the justice needed to actually commit themselves to do it:
Only those among the readers of this paper who have been managers or who
have worked themselves at a trade realize how far the average workman falls
short of giving his employer his full initiative. It is well within the mark to
state that in nineteen out of twenty industrial establishments the workmen
believe it to be directly against their interests to give their employers their best
initiative, and that instead of working hard to do the largest possible amount
of work and the best quality of work for their employers, they deliberately
work as slowly as they dare while they at the same time try to make those over
them believe that they are working fast. (p. 32)
Overcoming the lack of justice issue is a key component. If this were not so,
the task of managers would be simply to discover the one best way and communicate
it to workers, who would immediately implement it. But laborers will not commit to
do their best even if they are told the techniques for doing so. Therefore, in addition
to providing the study, knowledge, and techniques necessary for maximum efficiency,
the managers are also responsible for providing incentives that will overcome the
natural inclination laborers have to do less than their best even when they are told the
means of doing so:
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The writer repeats, therefore, that in order to have any hope of obtaining the
initiative of his workmen the manager must give some special incentive to his
men beyond that which is given to the average of the trade. This incentive can
be given in several different ways, as, for example, the hope of rapid
promotion or advancement; higher wages, either in the form of generous
piecework prices or of a premium or bonus of some kind for good and rapid
work; shorter hours of labor; better surroundings and working conditions than
are ordinarily given, etc., and, above all, this special incentive should be
accompanied by that personal consideration for, and friendly contact with, his
workmen which comes only from a genuine and kindly interest in the welfare
of those under him. It is only by giving a special inducement or incentive of
this kind that the employer can hope even approximately to get the initiative of
his workmen, (pp. 33-34)
Under older models of management, according to Taylor, it was believed that
the managers provided the incentive while workers, properly incentivized, would
provide the initiative, thus overcoming the justice deficiency inherent in most workers
because of their inborn laziness. Taylor believes such systems had not worked and
would not work in the future. The problem is that initiative is left up to the laborers
and they simply lack the prudence to know what to do, how to do it, and when to do
it. They are incapable of developing the one best way. It is here that the study and
science of the managers is key for:
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Under the old type of management success depends almost entirely upon
getting the initiative of the workmen, and it is indeed a rare case in which this
initiative is really attained. Under scientific management the initiative of the
workmen (that is, their hard work, their good-will, and their ingenuity) is
obtained with absolute uniformity and to a greater extent than is possible
under the old system, (pp. 35-36)
It is actually unfair of managers to expect workers to be prudent and just in their work
as these are beyond the capacities of most. The lack of efficiency, productivity and
the waste of resources—a concern shared by Roosevelt and Taylor—is then actually
the result of faulty management. The laborers cannot be expected to either discover
or implement the single best way and so they bear little of the blame. Management’s
failure was robbing the nation of its true potential.
Taylor’s focus is not a revolution for the common laborer. Instead, his
challenge is laid squarely at the feet of managers who have not pulled their weight
and done their job. According to Taylor, there were to be four new duties for
managers:
“First. They develop a science for each element of a man’s work, which
replaces the old rule-of-thumb method. Second. They scientifically select and
then train, teach, and develop the workman, whereas in the past he chose his
own work and trained himself as best he could. Third. They heartily cooperate
with the men so as to insure all of the work being done in accordance with the
principles of the science which has been developed. Fourth. There is an
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almost equal division of the work and the responsibility between the
management and the workmen. The management takes over all work for
which they are better fitted than the workmen, while in the past almost all of
the work and the greater part of the responsibility were thrown upon the men.
(pp. 36-37)
While such an approach might be initially appealing to laborers because the
true blame for their lack of productivity is attributed to management, not to them, it is
important to think carefully about what Taylor is claiming about the majority of
laborers who encompass the majority of human adults. The lack of productivity and
the waste of resources have, at their root, an overly optimistic assessment of both the
intellectual capabilities and the ethical makeup of labor. Management has left too
much up to people who are simply incapable of rising to the occasion. Management
is to blame and their principle mistake has been the assumption that people are
generally prudent in that they will know what is good and just and will do it. The
waste of resources in industrial society came about because of faulty assumptions
about the nature of most human beings. Taylor’s operational anthropology posits that
neither of management’s assumptions about people in general are true. Taylor intends
to cast this in the context of a benefit to laborers who have been unfairly asked to do
something that they are simply incapable of doing. For true efficiency that makes the
most of the resources available, management must change. The fourth of these
elements—“an almost equal division of the responsibility between the management
and the workmen”—requires further explanation for “the philosophy of the
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management of initiative and incentive makes it necessary for each workman to bear
almost the entire responsibility for the general plan as well as for each detail of his
work, and in many cases for his implements as well. In addition to this he must do all
of the actual physical labor, (p. 37)
What Taylor advocates is:
The development of a science which involves the establishment of many rules,
laws, and formulae which replace the judgment of the individual workman and
which can be effectively used only after having been systematically recorded,
indexed, etc. The practical use of scientific data also calls for a room in which
to keep the books, records, etc., and a desk for the planner to work at. Thus all
of the planning which under the old system was done by the workman, as a
result of his personal experience, must of necessity under the new system be
done by the management in accordance with the laws of the science; because
even if the workman was well suited to the development and use of scientific
data, it would be physically impossible for him to work at his machine and at a
desk at the same time. (pp. 37-38)
When workers are asked to manage themselves and their own work, they are
being asked to do two tasks, one of which is simply beyond their grasp. If industry is
to be efficient, one core belief will have to be accepted and that is that “in most cases
one type of man is needed to plan ahead and an entirely different type to execute the
work” (p. 38). A place for everyone and everyone in their place.
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Taylor’s description of some of his experiments with pig-iron handlers is
meant to illumine how the principles he is describing can be put into action. His
phraseology is ill-chosen as he describes the work:
The pig-iron handler stoops down, picks up a pig weighing about 92 pounds,
walks for a few feet or yards and then drops it on to the ground or upon a pile.
This work is so crude and elementary in its nature that the writer firmly
believes that it would be possible to train an intelligent gorilla so as to become
a more efficient pig-iron handler than any man can be. (p. 40)
At first glance, the offensiveness of his statement is what catches the eye. But
it is important to note that Taylor observes this scene and sees profound and
complicated science at work. Taylor continues his thought and describes the core of
his book:
It will be shown that the science of handling pig iron is so great and amounts
to so much that it is impossible for the man who is best suited to this type of
work to understand the principles of this science, or even to work in
accordance with these principles without the aid of a man better educated than
he is. (p. 40)
Again, there is a mixed anthropological message. The pig-iron handler might take
pride in the idea that his task is, at its base, a matter of a significant amount of
science. But he might also be equally ashamed that he lacks the capability to
comprehend that science despite spending 50 hours a week doing it.
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Taylor does not limit this concept to pig-iron workers humping pieces of metal
from location A to location B. He intends to give additional illustrations that,
will make it clear that in almost all of the mechanic arts the science which
underlies each workman’s act is so great and amounts to so much that the
workman who is best suited actually to do the work is incapable [either
through lack of education or through insufficient mental capacity] of
understanding this science. This is announced as a general principle, (p. 41)
In the theoretical discussion, Taylor seems to lean toward a rather low
impression of the abilities and morality of workers in general. When he begins to
describe actual cases, he plummets into a kind of anthropological position that
borders on treating laborers as fancy animals. His treatment of one laborer is such as
might offend an intelligent gorilla if he were to be so treated. Taylor tells the story of
a Pennsylvanian Dutchmen who handles pig iron. The Dutchman is cheap and stupid.
His Dutch brogue is phonetically spelled out to enhance the perception of ignorance.
He is allowed no “back-talk” which means he is not allowed to express an opinion (p.
46). Taylor seems to know that his description of this laborer might be offensive to
some, but he justifies it as follows:
This seems to be rather rough talk. And indeed it would be if applied to an
educated mechanic, or even an intelligent laborer. With a man of the mentally
sluggish type of Schmidt it is appropriate and not unkind, since it is effective
in fixing his attention on the high wages which he wants and away from what,
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if it were called to his attention, he probably would consider impossibly hard
work. (p. 46)
Schmidt is not meant to be an exceptionally imprudent and unjust example. Instead,
he is meant to be the archetype of the capabilities and capacities of the average
laborer. In treating Schmidt in this manner, Taylor believes he is actually doing what
is fair, right, and appropriate to Schmidt’s class and type of human being.
Laborers’ inability to innovate and take initiative is more than a lack of mental
capability. It is a moral failure. Whatever creativity they possess is used for harm and
not good, making their kind generally unjust:
Laborers use their ingenuity to contrive various ways in which the machines
which they are running are broken or damaged—apparently by accident, or in
the regular course of work—and this they always lay at the door of the
foreman, who has forced them to drive the machine so hard that it is
overstrained and is being ruined. And there are few foremen indeed who are
able to stand up against the combined pressure of all of the men in the shop.
(p. 50)
It is not that they believe such actions to be immoral. Rather, their conception of
what is right and wrong is inherently flawed in that they believe it is a good act to
destroy or disable company equipment. Taylor says that their inverted understanding
of the good has even resulted in the threat of murder against those in shops who
refused to soldier and do less than they were capable of doing (pp. 51-52).
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For Taylor’s system to work, there must be a place for everyone and everyone
must be in their proper place. There is a certain class of person perfectly fitted for
hauling pig iron and managers must understand both the job and person best fitted to
do it:
Now one of the very first requirements for a man who is fit to handle pig iron
as a regular occupation is that he shall be so stupid and so phlegmatic that he
more nearly resembles in his mental make-up the ox than any other type. The
man who is mentally alert and intelligent is for this very reason entirely
unsuited to what would, for him, be the grinding monotony of work of this
character. Therefore the workman who is best suited to handling pig iron is
unable to understand the real science of doing this class of work. He is so
stupid that the word ‘percentage’ has no meaning to him, and he must
consequently be trained by a man more intelligent than himself into the habit
of working in accordance with the laws of this science before he can be
successful, (p. 59)
While it might be assumed that such knuckle-dragging, ignorant, phlegmatic human
persons make up only a small percentage of the population in Taylor’s mind, the
reality is that he found no shortage of such people. According to his story, “we had
not the slightest difficulty in getting all the men who were needed—some of them
from inside of the works and others from the neighboring country—who were exactly
suited to the job” (p. 60).
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As a matter of fact, what he found was that only one person in eight currently
working as a pig-iron handler was capable of the job, which meant that the other
seven were below that class (p. 60). Taylor vacillates between a lack of natural ability
and a lack of education as the potential causes for what he sees among the common
laborers, but comments such as that above demonstrate that it is his belief that the
most common cause is an undeniable lack of ability.
This belief is further demonstrated in his comments that when workers are put
into groups, as they were in post-Civil War assembly line industrial settings, the least
productive workers are not inspired or challenged by the more productive. Instead:
A careful analysis had demonstrated the fact that when workmen are herded
together in gangs, each man in the gang becomes far less efficient than when
his personal ambition is stimulated; that when men work in gangs, their
individual efficiency falls almost invariably down to or below the level of the
worst man in the gang; and that they are all pulled down instead of being
elevated by being herded together, (pp. 72-73)
Laborers are generally neither prudent nor just in their work. Even if they wanted to,
they lack the natural ability to determine the one best way. Even if they were capable
of discovering it, they would not do it. As Taylor sees it:
It is only through enforced standardization of methods, enforced adoption of
the best implements and working conditions, and enforced cooperation that
this faster work can be assured. And the duty of enforcing the adoption of
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standards and of enforcing this cooperation rests with the management alone,
(pp. 82-83)
This is true not only because this is the task of management but also because they are
the only ones capable of it.
After working his way through several examples involving multiple kinds of work
sites, Taylor’s summation of the content of scientific management is as follows:
To repeat then throughout all of these illustrations, it will be seen that the
useful results have hinged mainly upon (1) the substitution of a science for the
individual judgment of the workman; (2) the scientific selection and
development of the workman, after each man has been studied, taught, and
trained, and one may say experimented with, instead of allowing the workmen
to select themselves and develop in a haphazard way; and (3) the intimate
cooperation of the management with the workmen, so that they together do the
work in accordance with the scientific laws which have been developed,
instead of leaving the solution of each problem in the hands of the individual
workman. In applying these new principles, in place of the old individual
effort of each workman, both sides share almost equally in the daily
performance of each task, the management doing that part of the work for
which they are best fitted, and the workmen the balance, (p. 114)
Taylor’s theory is not built upon anthropological assumptions unnamed or
unexplored by him. He is aware that his research has been built on certain
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assumptions and that his research has led him to concrete conclusions about the
nature of the human person. In the final pages of his book, he writes:
There is another type of scientific investigation which has been referred to
several times in this paper, and which should receive special attention,
namely, the accurate study of the motives which influence men. At first it may
appear that this is a matter for individual observation and judgment, and is not
a proper subject for exact scientific experiments. It is true that the laws which
result from experiments of this class, owing to the fact that the very complex
organism—the human being—is being experimented with, are subject to a
larger number of exceptions than is the case with laws relating to material
things. And yet laws of this kind, which apply to a large majority of men,
unquestionably exist, and when clearly defined are of great value as a guide in
dealing with men. In developing these laws, accurate, carefully planned and
executed experiments, extending through a term of years, have been made,
similar in a general way to the experiments upon various other elements which
have been referred to in this paper, (pp. 118-119)
Those who study and theorize about management must be students of human nature,
not simply out of interest but because the results and conclusions of such studies
relate directly to the science of management.
Taylor’s concern is not only for an understanding of human beings as they are
but also as they will become under his system. Clearly he had heard critiques of his
theory that amounted to a charge of treating human beings like machines and, thus,
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turning them into parts in a machine. He does not see it this way. Instead, he views
scientific management as consistent with and most applicable to the newly
industrialized world of specialization. The days of the generalist were ending. The
era of specific people doing very specific tasks through division of labor had begun,
rendering older models of management and work obsolete:
Now, when through all of this teaching and this minute instruction the work is
apparently made so smooth and easy for the workman, the first impression is
that this all tends to make him a mere automaton, a wooden man. As the
workmen frequently say when they first come under this system, “Why, I am
not allowed to think or move without some one interfering or doing it for me!”
The same criticism and objection, however, can be raised against all other
modem subdivision of labor. It does not follow, for example, that the modem
surgeon is any more narrow or wooden a man than the early settler of this
country. The frontiersman, however, had to be not only a surgeon, but also an
architect, housebuilder, lumberman, farmer, soldier, and doctor, and he had to
settle his law cases with a gun. You would hardly say that the life of the
modem surgeon is any more narrowing, or that he is more of a wooden man
than the frontiersman. The many problems to be met and solved by the
surgeon are just as intricate and difficult and as developing and broadening in
their way as were those of the frontiersman, (p. 125)
Generalists might have been the order of the day in a different economy, but in
industrialization, if President Roosevelt’s call for efficiency and an end to wasting of
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resources was to be realized, people must be dividing according to their abilities. A
place for everyone and everyone in their place. The industrial world should not view
this as a compromise of human dignity. Instead, it should be seen as an opportunity to
make the most of the abilities of the natural resources of human labor.
He believed his system was not the caste system some might think it to be.
Instead, it was a meritocracy. Those few with high levels of ability who were
occasionally found among the common workers had an opportunity for advancement.
Taylor surely considered himself a prime example, moving from laborer to gang-boss,
foreman, and finally chief engineer in a period of six years. Of course, a basic level
of competency is required for such upward mobility, something he believed to be
uncommon among laborers. Despite its infrequency:
The workman who is cooperating with his many teachers under scientific
management has an opportunity to develop which is at least as good as and
generally better than that which he had when the whole problem was “up to
him” and he did his work entirely unaided. If it were true that the workman
would develop into a larger and finer man without all of this teaching, and
without the help of the laws which have been formulated for doing his
particular job, then it would follow that the young man who now comes to
college to have the help of a teacher in mathematics, physics, chemistry, Latin,
Greek, etc., would do better to study these things unaided and by himself. The
only difference in the two cases is that students come to their teachers, while
from the nature of the work done by the mechanic under scientific
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management, the teachers must go to him. What really happens is that, with
the aid of the science which is invariably developed, and through the
instructions from his teachers, each workman of a given intellectual capacity
is enabled to do a much higher, more interesting, and finally more developing
and more profitable kind of work than he was before able to do. The laborer
who before was unable to do anything beyond, perhaps, shoveling and
wheeling dirt from place to place, or carrying the work from one part of the
shop to another, is in many cases taught to do the more elementary machinist's
work, accompanied by the agreeable surroundings and the interesting variety
and higher wages which go with the machinist’s trade. The cheap machinist or
helper, who before was able to run perhaps merely a drill press, is taught to do
the more intricate and higher priced lathe and planer work, while the highly
skilled and more intelligent machinists become functional foremen and
teachers. And so on, right up the line. (pp. 126-127)
Despite his earlier described treatment of Schmidt, who was not allowed any
“back-talk,” Taylor ends his book attempting to speak in more general terms of the
contributions laborers can potentially make to the scientific analysis of the jobs they
do daily:
It is true that with scientific management the workman is not allowed to use
whatever implements and methods he sees fit in the daily practise of his work.
Every encouragement, however, should be given him to suggest
improvements, both in methods and in implements. And whenever a workman
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proposes an improvement, it should be the policy of the management to make
a careful analysis of the new method, and if necessary conduct a series of
experiments to determine accurately the relative merit of the new suggestion
and of the old standard, And whenever the new method is found to be
markedly superior to the old, it should be adopted as the standard for the
whole establishment. The workman should be given the full credit for the
improvement, and should be paid a cash premium as a reward for his
ingenuity. In this way the true initiative of the workmen is better attained
under scientific management than under the old individual plan. (pp. 127-128)
Taylor fully expected the transition of older management models to scientific
management to occur over time and cautioned against a quick implementation of his
ideas. He believed that the workers needed to be brought on board gradually,
“through the presentation of many object-lessons, which, together with the teaching
which he received, thoroughly convince him of the superiority of the new over the old
way of doing the work” (p. 113).
Perhaps anticipating the objections that would be raised as his theories were
disseminated via his book, he ends by pointing out two important features. The first
is that he believes that the good of the laborer is of central concern to his system.
Reflecting on the transitions which took place in the industrial settings in which he
implemented his theories, he highlights the prudence and justice of the managers with
whom he had worked: “Those who undertook to make this change were men of
unusual ability, and were at the same time enthusiasts and I think had the interests of
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the workmen truly at heart” (p. 132). Their abilities made them prudent. Their
concern for the laborers made them just.
To reinforce the issue of justice, Taylor points out that despite strikes that
were occurring around the nation in his day of labor unrest, “during the thirty years
that we have been engaged in introducing scientific management there has not been a
single strike from those who were working in accordance with its principles, even
during the critical period when the change was being made from the old to the new”
(p. 135). To those who might be critical of his assumptions about and treatment of
human beings as “draft animals,” his response was that the proof was in the mix of
higher wages for laborers, greater profits for owners, and little social upheaval in the
workforce.
Placing Taylor’s theory in the prudence/justice grid is more complicated that
finding a single point of intersection. His theory of human depends on which class of
humanity is being discussed: owners, workers, or managers. About owners, Taylor
says very little. It is safe to assume that that he places them above the worker class
given the fact that they own rather than operate industrial plants, but he is silent as to
their level of prudence or justice, only commenting that they lack the technical and
specific knowledge necessary to directly the tasks done in the factories they own.
Laborers are, generally, people of little prudence or wisdom. A handful might
have the ability to rise above their stations—Taylor himself is an example—but by in
large, they cannot be expected to display either virtue. They will work at the lowest
rate of production possible unless incentivized to live up to their potential. They do
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not know what is good and, even if they did, are not inclined to do it. On the grid of
prudence and knowledge, they are to be found in the lower-left quadrant.
Managers, in Taylor’s view, are in the upper-right quadrant. Those who are
especially adept managers approach Aristotle’s philosopher-kings. They are generally
both well-born and well-educated as a high station at birth is not sufficient for
entering the managerial class. Managers are prudent in that they know how to
determine what ought to be done. They hold the key to discovering the single best
way to do a particular task through the application of scientific management. They
will make the most of human and natural resources. At the same time, they are just,
benevolent, and paternalistic in that they are fully cognizant of the mental and moral
limitations so commonly found in laborers. They know what is prudent for people
who are not capable of acquiring such knowledge and they are committed to using
this knowledge to benefit even those who lack it and hold no prospect of gaining it.

Frederick Taylor

Justice
Figure 6. Frederick Taylor
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Herbert Simon’s Administrative Behavior

The second book to be included in this project, and the overwhelming winner
of Sherwood’s 50 greatest books on the theory of public administration survey, is
Herbert Simon’s Administrative Behavior. First published in 1947, it sold only 1,900
copies in its first 12 months. Its influence, however, grew over time. By 1990, it had
sold over 150,000 copies, had been translated in 12 languages, and was still in print
having gone through several editions. It is the only book on the list whose author won
a Nobel Prize, awarded in 1978.
Whereas Frederick Taylor’s professional interests focused primarily on
developing and honing the tools and procedures of scientific management, Herbert
Simon was a Renaissance man whose interests spanned public administration,
philosophy, computer science, cognitive psychology, and economic sociology. He
won awards for his work in artificial intelligence, psychology, and, in 1978, was
awarded a Nobel Prize in economics.
Simon was raised in a bright and inquisitive home. His father was an
immigrant from Germany with professional interests in engineering, design, and law.
His mother was an accomplished musician. Following his childhood in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, he began his post-high school education at the University of Chicago in
1933, focusing on mathematics and social sciences. The combination of math and
social sciences sparked an interest in organizational decision-making, an area that
eventually would become the subject of his dissertation, which was printed as his first
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and most influential book: Administrative Behavior. His career revolved around
universities and research groups and focused on the intersection of microeconomics,
decision-making, and organization structures. In later years, decision-making
computer simulations occupied much of his attention.
In some ways, Simon’s training and perhaps general outlook was similar to
Taylor’s. Both had a fondness for numbers, math, and modeling in their own way.
Taylor would have had a deep appreciation for computer modeling, had the
technology been available in his lifetime, and likely would have made great use of it
in determining what he would have considered the single best way to accomplish a
task or series of tasks. He would not have appreciated Simon’s rejection of the search
for a single best way based on environmental and situational variations.
The two share other similarities. Taylor’s writing appears harsh to theorists
whose work post-dates his. Waldo described Taylorism as being built upon a “spirit
of cold, scientific self-calculation” (p. 83). The same can be said of Simon whose
mathematical models and computer simulations were used to determine how human
beings make decisions. His concept of “bounded rationality,” however, demonstrates
that he recognizes the limitation of pure reason in decision-making. While it might be
largely rational, rationality is limited by other factors, including incomplete
knowledge and the inability to process information.
In the introduction to the second edition, written in 1975, Simon describes his
work as a voyage of “discovery into human-decision making” (p. ix). The “what” of
decision-making is of lesser interest to him than the “how.” It is his desire to break
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decisions into their components the way a physicist might break atoms into their
subatomic particles: “We regard human choice as a process of ‘drawing conclusions
from premises’. It is therefore the premise [and a large number of these are combined
in every decision] rather than the whole decision that serves as the smallest unit of
analysis” (p. xii). It is Simon’s contention that too much attention has been given to
matters of role and action.
There is something mechanistic about Simon’s conception of how human
beings actually make decisions. He rejects the notion that decisions are made strictly
depending on the roles that human beings play in their organizational life because “it
does not leave any room for rationality in behavior” (p. xxxvii). The focus ought to
be on the rationality of decision-making with specific focus on the premises not only
because it can explain what has been done but also because, “Behavior can be
predicted. . . when the premises of a decision are known [or can be predicted] in
sufficient detail” (p. xxxvii). Predictability is key not only in public administration
but to every form of human organization. The ability to say with relative certainly
what decision a person or persons will make within an organization would greatly
increase efficiency, how rules are made, and the manner in which training is done.
Simon’s focus is not on the individual. Instead, his attention is on how
individuals functions within an organization. He is aware that the relationship
between person and organization is not a one-way street. The human person has an
impact on the organization, but the organizational setting also has a profound
influence on the person: “A man does not live for months or years in a particular
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position in an organization, exposed to some streams of communication, shielded
from others, without the most profound effects upon what he knows, believes, attends
to, hopes, wishes, emphasizes, fears, and proposes” (p. xvi). Another way to think
about this is that people in organizations are not unmoved movers of their
organizations but are profoundly shaped by them:
Organization is important, first, because organizational environments provide
much of the force that molds and develops personal qualities and habits.
Organization is important, second, because it provides those in responsible
positions the means for exercising authority and influence over others.
Organization is important, third, because, by structuring communications, it
determines the environments of information in which decisions are taken, (p.
xvi)
Of course, Simon has said nothing of prudence or justice to this point. His
human person within the organization appears to come to the organization akin to a
computer with room for additional programs which will have an impact on everything
that has already been downloaded to the hard drive. Simon’s organization human is
changed by the organization at least as much as they change it. Those entering such a
setting become part of a “complex pattern of communication and relationships in a
group of human beings” (p. xvii). He has little to say about the state of human
nature prior to entering such a complex entity. Instead, the organization,
provides to each member of the group much of the information and
many of the assumptions, goals, and attitudes that enter into his
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decisions, and provides him also with a set of stable and
comprehensible expectations as to what the other members of the
group are doing and how they will react to what he says and does. (p.
xvii)
What role can rationality play in the decision-making that occurs within such a
setting? The person in the organization is so deeply affected by operating within a
setting where assumptions, goals, attitudes, and expectations are imposed that it is
difficult to know how rationality might play a role. What he has in mind is not
rationality as a kind of ontological sense of a person coming to the correct
conclusions by considering the strengths and weaknesses of various options. Instead,
his definition of rationality is whether a person makes decisions that are consistent
with the assumptions, goals, attitudes, and expectations that already exist in the
organization. It is as if the person in the organization brings little to it but is filled by
it.
Simon seeks to avoid what he calls the two extremes of thinking about the role
of rationality:
At one extreme, the economists attribute to economic man a preposterously
omniscient rationality. Economic man has a complete and consistent system
of preferences that allows him always to choose among the alternatives open
to him; he is always completely aware of what these alternatives are; there are
no limits on the complexity of the computations he can perform in order to
determine which alternatives are best; probability calculations are neither
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frightening nor mysterious to him. Within this past generation, in its
extension to comparative game situations and to decision-making under
uncertainty, this body of theory has reached a state of Thomistic refinement
having great intellectual and esthetic appeal but little discernible relation to
the actual or possible behavior of flesh-and-blood human beings, (pp. xxvixxvii)
In other words, human persons are limited in their capacity to be prudent and just
given their inability to know and understand all options as well as how choosing one
option might influence others.
However, not all can be assigned to the realm of the emotions either: “At the
other extreme are those tendencies in social psychology traceable to Freud that try to
reduce all cognition to affect

The past generation of behavioral scientists has been

busy, following Freud, showing that people are not nearly as rational as they thought
they were” (p. xxvii).
The human person entering the organization is neither all logic nor all
emotion. Simon hopes to land in the middle, which he believes is what “we should
expect actually to see it in real life” (p. xxvvii). This conception of the human person
is more humane and less computer-like than might first appear to be the case. Human
persons are neither information-processing systems nor are they pure emotion and
instinct. They choose among options but with incomplete information. Affect plays a
role, but assigning all decision-making to it would not represent real life. A fine line
must be traveled between the two to come to a true understanding of the human
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person within the organizational structure, for as Simon points out, “The central
concern of administrative theory is with the boundary between the rational and the
nonrational aspects of human social behavior” (p. xxviii).
The human person is a complex being who “deals with the real world in all its
complexities” (p. xxix). In this world, prudence and justice cannot be perfectly
achieved because rationality is limited. Economic Human is a fallacy. Reality is
much more analogous to Administrative Human. In his comparison of the two, he
writes, “Whereas economic man maximizes—selects the best alternative from among
all those available to him, his cousin, administrative man, satifices—looks for a
course of action that is satisfactory or ‘good enough’” (p. xxix). Prudence and justice,
in this way of conceiving of the human person, can only be shades of gray.
Rationality is operative, but it cannot escape the borders of the limitations of
knowledge, affect, and the inability to process all possible options.
Administrative Man uses a “drastically simplified model” of human life,
taking “into account just a few of the factors that he regards as most relevant and
crucial” (pp. xxix-xxx). Why does Administrative Human limit herself or himself in
such a fashion? Because “administrative man can make his decisions with relatively
simple rules of thumb that do not make impossible demands upon his capacity for
thought” (p. xxx).
In Simon’s perspective, it is not possible to seek a single best way to do a
particular task. Human beings are bound in their rationality so that it simply is
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impossible to consider all the options and find the very best one on which all could
agree. In Taylor’s search, he:
mistakenly sought to discover categorical and invariant ‘principles’ of
organization, applicable unqualifiedly to all organizations at all times. The
‘principles’ have gradually been yielding to a vigorous stream of criticism and
empirical research that has shown that an organization can be effective only if
its design is appropriate to its functions and to its social and technical
environment, (p. xxxviii)
What is determined to be the one best way in one setting, even if that were possible,
could not be assumed to be the one best way in another. Whereas Taylor virtually
ignores environmental influences in decision-making, Simon makes them royalty.
Human beings do have rationality that is operational in decision-making. If it
were not, decision-making itself would not be possible. Making decisions means that
people with limited knowledge and limited processing ability make choices within a
specific environment. Clearly, prudence, which is the ability to consider options and
choose what is best, and justice, which is the ability to consider the rightful claims of
others, must be a part of choosing.
Simon identifies two parts or stages to decision-making:
An initial stage of problem formulation, during which the problem solver
arrives at a way of representing the problem situation, and a subsequent stage
during which he manipulates the problem situation, with the representation he
has adopted, in a succession of efforts to find a solution, (p. xxxix)
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While he does not make an explicit egalitarian claim that all people possess the same
level of ability to know, process, and decide, it is clear that he believes these
capabilities to be broadly rather than narrowly dispersed. He does not mention class
or occupation or educational level where these abilities are higher functioning or
lower functioning. He acknowledges there is a ceiling to knowledge and processing
in making decisions but does not address the floor.
Simon’s emphasis is on the process by which one arrives at a decision. Simon
considers process to be at least as important as action within an organization because
deciding “pervades the entire administrative organization quite as much as does the
task of ‘doing’” (p. 1). He acknowledges that various kinds of organizations have
different levels of decision-making built into them because of the nature of the
organization. He believes that decisions are made at every level no matter if the
organization under the microscope is the military, an assembly line, or an office. He
does not disparage the role of those at the lower end of the decision-making chain
because he knows that they too make decisions daily. The person in the lower echelon
of the organization is not the sheep that Taylor considers him or her to be. Simon
readily accepts bureaucracy and hierarchy as playing a role in decision-making. His
focus is really on the “administrative or supervisory staff.” However, every person
within the organization is an important link in the decision-making chain in that
limited options are considered, choices are made, and potential actions are realized.
In Simon’s conception, there is little consideration that those within a hierarchical
structure are both the influenced and the influencer. Decisions mostly flow down. It
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does not seem to occur to him that influence and even decision-making might have an
influence further up the decision-making ladder.
The role of rationality and Simon’s understanding of it are significant. To be
rational does not mean necessarily choosing that which is prudent or just. Rationality
is not even always at the level of consciousness, for “all behavior involves conscious
or unconscious selection of particular actions out of all those who are physically
possible to the actor” (p. 3). Not all action is deliberate in that the person thought
through several options first and then made a choice. Some decisions are clearly
reflex, but even in these instances, “the action is, in some sense, rational” (p. 3).
Simon’s definition of rationality at this point seems to be stretched. If rationality
involves making a choice among options—an action that seemingly needs to be done
consciously and involves consideration of the options prior to action—how can reflex
be said to be rational?
The answer depends on his definition of rationality. For Simon, rationality
does not necessarily mean that all or even most of the options are considered. Instead,
what is rational is that which is “goal-oriented” (p. 4). Ducking when an object is
thrown at one’s face is rational despite the fact that such an action might be described
as mere reflex because it is consistent with the overall goal of self preservation.
Applied to the context of the organization, decision-making “is purposive-oriented
toward goals or objectives. This purposiveness brings about an integration in the
pattern of behavior, in the absence of which administration would be meaningless” (p.
4).
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Where do prudence and justice fit into this conception of the rationality of
decision-making? If rationality is defined as that which is consistent with the goals
and objectives of the organization and irrationality is defined as that which is
inconsistent with the goals and objectives of the organization, do prudence and justice
have a voice? Perhaps, but that voice is not easily discerned. Simon would likely
agree that in considering which options should be chosen as the means most
consistent with the goals or objectives of the organization, prudence and justice would
have some minor role.
Their major role, if they indeed have one in decision-making, is more
operational in what Simon calls “value judgments” as opposed to “factual
judgments.” Value judgments are “decisions which lead toward the selection of final
goals,” whereas factual judgments are those that “involve the implementation” of
final goals (pp. 4-5). Value judgments are most often made at the highest level of an
organization. In public policy and public administration, the “goals or final objectives
of government organization and activity are usually formulated in very general and
ambiguous terms— ‘justice,’ ‘the general welfare,’ or ‘liberty’” (p. 5). He does not
bother to flesh out what such general concepts might mean nor does he seem
interested in exploring how they might be operative not only among those who are
making value judgments but also among those who are implementing what has been
chosen. For Simon, in most instances, someone else chooses the goals and objectives.
His interest is in how decisions are guided by them and whether or not the decisions
made are consistent with them. It is here that behavior is purposive or rational for
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behavior is purposive in so far as it is guided by general goals or objectives; it is
rational in so far as it selects alternatives which are conducive to the achievement of
the previously selected goals (p. 5).
Such a construct leaves itself open to wonderings about the nature of ethics
within an organization. A Jesuit ethic of the ends justifying any means could be
defended within such a construct. Factual judgments, in Simon’s understanding, are
rational if only they are consistent with the achievement of goals set by those who
occupy a higher level of decision-making and are those who are responsible for value
judgments. The factual-judgment level implies that most persons operate at this level
within their organizations and that they have little influence over what kind of value
judgments are made. Their role is not to question why. Their role is to do or die.
In this conception, most people within an organization are worker bees who
either are incapable of value considerations or simply do not think of such
considerations. Their role is to decide how to implement and not whether the
implementation of such a value judgment might be foolish, harmful, unjust, or simply
wrong. Could the Nuremburg trials have rested on the illegality of crimes against
humanity for anyone other than those at the level of value judgments? The defense of
“I was just following orders” would hold water in Simon’s dichotomy of value and
factual judgments. Concentration camp administrators could be help account for how
well or efficiently they carried out orders but not for the orders themselves.
Simon’s value/factual judgments distinction can also be observed within the
organization itself. There are two types of employees: “operative” employees whose
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focus is making factual judgments and “administrative” employees whose
responsibility it is to ensure that the value judgments are communicated to and
embraced by operative employees who actually make on-the-ground decisions. The
operative employee’s responsibility is to buy into the value judgments of those who
lead the organization. The administrative employee’s role is “establishing in the
operative employee himself the attitudes, habits, and a state of mind which lead him
to reach that decision which is advantageous to the organization” (p. 11). Such
establishment is realized by imposing on the operative employee decisions reached
elsewhere in the organization. The administrator “does not seek to convince the
subordinate, but only to obtain his acquiescence” (p. 11). It is not a matter of
explaining the situation or explaining the choices as well as which one would be best
in achieving the goals of the organization. The obedience of the operative “depends
on the sanctions which authority has available to enforce its commands” (p. 12). It is
carrots and sticks, but mostly sticks.
Taylor would have agreed and asserted that the carrot and stick are necessary
to counter the influence of the group mentality that developed among workers which
encouraged them to perform at the lowest level possible. Simon agreed that the
influence of group mentality was formative, but he does not see this as something that
must be broken. Instead, the administrator must use the group to guide the decisions
of the operative.
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Above the administrators are those who make the ultimate value judgments,
be they owners, board members, or elected officials. Their role is to limit the range of
values that will guide the decisions of the administrators, for:
If an administrator, each time he is faced with a decision, must perforce
evaluate that decision in terms of the whole range of human values, rationality
in administration is impossible. If he need consider the decision only in the
light of limited organization aims, his task is more nearly within the range of
human powers, (p. 13)
The chain of command, then, consists of owners, board members or elected
officials who set the range of values that serve as the arena in which the
administrators make decisions that guide the actions of the operatives who are
motivated both by positive and negative reinforcement through reward, punishment,
and the context within which they operate.
Simon recognizes that this uncomplicated system holds within it the
possibility of significant interest conflicts in complex organizations. The larger the
organization, the more likely conflicts become. In situations where an administrator
has oversight over multiple sub-agencies, the administrator will likely be conflicted in
that one will might receive more resources and one might receive less or what would
benefit one might damage another.
In the context of public administration, “the higher we go in the administrative
hierarchy, and the broader becomes the range of social values that must come within
the administrator’s purview, the more harmful is the effect of valuation bias, and the
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more important is it that the administrator be freed from his narrower identifications”
(p. 14).
An interesting dynamic, then, occurs as one advances to the higher echelons of
the hierarchy. At the level of the operative, the chief issue is compliance, which
involves a minimal amount of consideration of either prudence or justice.
Administrators operate within a narrow range of choices set for them by those higher
up the hierarchy. Their true focus is an applied but bounded rationality that makes
use of the resources at their disposal toward the most efficacious achievement of the
goals of the organization. They “enforce the conformity of the individual to norms
laid down by the group” (p. 10). Prudence and justice are more operative here than at
the level of the operative as administrators consider the most effective means of
bringing about the desired compliance. They are not, however, involved in the
selection of values: “the efficiency criterion is completely neutral as to what goals are
to be attained” (p. 14). The role of the administrator is to be efficient, which “simply
means to take the shortest path, the cheapest means, toward the attainment of the
desired goals” (p. 14). For administrators to involve themselves in matters of value
judgments would be neither prudent nor wise.
At the top of the hierarchy are those who must be most concerned with
prudence and justice as they decide the values of the organization. In public
administration, the range of social values includes things like justice and the common
good, which certainly is a matter of prudence. Simon is least interested in how such
value decisions are made and very nearly completely ignores this group. His
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assumption is that these have been set and his focus is on how administrators work
within the range of decision-making options that have been created for them by those
above them and how they bring them to life for those beneath them.
There is a strong military sense about this structure. Operatives comply. They
follow the orders they are given without question, discussion, or input. Those above
them in the chain of command operate within a range of choices, but the range and the
final objectives are chosen by a commander-in-chief. In many ways, Simon’s system
is not dissimilar to Taylor’s. Taylor argues that the administrator’s or manager’s task
is to scientifically study each movement of those down the chain of command to
ensure that the single best way of performing the movement is discovered and
implemented. For Simon, there is more room for discernment available to the
administrator because different situations will require different techniques. But on the
whole, the two systems appear to be variations on the same theme.
One significant difference does arise. Taylor’s system is built on putting the
“right man” in the right position. A caste system undergirds his conception of the
workforce. Those at the lowest level must be constantly monitored, measured, and
overseen. Without this oversight, workers would quickly revert back to their natural
tendencies toward laziness and a minimalist approach. Simon is more positive. With
the proper incentives and disincentives, operatives will internalize the procedures. He
asserts that “training prepares the organizational member to reach satisfactory
decisions himself, without the need for the constant exercise of authority or advice”
(p. 14). Proper training will create bounded rationality which in turn will produce
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prudence and justice in the limited decisions that administrators and operatives are
allowed to make. If done properly, “training procedures are alternatives to the
exercise of authority or advice as means of control over the subordinate’s decisions”
so that “it may be possible to minimize, or even dispense with, certain review
processes” (p. 15). Such training can be accomplished via a wide range of
techniques. Those conducting the training “may supply the trainee with the facts
necessary in dealing with these decisions; it may provide a frame of reference for his
thinking; it may teach him ‘approved’ solutions; or it may indoctrinate him with the
values in terms of which his decisions are to be made” (p. 16). Compared to Taylor,
Simon holds a higher degree of appreciation for the talents of every level within the
organization. There is no sense of caste. There is only proper training.
Taylor’s focus was the manager. Simon’s focus is the administrator. The two
share much in common. Their mutual goal is efficiency. They both seek the
elimination of the waste of resources. Simon’s ‘administrative man’ is rational and
careful in the allocation of resources. He follows the simply guideline that “among
several alternatives involving the same expenditure the one should always be selected
which leads to the greatest accomplishment of administrative objectives; and among
several that lead to the same accomplishment the one should be selected which
involved the least expenditure” (pp. 38-39). Simon recognizes that what he is
applying to administration has long been advocated by economic theorists:
Since this ‘principle of efficiency’ is characteristic of any activity that attempts
rationality to maximize the attainment of certain ends with the use of scarce
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means, it is as characteristic of economic theory as it is of administrative
theory. The ‘administrative man’ takes his place alongside the classical
‘economic man.’ (p. 39)
Simon’s interest and work in economics makes this the central focus of his
administrative theory. By focusing on the rationality of decision-making, Simon
wants to raise administration to the same footing as the study of economics. While
Taylor sought to legitimize administration through the application of the principles of
physical science and engineering, Simon seeks legitimization through the principles
of classic economics. Relying on proverbs will render administration a second-class
field of inquiry. Attention must be given to how administrators allocate scarce
resources in achieving goals.
The rationality inherent in classic economics is what drives good or correct
administration to a degree that renders Simon closer than he might have appreciated
to Taylor’s search for the one best way: ‘Two persons, given the same skills, the same
objectives and values, the same knowledge and information, can rationally decide
only upon the same course of action” (p. 39). Simon’s rational administrator is
computer-like: as long as proper programming is done and the correct dataset is
provided, one computer will render the same conclusion as any other. In such a
conception is found the key to moving the science of administration from a collection
of loosely connected and frequently contradictory proverbs to a science where
behavior can be both explained and predicted, similar to that of economics. Simon’s
organizational person operates with rationality within boundaries and is no more or
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less rational than a human person within the context of economics. Both face the
same limitations, which, in administration, Simon lists as the “speed of mental
processes,” the person’s “values and conceptions of purpose” of the organization, and
the “extent of knowledge of things relevant to his job.” Of course, with slight
adjustment, each of these would be readily accepted by any classic economist.
Simon’s pragmatism is not lacking philosophical reflection, although he
chooses to begin from a rather odd point. Instead of laying out and defending his
philosophical underpinnings, he writes, “the conclusions reached by a particular
school of modem philosophy—logical positivism—will be accepted as a starting
point, and their implications for the theory of decisions examined” (p. 45).
It is important to understand some of the basics of logical positivism or, as it
is sometimes called, logical empiricism to understand some of the a priori
assumptions Simon accepts at face value, as if they need no defense. Without an
entry level understanding of logical positivism, it is difficult to grasp what Simon is
expressing in his distinction between fact and value in decision-making. Acceptance
of the tenets of logical positivism, for Simon and most other adherents to the school,
ends the discussion about the role of ethics, prudence, justice, or any other form of
metaphysical consideration.
Logical positivism, at its core, is a combination of the empiricism and
rationalism. The experiential and the rational are the basis of all knowledge that can
be truly known. Metaphysics and ethics are in essence without meaning. Such things
cannot be unknown, proven, or disproven. Rudolph Carnap was one of its leading
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lights in the early twentieth century. Carnap attempted to develop artificial languages
based on math and logic that could be used as a way of dealing with philosophical
problems. It is not difficult to see that Carnap’s conception was completely
compatible with the development of computer languages built on ones and zeroes
which could guide sophisticated computer generated models of logic.
Simon was a student of Carnap and held him in high regard. Simon’s choice
of logical positivism as the philosophical basis of his thinking on administrative
decision-making produces a rather cold, computer-like, inhumane conception where,
as for Taylor, there is “a place for everything and everything in its place.” The
metaphysical meaning or purpose of the work of a common person is of no
consideration. What matters is measurable and efficient achievement of goals
through the compliance of the worker.
Is there an ethical factor in decision-making? At first, Simon seems to agree
that, indeed, there is:
Decisions are something more than factual propositions. To be sure, they are
descriptive of a future state of affairs, and this description can be true or false
in a strictly empirical sense; but they posses, in addition, an imperative
quality—they select one future state of affairs in preference to another and
direct behavior toward the chosen alternative. In short, they have an ethical as
well as factual content, (p. 46, italics his)
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It seems logical to him that in choosing one’s preferred future, there must be some
ethical component. Is the choice prudent? Is it just to others? Such questions do not
seem outside of realm logic.
But on the very same page, Simon concludes:
The question of whether decisions can be correct and incorrect resolves itself,
then, into the question of whether ethical terms like ‘ought,’ ‘good,’ and
‘preferable’ have a purely empirical meaning. It is a fundamental premise of
this study that ethical terms are not completely reducible to factual terms. No
attempt will be made here to demonstrate conclusively the correctness of this
view toward ethical propositions; the justification has been set forth at length
by logical positivists and others, (p. 46)
According to Simon, “there is no way in which the correctness of ethic propositions
can be empirically or rationally tested,” and this, of course, is the kiss of death for a
logical positivist who dismisses anything that cannot be tested via logic or experience
(p. 46). Evaluating decisions on an ethical basis is unscientific, illogical, and can be
considered a waste of time.
How does he square these? He agrees that as a person chooses a preferred
future, ethics must be part of the discussion. But then he proceeds to reject any role
for considering the ethics of a particular decision because they cannot be empirically
or rationally tested. His solution is as follows: ‘The important point for this present
discussion is that any statement that contains an ethical element, intermediate or final,
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cannot be described as correct or incorrect, and that the decision-making process must
start with some ethical premise that is taken as a ‘given’” (p. 50).
The questions quickly arise as to which “givens” ought to operate and who
ought to choose them. This is where Simon’s hierarchy serves him well. Within the
organization, the “givens” are truly given. Administrators decide how to most
efficiently achieve the givens. Operatives merely comply with the plans of the
administrators. Neither has input into the givens, which do not appear to be
negotiable. It is for this reason that they are givens. Those who give them are the
owners and board members in business and legislators in the government: “The
ethical premise [the given mentioned above] describes the objective of the
organization in question” (p. 50).
There remains in Simon a separation between public administrators and
legislators. Public administrators remain apolitical and neutral. It is not their place to
question the ethical givens or the organizational objectives that come from them. As
Simon writes:
In order for an ethical proposition to be useful for rational decision-making,
(a) the values taken as organizational objectives must be definite, so that their
degree of realization in any situation can be assessed, and (b) it must be
possible to form judgments as to the probability that particular actions will
implement these objectives, (p. 50)
Prudence and wisdom, as was already made clear, are matters of consideration for
those at the top of the hierarchy. These must be made crisp and clear for both
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administrators and operatives. Ethical considerations are directly connected to
objectives, not to means. If means have an ethical component, it is only so far as they
are connected to the objective. In this construction, means have only derived ethical
components, not direct, for as Simon comments, “most objectives and activities
derive their value from the means-ends relationships with them with objectives or
activities that are valued in themselves. By a process of anticipation, the value
inherent in the desired end is transferred to the means” (p. 52).
At first glance, it appears that Simon is a defender of a philosophical oligarchy
where a handful of legislators, owners, and board members set the objectives and
make the necessary moral decisions in culture. This assertion is true of Simon who
locates most prudence and justice in the managers who, through science, know not
only what the right thing to do is but also the one best way to do it. Simon’s
conception is not so simple. He loops back around to democracy and denies any such
role for his administrators/managers. They are specialists in one area and have no
business involving themselves in determining the objectives which they are to seek to
attain. In the realm of government:
Democratic institutions find their principal justification as a procedure for the
validation of value judgments. There is no ‘scientific’ or ‘expert’ way of
making such judgments, hence expertise of whatever kind is no qualification
for the performance of this function. If the factual elements in decision could
be strictly separated, in practice, from the ethical, the proper roles of
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representative and expert in a democratic decision-making process would be
simple, (p. 57)
Simon’s conception of the relationship of public policy, public administrators,
and citizens is a fascinating one. Legislators decide the objectives, which include a
consideration of prudence, justice, and other ethical matters. Public administrators
rationally seek the most effective and efficient means of achieving those objectives.
They play the role of specialists and experts who can discover the best means of
achieving the objectives but cannot be relied on to determine the objectives because
to do so would be out of their realm of expertise. Administrators are not better
persons nor does the existence of a specialized knowledge carry over into all decision
making so that they become philosopher-kings. The operatives lend their compliance
to the administrators and, ultimately, to the legislators by simply doing what they are
told. The system is given moral legitimacy and validation in that those legislators
who determine the objectives are democratically elected and responsible to the
citizens who have elected them.
This is a significant difference with Taylorism. Taylor believed that workers
or operatives were not capable of deciding either objectives or means. Owners, in
most instances, were too distant from the work to comment either on the objectives or
the best means of achieving them, other than the overall objective of higher
profitability. For him, the managers or administrators are the persons with the
knowledge, fortitude, and science to determine what should be done and how it
should be done.
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It does not seem to occur to Simon that in his conception of democracy, the
people granting moral legitimacy and justification to the decisions of the legislators,
who determine the overall objectives, are, in most cases, the same people who are the
operatives in most organizations who he believes have little input in the determination
of objectives in the organizations in which they work. There is some inconsistency
here. If not capable of participating in the determination of objectives because of lack
of knowledge or education, what could possibly qualify the average person to
determine by their vote who in their society should set these objectives?
Simon’s main foci is on the administrative level and so perhaps it is unfair to
ask such questions of his philosophical underpinnings, but his assumptions do work
their way through every part of his administrative theory. Such assumptions
determine what he means by decision-making and rationality in administrative
behavior. Assigning the consideration of prudence, justice, and other ethical matters
to metaphysics through adherence to logical positivism, to objective-setting, or to the
legislative level in his hierarchical understanding of human society, he is free to
consider decision-making from a purely rational perspective without all the messiness
of ethical and moral considerations. At worse, he has removed consideration for what
is good and evil or right and wrong. At best, he has made such considerations
irrelevant. Either way, it aids in his project of making administration more of a hard
science, but it guts his perception of administration of much of what might be
considered humane or even human. Making choices is unplugged from ethics. As he
writes:
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Choice, in so far as it is rational and cognizant of its objective conditions,
involves a selection of one alternative from among several. The alternatives
differ with respect to the consequences that flow from them, and an analysis of
decision-making in its objective aspects will refer primarily to these variable
consequences of choice, (p. 61)
The ends justify the means and, for administrators, everything is means. The ends are
set by those above them and are validated in the voting of those below them.
Classical economic theory had as one of its foundations that human beings
always behave rationally. Simon does not agree. There are limits to rationality,
which create the conditions necessary for his concept of satisficing:
Concentration on the rational aspects of human behavior should not be
construed as an assertion that human beings are always or generally rational.
That misconception, which permeated utilitarian political theory and a large
part of classical economic theory, has been decisively refuted by modem
developments in psychology and sociology, (pp. 61-62).
Human beings are not robots, so it is not uncommon to find people behaving
irrationally.
Rationality is not a common denominator in all administrators. Instead, it is
what separates good administrators from bad ones (or those that are not good). By
using the term “good,” Simon is not making a moral judgment. Instead, he is merely
addressing whether administrators use rationality in assessing the options available to
them and make decisions that lead to the most efficacious means of achieving the
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objectives set for them. In the context within which decisions are made, this is not
always easily done. According to Simon, not all objectives are clear or final. One
objective might conflict with another. One might supersede another.
Furthermore, not all of what can be known is always known. Administrators
are constantly working with limited knowledge when considering alternative
strategies. Even when attempting to decide between alternatives, the administrator is
projecting into an unknown future and “cannot, of course, know directly the
consequences that will follow upon his behavior” (p. 68). Some educated guessing is
bound to occur in a situation where there are limits on “known empirical
relationships, and upon information about the existing situation” (p. 69). Additional
difficulty is introduced into the decision-making process when more than one person
is involved, even when all are attempting to achieve the same objective, for:
In cooperative systems, even though all participants are agreed on the
objectives to be attained, they cannot ordinarily be left to themselves in
selecting strategies that will lead to these objectives; for the selection of a
correct strategy involves a knowledge of each as to the strategies selected by
the others, (p. 73)
Simon’s concept of bounded rationality is a reflection, then, of reality and not
pure theory. This is the empiricism of his philosophical logical positivism. His belief
in rationality will not allow him to discard it completely because he holds firm to the
position that human beings have the capacity of reason, but it is not pure reason,
something he learns from his adherence to the necessity of empirical evidence:
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(1) Rationality requires a complete knowledge and anticipation of the
consequences that will follow on each choice. In fact, knowledge of
consequences is always fragmentary. (2) Since these consequences lie in the
future, imagination must supply the lack of experienced feeling in attaching
value to them. But values can only be imperfectly anticipated. (3) Rationality
requires a choice among all possible alternative behaviors. In actual behavior,
only a very few of all these possible alternatives ever come to mind. (p. 81)
While rationality is limited by empirical reality, this does not mean that human
beings in general are unteachable or will not, on their own, learn to adapt for “the
human being exhibits docility; that is, he observes the consequences of his
movements and adjusts them to achieve the desired purpose. Docility is
characterized, then, by a stage of exploration and inquiry followed by a stage of
adaptation” (p. 85). He uses as an example a crane operator who:
first obtains information from someone skilled in its operation as to how it is
controlled and what the functions are of the various instruments and levers.
He then supplements his information by experimenting with the crane,
gradually learning from practice what reaction he can expect from the
equipment when he manipulates is in a particular way. (p. 85)
This capacity is not limited among the human population. Instead, Simon believes
most or all people have it. This contrasts with Taylor who believed that most workers
learn their skills from their predecessors and do little or nothing to improve upon
what they have learned. Indeed, according to Taylor, there is environmental pressure
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among the workers to reject innovation that might increase productivity which means
the manager’s job is to determine the single best way and then incentivize workers to
adapt their operations to it.
For Taylor, workers in community are detrimental to productivity and profit.
It is as if the traits of the laziest and least productive worker are assumed by all.
Individuals within an organization are a danger to the organization and must be
controlled and even broken by managers. For Simon, fullest human potential is only
discovered within organizations because “organizations and institutions permit stable
expectations to be formed by each member of the group as to the behaviors of the
other members under specified conditions” (p. 100). Rationality is the greatest
beneficiary of the group environment for, “Such stable expectations are an essential
precondition to rational consideration of the consequences of action in a social group”
(p. 100) and “Human rationality gets its higher goals and integrations from the
institutional setting in which it operates and by which it is formed” (p. 101).
Rationality, while latent in all human persons, finds its fullest expression
within organizations in which each person understands his or her role and accedes to
their given tasks, whether they encompass administrative determination of the most
efficient means of accomplishing a given objective or obeying instructions. Simon
believes that “human rationality in any broad sense” can only be achieved within an
organization (p. 102). An individual making his or her own decisions is far from the
most rationed being, for “a person’s decisions must not be the product of his own
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mental processes, but also reflect the broader considerations to which it is the function
of the organized group to give effect” (p. 102).
Organizations develop habits and have institutional memory. The wheel does
not need to be reinvented every time but can be recalled. Decisions can be made
within an organizational context more quickly and easily when good training provides
a sense of history and purpose and when options for decisions are limited. Simon is
not advocating for instant decisions or reference to some kind of decision chart into
which the individual within an organization is slotted. As a matter of fact, he argues
for “hesitation” in decision-making because, “if rationality is to be achieved, a period
of hesitation must precede choice, during which the behavior alternatives, knowledge
bearing on environmental conditions and consequences, and the anticipated values
must be brought into the focus of attention” (p 89). The organization functions to
limit the number of options to be considered, clarify potential options for the various
choices, and make explicit the values that must be at the core of decision-making.
Without the organizational context, “The individual, realizing his inability to take into
consideration all the factors relevant to his choice, and despairing of rationality, might
vacillate among the available alternatives until the time for action was past” (p. 89).
Prudence and justice, at least as far as they can be considered as rational
within Simon’s scheme, can be enhanced by the organization, which is clear in its
operational memory and overall values. They can become patterns of behavior rather
than merely individual acts, chosen in every decision-making opportunity.
Habituation within an organization enables an individual to do what is rational with
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enough hesitation to consider the available options and operative values without so
much hesitation that that person is rendered ineffective by the necessity of considering
every possible option.
According to Simon, effectiveness comes through the division of labor,
standardization, downward decision-making, communication channels, and training
(pp. 102-103). Despite first appearances, Simon is not encouraging the development
of an entirely top-down organization. While stating that downward decision-making
is optimal, “lateral or even upward” transmission of decisions should not be ruled out
(p. 103). While his mention of communication channels might appear to be highly
bureaucratic and unidirectional, his conception is that “the organization provides
communication running in all directions through which information for decision
making flows” (p. 103). Organizations which lack multi-directional communication
are weaker for it. In many instances, “the ‘facts of the case’ may be directly present to
the subordinate but highly difficult to communicate to the superior. The insulation of
the higher levels of the administration hierarchy from the world of fact known at first
hand by the lower levels is a familiar administrative phenomenon” (p. 238).
Therefore:
We may conclude, then, that some measure of centralization is indispensable
to secure the advantages of organization: coordination, expertise, and
responsibility. On the other hand, the costs of centralization must not be
forgotten. It may place in the hands of highly paid personnel decisions which
do not deserve their attention. It may lead to a duplication of function which
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makes the subordinate superfluous. Facilities for communication must be
available, sometimes at considerable cost. The information needed for a
correct decision may be available only to the subordinate.. . . These are the
considerations which must be weighed in determining the degree to which
decisions should be centralized or decentralized, (pp.239-240)
Simon’s contrast with Taylor is stark. There is even some evidence that the
contrast between Simon earlier in his book and Simon around page 100 is stark. In
his earlier comments, the hierarchy is clear. Board members, executives, owners, or
elected officials determine values. He is sticking to this point and is not advocating
that operatives or administrators involve themselves in setting the value agenda. But
his conception of how the administrators relate to the operatives seems to have
evolved within his own book. Earlier, operatives are those whose choices are limited
to obedience or disobedience. There was little indication that the operative had much
influence over how something would be done. It was the task of the administrator to
decide the most efficient means of accomplishing the goals set by those above,
making use of the limited resources available. But in later sections, Simon opens up
communication channels so that operatives can communicate up the organizational
chart. There remain limitations. Division of labor is limiting in that “By giving each a
particular task to accomplish, it directs and limits his attention to that task” (p. 102).
Standardization also binds the operative in that “By deciding once for all [or at least
for a period of time] that a particular task shall be done in a particular way, it relieved
the individual who actually performs the task of the necessity of determining each
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time how it shall be done” (p. 102). While tipping his hat to ideas that might flatten
the bureaucratic organization, his understanding of the organization itself remains
focused on a properly functioning bureaucracy where there is a place for everything
and everything is in its place.
While Simon’s logical positivism dismisses the role of ethics as unscientific
and, therefore, not worthy of discussion, he does believe that ethics play a role in
getting a person to accept the authority of another. Ethics and the role of authority
within an organization are intricately linked. Simon rejects the notion that carrots and
sticks, being the external motivators that they are, can explain why one person obeys
the direction of another. Instead:
The person who accepts the authority of a legislature, a property holder, or a
father within a particular institutional setting, is probably motivated much
more by socially indoctrinated ethical notions than by fear of sanctions. That
is, the individual in a particular society believes that he ought to obey the laws
adopted by the constituted authorities and that he ought to recognize property
rights, (p. 136)
This is a strange diversion from his philosophical logical positivism. The compulsion
to obey is internal in most cases. There is a moral sense of “oughtness” which has
little to do with either reward or punishment and is to be found widely distributed
throughout the human population. Without it, there is little chance that society as a
whole could function. Simon’s adherence to a strict classical economic model in
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which cost and benefit analysis form the basic framework of all decision-making is
called into question with his introduction of ethical oughtness.
Value questions cannot be disregarded: “to consider the administrative
activity as valuationally neutral is an abstraction from reality which is permissible
within broad limits but which, if carried to extremes, ignores very important human
values” (p. 184). He does not list which human values are important nor does he
make a defense for his claim. While strict logical positivists would reject ethics as
part of decision-making, Simon gives it a role: ‘The ethical element in decision
making consists in a recognition and appraisal of all the value elements inherent in the
alternative possibilities” (p. 184).
Simon’s examples focus primarily on matters of justice, a consideration of
more than self:
(1) If cost is measured in money terms, then the wages of employees cannot be
considered as a valuationally neutral element, but must be included among the
values to be appraised in the decision. (2) The work pace of workers cannot be
considered as a valuationally neutral element—else we would be led to the
conclusion that a ‘speed-up’ would always be eminently desirable. (3) The
social aspects of the work situation cannot be considered as a valuationally
neutral element. The decision must with the social and psychological
consequences of substituting one type of work-situation for another. (4) Wage
policies, promotional policies, and the like need to be considered not only

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

156

from the viewpoint of incentives and result-efficiency, but also from that of
distributive justice to the members of the group, (p. 185)
This is not consistent with his earlier comments that values are determined at
the level of the board, the owner, or elected officials. Value considerations are real,
important, and can be key to just decision-making, especially for administrators.
There are limitations. Administrators do not bear the weight of considering every
possible communal or public value but are responsible only for those germane to an
administrator’s specific area. Simon opposed the idea that:
The administrator, serving a public agency in a democratic state, must give a
proper weight to all community values that are relevant to his activity, and
that are reasonably ascertainable in relation thereto, and cannot restrict himself
to values that happen to be his particular responsibility, (p. 186)
In a democratic society, such considerations are the responsibility of those who hold
elected office. Perhaps prudence is knowing which values are and are not appropriate
for consideration by an administrator within a particular setting.
So what is Simon’s understanding of the nature of the human person as it
relates to administrative theory? Simon’s interest tilts heavily toward administrative
decision-making within organizations and so the individual human person gets little
attention. What thought he does dedicate to philosophical reflection on the human
person is occasionally contradictory with what he has written in other places in the
same book. He lacks consistency. However, some of his anthropological
assumptions can be gleaned from his text.
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First and foremost, Simon believes that humans are mostly rational beings. He
holds the human ability to be reasonable in high esteem. A machine is no match for
the human person because “the most powerful information-processing system. . . is
the aggregate of memory that is distributed among 200 million human heads” (p.
297). Of course, the view of human beings primarily as information-processing
systems is hardly a full-orbed anthropology but is consistent with his acceptance of
logical positivism, although such an approach leaves little room for consideration of
human emotion, ethics, or anything else that smacks of metaphysics. His desire is to
raise the theory of administration to the level of physical science or at least classic
economics, neither of which leave much room for non-rational human matters. His
emphasis on rationality leads him to almost completely ignore other elements of
human existence that might play a role in how an organization functions like emotion,
aesthetics, religion, morality, calling, and relationships. Simon leaves the initial
impression that human beings are like computers who, by joining an organization,
become linked to other computers with more powerful and sophisticated operating
systems, thereby becoming more powerful and efficient themselves.
Simon’s appreciation for rationality, though, is perhaps more limited than
might be found among physicists or economists. Human beings are rational but in a
limited fashion. They bear the capacity for reason but not as classically defined as
prudence, justice, or any other virtue. Rationality, for Simon, is a method of
operation which seeks to determine the most efficient means of accomplishing a
specific goal (p. 240). It is his empiricism that leads him to conclude:
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If there were no limits to human rationality, administrative theory would be
barren. It consists of a single precept: Always select that alternative, among
those available, which will lead to the most complete achievement of your
goals. The need for administrative theory resides in the fact that there are
practical limits to human rationality, and that these limits are not static, but
depend upon the organizational environment in which the individual’s
decision takes place. The task of administration is to design this environment
that the individual will approach as close as practicable to rationality [judged
in terms of the organization’s goals] in his decisions, (pp. 240-241)
Human beings on their own are limited in their rationality for, as Simon
writes, the individual “is limited by his unconscious skills, habits, and reflexes; he is
limited by his values and conceptions of purpose, which may diverge from the
organizational goals; he is limited by the extent of his knowledge and information” (p.
241). It is the organization, specifically the administrator, whose role is it to develop
the skills, habits and reflexes of the operative, make clear the organization’s goals,
and provide the knowledge and information that will make the organization efficient.
Inefficiency, then, is not caused by the failure of an individual. Its root is
administrators who have failed in their core responsibilities.
It important to note that, by-in-large, Simon makes no mention of classism.
There are no tiers or castes of human persons. There are no great men or women.
There are people with the skills and necessary information who understand the goals
of the organization. These people are efficient. Then there are those who have none
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of these, for which they cannot be blamed. There is no class that is more efficient
than another for:
The individual can be rational in terms of the organization’s goals only to the
extent that he is able to pursue a particular course of action, he has a correct
conception of the goal of the action, and he is correctly informed about the
conditions surrounding his action, (p. 241)
There is little consideration given to culture, taste, or preference. People’s
choices are not effected by such things. For Simon, there is rationality and
irrationality. Indeed, ‘Two persons, given the same possible alternatives, the same
values, the same knowledge, can rationally reach only the same decision” (p. 241). It
is important to note that he does not mean personal values. Rather, he means given
the same set of organizational values. Personal values have no part to play in
efficiency or rationality.
The real enemy of the administrator is irrationality. The task of the
administrator is to work to banish its existence from the organization. As Simon
writes, “administrative theory is concerned with the control of the nonrational.” It
turns out that “the larger area of rationality” is “less important” (p. 244). The focus,
then, is getting rid of what hinders. Administration is extermination of what is not
rational as far as it is humanly possible. Administrators are not really decision
makers in the sense that they decide what must be done and how it must be done, as
in Taylor’s conception. The administrator creates an environment in which decisions
are limited, specified, and made rationally. It is not specialized training that is needed.
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Instead, “the proper training of ‘administrators’ lies not in the narrow field of
administrative theory, but in the broader field of social sciences generally” (p. 247).
Better that administrators be taught sociology or psychology than administration
theory.
And yet, Simon has little use for human relations theorists:
The principle normative concern here was to create organizational
environments in which employees would be motivated to join the
organization, to remain in it, and to contribute vigorously and effectively to its
goals. As a result of theory and empirical research in human relations, the
factory and office came to be viewed as relatively impoverished human
environments—starving both the human mind and the human emotions.. . .
‘Job enrichment’ and ‘democratic management’ are labels commonly applied
to these emphases in organizational design, (p. 289)
It is enlightening that factory and office work are not in themselves occasionally
impoverished. It is only human relationship theorists who have created such an
impression within the minds of employees. Job fulfillment equals efficiency for, in
fact, “the happy employee is the productive employee” (p. 289). Such statements are
difficult to square with his assertion that administrators are best trained in social
sciences rather than administrative theory. If the happy employee is the productive
employee, then Frederick Taylor was right and the focus should shift to scientific
management. Productivity, time-study, and physical science ought to be the sole tools
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of the administrator who can safely assume that employee happiness will naturally
follow in its wake.
There are distinctions within administration, specifically within very large
organizations, by which Simon usually means public administrative systems. As he
points out, “the content decisions of the higher administrator deal with more ultimate
purposes and more general processes than the decisions of the lower administrator.
We might say that the lower administrator’s purposes are the upper administrator’s
processes” (p. 246). Such higher administrators often have responsibilities for
multiple agencies or tasks forces with objectives that may be competitive or in
opposition to one another.
Moral themes and ethical issues like prudence and justice find themselves
mostly overlooked in Simon’s theory. Where they are mentioned, they are redefined:
It is sometimes thought that, since the words ‘good’ and ‘bad’ often occur in
sentences written by students of administration, the science of administration
contain an essentially ethical element. If this were true, a science of
administration would be impossible, for it is impossible to choose, on an
empirical basis, between ethical alternatives. Fortunately, it is not true. The
terms ‘good’ and ‘bad’ when whey occur in a study on administration are
seldom employed in a purely ethical sense. Procedures are termed ‘good’
when they are conducive to the attainment of specified objectives, ‘bad’ when
they are not conducive to such attainment, (p. 249)
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Of course, there is an ethical component to both the means and the end.
Simon would prefer to consider only the means as the administrator’s chief
responsibility. The ends are determined by others, creating a situation where
administrators are in essence morally neutral. If the overall goal is to get rid of toxic
waste and this goal is set by the board of directors, the administrator’s job is to do so
as efficiently as possible. Simon’s ethically empty administrator might determine that
the most efficient means is to dump it in a river so that it becomes someone else’s
problem. Prudence has no role to play. Neither do just considerations of what the
administrator might be doing to the people living downstream. Unless the overall
goals of the company specifically state an objection to such environmentally
damaging behavior, the administrator who dumps waste into a stream might be said to
be “good” in that he or she found a very inexpensive and effective means of ridding
the company of its toxic waste. How is this possible? Because, as Simon writes:
We may summarize the conclusions we have reached with respect to a science
of administration. In the first place, an administrative science, like any
science, is concerned purely with factual statements. There is no place for
ethical assertions in the body of a science, (p. 253)
So are people generally truly prudent and just or are they operating with a false
prudence and unjust? To a large degree, for Simon, the answer does not matter for
administrators and operatives. Actually, the question itself is invalid because the
categories of justice and prudence cannot be established within the framework of
logical positivism. People can be efficient or inefficient. They can be obedient or
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disobedient. They can be rational or nonrational. They can be knowledgeable or
ignorant. They may be skillful or they may lack skills. But they cannot be prudent or
just any more than a computer can attain either or both of these designations.

Herbert Simon

Justice
Figure 7. Herbert Simon

Frederick Mosher’s Democracy and the Public Service

The third book examined in light of the prudence/justice model is Frederick C.
Mosher’s Democracy and the Public Service, first published in 1968. It was number
five in Sherwood’s survey of influential books. For the purpose of this project,
Mosher’s work represents certain aspects of thought being discussed during the period
the first Minnowbrooke Conference was held and focuses more on the public servants
within the public administration sector and their place within a democratic political
system.
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Mosher’s career was almost entirely devoted to the study of public
administration. Following his graduation from Dartmouth in 1934, he completed a
master’s degree from Syracuse and a doctorate in public administration from Harvard.
Mosher’s career primarily focused on teaching. He served on the faculties of the
Maxwell School of Syracuse, the University of Bologna, the University of California
at Berkeley, and the University of Virginia. He was the editor-in-chief of the Public
Administration Review from 1951 until 1954, served on its board of editors and often
served as a referee for journal entries. He authored, co-authored, or edited fourteen
books in addition to the one considered here.
Toward the end of his career, Mosher put out a second edition of Democracy
and the Public Service. He added a new preface, which he wrote in 1982. Since the
first edition, written in 1968, the United States had been through the withdrawal from
Vietnam, Watergate, the resignation and pardoning of President Nixon, the one term
presidency of Jimmy Carter, and the inauguration of Ronald Reagan. It grated
Mosher to hear the current president of the United States lay the blame for problems
in the nation at the feet not just of elected officials, but specifically of public
administrators:
“A government bureau is the closest thing to eternal life we’ll ever see on this
earth.”
“A taxpayer is someone who works for the federal government but
who doesn't have to take a civil service examination.”
“Concentrated power has always been the enemy of liberty.”
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“Freedom prospers when religion is vibrant and the rule of law under
God is acknowledged.”
“Government is like a baby. An alimentary canal with a big appetite at
one end and no sense of responsibility at the other.”
“Government is the people’s business and every man, woman and
child becomes a shareholder with the first penny of tax paid.”
“Government is not the solution to the problem. Government IS the
problem.”
“Government’s view of the economy could be summed up in a few
short phrases: If it moves, tax it. If it keeps moving, regulate it. And if it stops
moving, subsidize it.” (Reagan, undated)

Mosher had dedicated his entire professional life to teaching public
administration. The president’s comment drew a defensive response from the author
in his newly penned preface:
The increasingly bitter and rancorous attacks upon the ‘bureaucracy’
and the ‘bureaucrats’ in recent years have been neither deserved nor
constructive. It now seems that few aspiring political executives think
they can run and be elected unless part of their campaigns consists of
invectives against those appointive public servants upon who they will
be—and in some cases have been—dependent in carrying out their
responsibilities if elected or reelected . . . for not very many of the best

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

166

people in the public services are likely to want to stay there when they
are paid far below their peers in the private sector and are the butt of
repeated charges of incompetence, dishonesty, and laziness by their
neighbors, the media, and indeed their own bosses, (p. xii)
Whatever enthusiasm generated by the first Minnowbrooke Conference in
1968 for making positive changes in the United States through public administration
had been squashed by events within the government, many of which were
unconnected to appointed public administrators and civil servants. Mosher’s focus in
his text:
is upon the public service, in its relation to democracy both as an idea
and as a way of governance. My premises are relatively clear and
limited, that (1) governmental decisions and behavior have tremendous
influence upon the nature and development of our society, our
economy, and our policy; (2) the great bulk of decisions and actions
taken by governments are determined or heavily influenced by
administration officials, most of whom are appointed, not elected; (3)
the kinds of decisions and actions these officials take depend upon
their capabilities, their orientations, and their values; and (4) these
attributes depend heavily upon their backgrounds, their training and
education, and their current associations, (p. 3)
There is much in this paragraph deserving of attention. The first is Mosher’s
causal linkages. The person of the public administrator has an impact upon the kinds
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of public administrative decisions made. These decisions make up the largest part of
operative government. Governing decisions influence societal development, policy,
and the economy and, therefore, have a profound impact on American democracy.
The person in public administration is not a threat to democracy. Instead,
public administrators are pillars of democracy. Their backgrounds, orientation,
education, training, values, capabilities, and associations form much of the backbone
of how democracy functions in the United States. They are not neutral errand boys
and girls for legislators. They are not people who have little say over the values and
objectives set by those in elected office. Their focus is not merely efficiency and
effectiveness in carrying out what they are ordered to do. They are key players in
democracy. Mosher would argue that they are, to some extent, even more influential
than legislators in making democracy work.
Mosher’s administrators are more fully human. They are not scientific
managers, like Taylor’s, whose central concerns are time-studies, the observations of
every minute motion, and squeezing the most productivity out of the human animal.
Nor are they Simon’s eliminators of nonrationality whose central concern is to
increase efficiency through bringing a higher level of rationality to the organizations
and programs they administer.
Administrators do not appear, as they do occasionally in Simon’s analysis, as
bundles of human potential formed and molded by the organizations and environment
in which they function. Instead, they appear as fully developed. Their ethics, beliefs,
allegiances are formed by their values, education, experiences, and associations quite
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apart from their organizational setting. While Simon’s administrators are profoundly
influenced by their organizations, Mosher’s administrators have a profound influence
on their organizations and, because they do, on society and democracy.
Because the influence of public administrators upon society and democracy is
so substantial, the focus ought to be on the kinds of persons that assume such
positions. Even if one had stopped reading after the first five pages of Mosher’s text,
it would be clear that education and training are going to be his major emphasis. If
the links he espouses are real, then American democracy depends on the kinds of
persons that assume these roles. There is, then, an administrative class. They might
not be well-compensated, but surely they must be prudent, just, and perhaps many
other things if democracy is to continue.
Mosher recognizes and addresses in his opening pages what appears to be the
inherent conflict of an unelected administrative class as some of the key pillars of
democracy: “How can a public service . . . be made to operate in a manner
compatible with democracy? How can we be assured that a highly differentiated body
of public employees will act in the interests of all the people, will be an instrument of
all the people?” (p. 5). Again, in an even more direct manner, “How does one square
a permanent civil service—which neither the people by their vote nor their
representatives by their appointments can easily replace—with the principle of
government ‘by the people’?” (p. 7).
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Mosher is clearly not an advocate of participatory or even direct democracy
found in Etzioni and the communitarians only a few decades later. As a matter of
fact:
Active representativeness run rampant within a bureaucracy would constitute a
major threat to orderly democratic government. The summing up of the
multitude of special interests seeking effective representation does not
constitute the general interest. The strengths of different private interest
groups within administration are vastly unequal, and the establishment of
anything approaching equity among them would be nearly impossible.. . .
Thus there are very real problems in the development of a rounded concept of
representative bureaucracy within our democratic framework, (p. 15)
Active representativeness would actually damage democracy because of
special interest groups and a tendency toward a majority domination. Those
representing a slice of American society would be neither prudent nor just. They
would be unable to consider the options available and make the wise choices based on
a concern not only for themselves, but for all citizens. Such neutrality is possible and
most likely to be found in the administrative class. Mosher does not consider the
possibility that the administrative class itself might have its own allegiances and
biases. Their very neutrality is the balancing force in a society made up of pockets of
more and less powerful special interest groups. They are the keepers of prudence and
justice, at least in his initial conception.
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Overcoming their inherent biases isn’t easily achieved. Mosher acknowledges
that public administrators are largely formed as persons when they enter public
service. They are not created within the organization, as Simon might argue. The
formative influences are their upbringing, experience, values, and education. He does
not believe that the persons in public administration can truly be neutral for they are
what they are when they assume leadership positions. How, then, can prudence and
justice be operative?
Mosher’s first attempt at an answer is to make the public administrative class
representative of those they serve. He does not seek the elimination of bias and
special interest among public administrators. Instead, through ensuring a diverse
body of public administrators, he seeks to proliferate special interests with the group
so that the interests of some are balanced by the interests of others. His idea is a
public administrative representativeness by statistical analysis which:
concerns the origin of individuals and the degree to which, collectively, they
mirror the whole society. It may be statistically measured in terms of locality
or origin, for example, and its nature [rural, urban, suburban], previous
occupation, father’s occupation, education, family income, family social class,
sex, race, religion. A public service, and more importantly the leadership
personnel of that service, which is broadly representative of all categories of
the population in these respects, may be thought of as satisfying Lincoln’s
prescription of government ‘by the people’ in a limited sense, (p. 15)
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Public administrators, in this system, would not be hired based on their skills,
previous employment, education, or the results of their civil service exam. Instead,
they would be hired on assumptions made from their familial, racial, economic,
geographic, religious, and social background. The civil service exam would more
closely resemble a personality profile. Simon called for public administrators to
reject specialization and instead be educated in the social sciences. If this initial
scheme of Mosher’s were to be put in place, the specific fields would be limited to
sociology and psychology as human resource workers would bear the responsibility of
determining which characteristics call for further slicing and which do not.
Such a system would also operate with the assumption that justice—that is,
considering the rightful claims of others—is limited only to considering the claims of
those who fall into one’s own specific slice of society. Can a male consider the
rightful claims of a female or someone bom on a farm the rights of someone bom in
Brooklyn? If not, why not? The answer is that prudence and justice are truncated and
curtailed by social, racial, religious, economic, and familial realities in each person’s
background. True prudence and true justice would not be possible.
Furthermore, if this is the case and various people from different backgrounds
are all competing to represent their specific slice of American culture, majority rule
will still be the order of the day. The groups with the largest number of people
represented will also be the largest groups with the public administrative sector.
In the end, Mosher rejects this approach as one that will solve the dilemma of
special interest groups in public administration. His rejection is not because such a

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

172

concept builds on a faulty view of the human person who limits their consideration of
the just claims of others only to their class. Instead, it is his fear that those within
each slice might not actually represent their specifically identified groups for having
certain history and characteristics “does not necessarily mean that a public servant
with given background and social characteristics will ipso facto represent the interests
of others with like backgrounds and characteristics in his behavior and decisions” (p.
16).
Mosher provides a second ground for his rejection of such a system and,
again, it is not a matter of building on a faulty anthropology that assumes human
beings can act prudently and justly with an eye toward only those who share their
background and social characteristics. Such a system might be possible. What stands
in the way of moving toward such a system is not a perspective of the human person
but rather a lack of knowledge at this point in history: ‘The fact is that we know too
little about the relationship between a person’s background and pre-employment
socialization on the one hand, and his orientation and behavior in office on the other”
(p. 16). He does not address the issue of whether such an approach would be
advisable if the knowledge gap was bridged.
Much of Mosher’s book focuses on the history and development of both
public administrative theory and public administrative practice. His lens is primarily
the educational system that produced an administrative class in European
administration and the American system where the establishment of such a class is
rejected and professionalism and specialization reign. He writes:
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We have no substantial ‘administrative class’ of cultured gentlemen as in
Britain or of legally oriented officials as in continental Europe. Where the
problems of most European governments, as those of most of the
underdeveloped countries as well, concern the dearth of well-qualified
specialists, ours seems to be a surfeit of specialisms and professionals and a
glaring need for generalists, (p. 55)
The difference in the two systems, according to Mosher, is education:
The reluctance of American colleges in the nineteenth century to prepare their
students for professional and administrative work, coupled with the
Jacksonian denial of careers in the public service, may well have been the
death knell of any administrative class in the United States, (p. 47)
European nations, meanwhile, created an administrative class by combining social
class and an education system designed to foster their expertise so that they would
remain in control of the levers of the government.
In the United States, during the nineteenth century:
The egalitarian drive which spurred and rationalized the spoils system proved
decreasingly effective as a guarantor of popular direction and control of
administration. Jackson and his successors reduced the influence of the gentry
and opened the gates of public service to the common people, (p. 66)
Or, at least to the common people who could request spoils from those they helped
electe or to whom they were related. The spoils system was not a fully open system,
of course, but it did stunt the growth of the development of an administrative class
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because it did not allow the permanency necessary to foster its growth.
Administrators were viewed as extensions of elected officials and often changed with
the results of elections.
Mosher contends that during the nineteenth and early twentieth century,
the generally high character and caliber of the early administrations delayed
the drive toward systematized merit systems. In the succeeding half century
the egalitarian philosophy—centered in populism and equality of
opportunity—made great strides. By the time of the Pendleton Act, a classoriented, university-based civil service system was politically impossible.
Hence ours was devised as an open system in which considerations of class or
family or formal education were intentionally minimized. The corruption and
scandal of the nineteenth century provided a moral groundwork for civil
service reform, (p. 82)
The greatest structural change was the Pendleton Act which:
accepted the principles of egalitarianism and of equal opportunity in the public
service.. . . The impetus to civil service reform in this country did not derive
from an effort to break a social class monopoly on the public service or to
transfer civil service control from one class to another, as it had in Britain.
The ideal of civil service reform in America was an open public service, (p.
67)
The egalitarian spirit, spurred on corruption in the spoils system and solidified
in the Pendleton Act, meant the development of an administrative class would not
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become part of the American system. The structure would be open. The focus of the
government, though, would change significantly with the Great Depression. Until
this point in American history, “most of government’s activities—and most thinking
about its role—concerned the provision of fairly well-established services” (p. 85). A
limited role for the government was one of the core beliefs of the Founding Fathers.
They feared a strong and pervasive state. The division of power between three
branches—executive, legislative, and judicial—and at least three levels—federal,
state, and local—was an effective check on government’s involvement in much of
American life. The government was inefficient by design. President Martin Van
Buren eloquently expressed the same sentiment 60 years after the Declaration of
Independence:
All communities are apt to look to government for too m uch.. . . But this
ought not to be. The framers of our excellent Constitution and the people who
approved it acted at the time on a sounder principle. They wisely judged that
the less government interferes with private pursuits the better for the general
prosperity. Its real duty is to leave every citizen and every interest to reap
under its own protection the rewards of virtue, industry, and prudence”
(White, 1954,443).
Van Buren, in summing up the thought of the Founders, believed that virtue and
prudence are generally dispersed among the population. The greatest threat to them
was the extension of the reach and power of government.
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With the Great Depression and President Roosevelt’s response to it, the
thinking about the proper role of the government changed significantly. In the face of
economic hardship, the government and its administrative apparatus would take the
lead, claiming to “both define the content of the good life and control the institutional
tools leading to it” (Rojas, 2001, p. 13). According to Mosher, “With the New Deal,
government ceased to be merely a routine servant or a passive and reactive agent. It
became itself an initiator of programs and change—for a while, almost the only one”
(p. 83). What began in the New Deal was further extended during Roosevelt’s
presidency via the outbreak of World War n when, as Mosher’s states, the
“government, military and civic, dominated much of American life” (p. 83).
Neither the New Deal nor World War II led to the development of an
administrative class, according to Mosher. During this period, administration was not
dominated by specialists who had been educated in narrow topics limited to their
profession. As a matter of fact:
There was widespread feeling against the narrowly conceived specialist and
technician in administrative positions. Public administrators might or might
not be trainable in administrative subject matter—the point was debated—but
in any case they should be broadly educated, energetic men and women,
developed through experience and protected by a merit system, (p. 85)
This concept was short-lived and quickly gave way to the next stage, which
Mosher calls the specialization or, more particularly, the professionalization of public
administration. Prudence and justice for determining the public good, originally
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believed by the Founders to be best left to citizens who had them in sufficient
quantity, were reallocated to the government who turned them over to specialists and
professionals in public administration. Such specialists were not of a particular social
class. Rather, their entrance was determined by their education.
Mosher recognizes that this was risky: “One may ask how we are to be
assured that the President and his influential advisers and staff units—especially those
that consist largely of career personnel—will behave responsibly for the good of the
whole people” (p. 97). His answer does not completely satisfy for it is a combination
of the accountability inherent to elected office, self-interest, loyalty to an individual
who serves in a protective role, and the idea that public administrators would be able
to balance all of the above with the restraints of their own sense of prudence and
justice. As Mosher writes:
For the President, the nominating and electoral process, the aspiration for an
honorable paragraph in history, and the constraints of the next elections
provide some safeguard [in other words, the president’s own self-interest].
For the political appointees, there is loyalty to the chief executive or political
officers appointed by him. There is also the somewhat hopeful concept that
conscientious, educated, and well-disposed public servants will behave in the
general public interest, (p. 97)
Mosher is a realist in that he recognizes that the self-interest and self-preservation
generally operative in all human beings is to be found also in the ranks of public
administrators. Of course, not all public administrators are conscientious, well-
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educated or well-disposed any more than all business people play by the rules or all
employees give one hundred percent of their effort on a daily basis. Some do. Some
don’t. Most fall somewhere between.
What developed was a public administrative system built on trust for those in
administrative positions. Mosher makes plain his discomfort with such a system for:
Heavy reliance upon the motivation of a relatively small group of anonymous
individuals entails some confidence in their wisdom [or prudence], in their
humanistic upbringing [or justice], and education and in their morality.. . .
Were not these high public officials a twentieth-century incarnation of Plato’s
philosopher kings or of Aristotle’s virtuous gentlemen? (p. 97)
In Mosher’s mind, what is true of the general public is true of public
administrators. No dichotomy exists between the vast majority of the public who
operate according to self-interest (or perhaps the rationality of an economist or the
bounded rationality of Herbert Simon) and the much smaller number of those who are
civil servants. Both operate, to some degree, from self-interest desiring an extension
of their territory, financial reward, protection from threat, and enhanced status:
The professions—whether general or public service, established or
emergent—display common characteristics which are significant for
democracy and the public service. One of these is the continuing drive of each
of them to elevate its stature and strengthen its public image as a profession...
. A prominent device for furthering this goal is the establishment of clear and
[where possible] expanding boundaries of work within which members of the
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profession have exclusive prerogatives to operate. Other means include: the
assurance and protection of career opportunities for professionals; the
establishment and continuous elevation of standards of education and entrance
into the profession; the upgrading of rewards [pay] for professionals; and the
improvement of their prestige before their associates and before the public in
general, (p. 117)
Against such concerns, it seems unlikely that concepts such as the common
good, prudence, justice and selfless public service will provide much guidance for
their decisions and their actions. Even if public administration was made up of a
collection of selfless individuals, Mosher believes they are neither sufficiently trained
nor focused to act in accordance with the common good. Public administrators in an
age of specialization and professionalization are primarily attentive to matters of
science and so “obscure the larger meaning of the profession in society” (p. 118).
Their scientific tunnel vision prevents them from developing into Aristotle’s virtuous
gentlepersons or Plato’s royal philosophers.
The professionalization of public administrators has led to conflicts with
elected officials and within the ranks of public administrators. According to Mosher,
“Politics is to the professionals as ambiguity is to truth, expediency is to rightness,
heresy is to true belief’ (p. 119). It is important to note that Mosher’s claim is that
public administrators understand themselves to be the standard-bearers of truth,
rightness, and true belief over against those that are the polar opposite of these
characteristics of prudence and justice.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

180

Such claims, though, ring hollow when Mosher considers the relationship
between public administrators and elected officials. If prudence and justice were
common among public administrators, it could be expected that those in various
agencies would see each other as assets and not competitors. To support staff, it
would seem that the goal of serving the common good would generate an office
environment where each respected the abilities and contributions of others. Mosher’s
lifetime spent studying public administrators leads him to reject both of these
expectations. Ego is more active than considerations of the common good, prudence,
or justice. As Mosher states, “my unproven observation is that the most conflictive
situations arise between those in different professions [or segments] and in different
personnel systems who are approximately equal in level or responsibility and pay, but
where one is ‘more elite’ than the other” (p. 132). Such dynamics do not occur simply
between those in different or competing agencies. According to Mosher, they are
commonly found within agencies themselves:
Members of the same profession in an agency are ‘colleagues,’ like professors
in a university; and the flavor of their work is similarly collegial. Toward
members of other professions, their behavior is likely to be more formal,
sometimes suspicious or even hostile. Toward paraprofessionals and other
workers, the relationship may more frequently be paternalistic, patronizing, or
dictatorial.. . . The ‘climate’ of an organization as well as its view of mission
and its effectiveness in carrying it out are in considerable part a product of its
professional structure and professional value system, (p. 133)
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Conflict and status connect at the hip. Mosher believes that quarrels are not
the result of difference of opinion as to what is prudent or just. Instead, disagreements
are a matter of territory and stature. This is not to say that the same is not true within
non-public administrative work settings, but it certainly rejects the idea that those
within public administration operate at a higher ethical level than do the general
public.
Mosher attributes this to the presence of professionals in the systems. Their
concern is not the common good. Instead, their first consideration is their career, their
territory, and their influence. The development of unions has set these concerns in
concrete: “The idea of objective responsibility is increasingly threatened by both
professionalization and unionization, with their narrow objectives and their focus
upon the welfare and advancement of their members” (p. 229). The concept of the
common good has been lost or, at least, mothballed. Mosher does not attempt to
make a distinction between the persons in such unions and the unions themselves.
Are the unions merely reflecting the true concerns of their members or are they
creating such concerns among their members? In other words, is the problem one of
human nature or organization? Such questions are not addressed directly. Mosher
does appear to lay blame at the feet of how public administration and its employees
are structured rather than at the feet of the persons themselves. Those placed in a
system dominated by acquiring, maintaining, and extending power will have little
time for consideration of what is prudent or just.
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The unionization and professionalization of public administration has had
some benefit to the operation of American government:
Among the larger units of American government, the older and more overt
violations of individual honesty and trust have been minimized. In terms of
the billions of dollars involved in governmental transactions every day, the
amount of theft, fraud, bribery, and even expense account padding are today
relatively small. Few sectors of American society are more carefully policed in
these regards than the administrative arms of its larger governments, (p. 230)
But the larger and more important issues of American government, according to
Mosher, have been ignored. Such a system has produced more honest power-grabbers
and more fiscally-transparent public employees who still act in their own self-interest.
What is least consequential has been addressed. What is most consequential remains
ignored. Mosher does not see this situation changing: “For better or worse—or better
and worse—much of our government is now in the hands of professionals.. . . It is
unlikely that the trend toward professionalism in or outside of government will soon
be reversed” (p. 142).
Taylor wanted scientists and time experts. Simon called for efficiency
experts. Mosher marks a significant shift in thinking. It is not specialization that is
needed. The shortcomings of public administration are not the result of a lack of
scientific training. The focus should not be on scientific techniques but rather on
human beings. The scope should not be narrowed but should be broadened. As
Mosher writes, “The need for broadening, for humanizing, and in some fields for
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lengthening professional education programs may in the long run prove more crucial
to governmental response to societal problems than any amount of civil service
reform” (p. 142). It would have been helpful had Mosher expanding on what he meant
by the “humanizing” public administration education. Rather than merely searching
for better techniques or means of carrying out their tasks, Mosher is calling for public
administrators to begin to examine what they are doing when they do their tasks.
What is the broader purpose or meaning? For Simon, such questions were out of
bounds for administrators. For Mosher, they may be the key.
Education, not class, remains the answer for Mosher but the nature of the
education must change:
As in our culture in the past and in a good many other civilizations, the nature
and quality of the public service depend principally upon the system of
education. Almost all of our future public administrators will be college
graduates, and within two or three decades a majority of them will probably
have graduate degrees. Rising proportions of public administrators are
returning to graduate schools for refresher courses, mid-career training, and
higher degrees. These trends suggest that university faculties will have
growing responsibility for preparing and for developing public servants both
in their technical specialties and in the broader social fields with which their
professions interact, (p. 240)
Mosher’s anthropology seems to be, on the whole, quite positive. He does not
believe that human persons are inherently selfish or only concerned about the
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acquisition, maintenance, and extension of their power. He says nothing to indicate
that he believes most people to be imprudent or unjust. People clearly have the ability
to serve the common good. Taylor believed that most people lack prudence and are
unjust. Placing human beings in an organizational setting simply brought everyone
down to the lowest ethical common denominator. Even the few upstanding workers
soon became as bad as the worst among them. Simon has little to say about the
inherent ability, prudence, or justice of the human person. Such considerations, to
him, are outside the arena of his interest or field of specialty. Unlike Taylor, he
believed that organizational settings are not the problem. Instead, they are the
solution. In organizational settings, people are given direction and guidance. It is
there that they find values.
For Mosher, the problem is neither the human person nor the organizational
setting in general. Instead, the genesis of the problem is the professionalization and
unionization of public administration. These features have created a situation where
self-interest—negatively conceived—reigns and the common good is largely ignored.
The solution is not extending or eliminating organizations. Instead, the answer is
developing a different kind of public administrator who will function within the
organizational structure with a much broader and more humane perspective. In such a
structure, human beings are the central concern, not scientific methodology.
Psychology, sociology, philosophy, and perhaps even theology will be of greater
importance and scientific specialization less significant. It is not different people that
are needed. What is required is different training, different education, deeper
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thinking, and more reflection. With the right focus in education, public
administrators will be both prudent and just as they consider what is and what is not
for the common good.
On the prudence/wisdom scale, Mosher believes that human being begin in a
neutral position at the center. It is not human beings that are prudent or imprudent,
just or unjust. He also rejects the idea that organizations are primarily responsible for
the kinds of people who operate within them. Instead, he proposes that human beings
within public administration have the capacity to be placed in the upper right
quadrant. What places them there is proper training. The creation of prudent and just
public administrators is not accomplished by incentive or threat. It is does not occur
because of red tape or rules. If more prudent and just people are required, then
theorists need to focus their attention on building them.

Frederick Mosher

Justice
Figure 8. Frederick Mosher
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Vincent Ostrom’s The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration

The fourth book, Vincent Ostrom’s The Intellectual Crisis in American Public
Administration, first appeared in 1973, “at the time Watergate was unfolding and the
Nixon presidency was becoming unglued” (Sherwood, 1990, p. 259). In Sherwood’s
survey, even those who rejected Ostrom’s public choice theory and describe it as
“morally pernicious” still include it in their list of most influential books (p. 258). It
is a rejection of the argument for a strong executive and advocates instead for
“multiple decision centers, power diffusion, and a market discipline” (p. 259).
Those in Sherman’s survey who reject Ostrom’s work because of its embrace
of public choice theory have hit on Ostrom’s key theme which marks a significant
shift in philosophical anthropological thinking among theorists so far considered. For
Taylor, the solution to administrative difficulties was the application of scientific
methodology to determine the one best means of accomplishing a particular task.
Overcoming the inadequacies, self-interest, and lack of production of the human
person was a matter of science. For Simon, the solution is to be found in the
organization itself. People are not necessarily at fault for their failures. Instead,
people who fail belong to organizations that have failed them through their structure
and decision-making processes. Mosher also rejects the idea that the failure to be
prudent and just in public administration is rooted in the human person. According to
Mosher, professionalization, unionization, and a lack of proper education are the basic
causes of failure.
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Ostrom’s approach is radically different. He assumes that all human beings
are essentially the same and operate from self-interest; that is, all persons make
rational decisions that provide them with the greatest benefit. Education does not
have the necessary corrective power and will not overpower self-interest. The
application of scientific principles and centralized planning will not accomplish what
needs to be done, according to Ostrom and, in many ways, actually contribute to the
problems inherent in administration. Professionalization and unionization, with their
central concerns for the personal advancement of public administrators, do not create
the problems in public administration, according to Ostrom. Instead, at best, they
merely reflect the reality that is the human person.
Ostrom is a student of and advocate for what is known as “public choice
theory,” and an understanding of its genesis and its core principles is important for
comprehending the main points of Ostrom’s theory. Of the theorists so far
considered, Ostrom is the most concise in his thinking about the nature of the human
person. This is primarily the case because public choice theory is based largely on a
specific understanding of human beings
Public choice theory is a relatively recently developed school of thought. It
began in the years immediately following the Second World War and its influence has
grown significantly since. Its main proponents have been people like James
Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, Mancur Olson Jr., and Gary Becker. Vincent Ostrom
belongs to this group for his advocacy of public choice theory and its application to
public administration.
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James Buchanan, Director of the Center for Study of Public Choice at George
Mason University and Nobel Prize winner in 1986, provides the most succinct
definition of some of the core tenets of public choice. According to Buchanan
(undated), ‘The hard core in public choice can be summarized in three
presuppositions: (1) methodological individualism, (2) rational choice, and (3)
politics-as-exchange” (p. 1). Each of these core beliefs is rooted in anthropological
assumptions. Public choice theorists believe that all human beings, regardless of their
position, education, or place in an organization, function as individuals who seek first
their own good. This search is conducted in a rational fashion where options are
weighed, taking into consideration that which will provide the most benefits to the
individual. Finally, and most applicable to public administration, people who work in
government do not remove themselves from methodological individualism or a
rational approach to seeking what is best for them. In other words, there is no sense
of the common good, even among those who are supposed to seek it in government.
This is not to say that something like the common good does not exist. Buchanan
would argue that when people operate from self-interest, their collective actions
actually create a situation in which the most good is done for the greatest number of
people.
Buchanan contrasts his theory with those of “social scientists and philosophers
at mid-century. The socialist ideology was pervasive, and this ideology was supported
by the allegedly neutral research program called ‘theoretical welfare economics,’
which concentrated on the identification of the failures of observed markets to meet
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idealized standards” (p. 6). In sum, “this branch of inquiry offered theories of market
failure. But failure by comparison with what? The implicit presumption was always
that politicized corrections for market failures would work perfectly. In other words,
market failures were set against an idealized politics” (p. 7). This dichotomy between
economic realism and political idealism made government appear to be the logical
choice for dealing with many of the perceived market failures such as economic
inequality. The market could not be prudent or just. In instances where the
individualist and rationalist market failed and prudence and justice were needed, the
government was the natural choice for handling these issues. Of course, the
assumption was that those within the government were operating with prudence and
justice as they sought the common good via the levers of power found in government
administration.
Buchanan’s challenge to this line of thought is primarily philosophical. If
those in the market operated in a fashion that was rationally individualistic, why
would not those in government operate in the same way? In the midst of dichotomist
assumption:
Public choice then came along and provided analyses of politics, of the
behavior of persons in public choosing roles whether these be voters,
politicians, or bureaucrats, that were on all fours with those applied to markets
and to the behavior of persons as participants in markets. These analyses
necessarily exposed the essentially false comparison that had described so
much of both scientific and public attitudes. In a very real sense, public choice
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became a set of theories of governmental failures, as an offset to the theories
of market failures that had previously emerged from theoretical welfare
economics, (p. 7)
Buchanan claims his theory is not meant as “some illegitimate antigovernment ideology” (p. 8). Instead, attempts to consider the criticisms commonly
made of markets as they would be applied to the realm of public administration for
“Public choice almost literally forces the critic to be pragmatic in any comparison of
proposed institutional structures. There can be no presumption that politicized
corrections for market failures will accomplish the desired objectives” (p. 7). This is
because,
Public choice, as an inclusive research program, incorporates the presumption
that persons do not readily become economic eunuchs as they shift from
market to political participation. The person who responds predictably to
ordinary incentives in the marketplace does not fail to respond at all when his
role is shifted to collective choice, (p. 7)
If those operating government do so in a way that has much in common with
those who function in a rationally individualistic market, what keeps society from
developing into anarchy where the strong dominate and the weak are dominated?
According to Buchanan, it is the development of a “Constitutional Political
Economy” (p. 5). The “constitutional” aspect is that rules exist for how people may
and may not rationally seek their own benefit and “have as their primary function the
imposition of limits or constraints on actions that might be taken” (p. 5).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

191

The question of ethics is an important one for Buchanan as it was for those
who responded to Sherman’s survey seeking the fifty most influential books in public
administrative theory and had serious reservations about the “morally pernicious”
theories of Ostrom. Buchanan does not attempt to make public administrators less
virtuous than everyone else, but neither does he want to “proceed with analysis of
politics under the illusion that persons do indeed become ‘saints’ as they shift to
collective choice roles” (p. 8).
According to Buchanan:
By simple comparison with the climate of opinion at half century, both the
punditry and the public are much more critical of politics and politicians,
much more cynical about the motivations of political action, much less naive
in thinking that political nostrums offer easy solutions to social problems, (p.
8)

At just the time Ostrom was writing his book, according the Buchanan,
“Governments everywhere, in both the socialist and the welfare states, overreached
themselves, and tried to do more than the institutional framework would support. This
record of failure came to be recognized widely, commencing in the 1960s and
accelerating in the 1970s” (p. 9). Ostrom, then, is reflecting the intellectual crisis not
only of the Watergate affair and its demonstration that people in elected or appointed
government office do indeed act with their own self-interest at heart. He is also
reflecting a broader and more complex sense that activist governments around the
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world, regardless of which political or economic theory they embraced, were failing
to provide what they promised in earlier decades.
Public choice did not create this situation. Instead:
Armed with nothing more than the rudimentary insights from public choice,
persons could understand why, once established, bureaucracies tend to grow
apparently without limit and without connection to initially promised
functions. They could understand why pork-barrel politics dominated the
attention of legislators; why there seems to be a direct relationship between
the overall size of government and the investment in efforts to secure special
concessions from government [rent seeking]; why the tax system is described
by the increasing number of special credits, exemptions, and loopholes; why
balanced budgets are so hard to secure; why strategically placed industries
secure tariff protection. (Buchanan, p. 9)
In doing so, according to Buchanan, public choice theorists were not actually
doing anything new or innovative. Instead, they were returning to their American
roots:
Public choice, in its basic insights into the workings of politics, incorporates a
presupposition about human nature that differs little, if at all, from that which
informed the thinking of James Madison at the American founding. The
essential scientific wisdom of the 18th century, of Adam Smith and classical
political economy and of the American Founders, was lost through two
centuries of intellectual folly. Public choice does little more than incorporate a
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rediscovery of this wisdom and its implications into analyses and appraisal of
modem politics, (p. 10)
It is, then, a reformation rather than a revolution.
Ostrom’s book reflects Buchanan’s thought, especially his presumption about
human nature. He describes his intellectual life as one that began with an assumption
of the truth and relevance of the prevailing thought at the beginning of his career only
to become disillusioned over time with centralization and power being located in the
hands of only a few:
Work with problems of educational administration fueled my skepticism
regarding the traditional principles of public administration. The contention
that independent school districts should be eliminated and integrated into a
single general unit of local government was becoming less and less
persuasive. Independent officials could collaborate without being
subordinated to a single chief executive, (p. xii)
Simon’s strong executive would not be the answer to the problems facing the
United States government. The problem, according to Ostrom, was that one person
lacked the necessary knowledge to ran a large bureaucracy for “No master-general of
American education could look at his watch and know what lesson students in each
school would be studying at any one moment” (p. xii). If this were the case in
bringing several small school districts together under one administrator, the prospects
for centralized command and control within a national agency could not be promising.
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This concern over knowledge naturally led Ostrom to include the study of
economics in his consideration of public administration. The extremes of the
economic spectrum, Marxism and free market capitalism, differ primarily in their
perspective on who controls the economy. For the Marxist, the economy is centrally
planned and controlled. For the adherents of free-market capitalism, such as Adam
Smith, the economy is not chaotic as might first seem to be the case in the absence of
centralized control. Instead, the market is controlled by what Smith and others
referred to as an “invisible hand” which, in reality, was visible in the hands of many.
It was an argument for an extremely decentralize economy where millions of small
decisions made by the citizens of a nation provide control over the economy.
The issues of prudence and justice must not be left in the hands of only a few
because they simply lack the information needed to make informed decisions on
behalf of the many. Just as these issues play a central role in the function of economic
reality, so Ostrom began to believe that they were central to all the functions of
government for, “No one can ‘see’ the whole picture and

accurately portray and

understand social reality” (pp. xvi-xvii). The reason such whole-picture perspectives
are impossible to see, know, and control is “human beings can draw upon different
conceptions and systems of ideas to fashion different social realities” and coining to
understand these differences within human societies “is a fundamental step to
becoming a master artisan in public administration and in the study of human
societies” (p. xix). It is not discovering that there is a single best way to do something
and then determining what it is in the name of efficiency. Instead, according to
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Ostrom, the key to public administration is understanding the complex tapestry that is
the human person within society, making choices and applying reason. If public
administration theorists refuse to get “hung up in trying to repudiate one another, we
have the possibility of coming to a reasonable level of awareness of what human
beings can and cannot do in fashioning their social realities” (p. xix). Ostrom’s choice
of words is interesting. He is not calling for theorists to determine what human
beings are and are not capable of doing. Instead, he simply wants theorists to observe,
pay attention, and see what they can learn about how people function in reality.
Despite his call for collegial observation, Ostrom is not above laying a
significant challenge at the feet of Simon and others in the traditionalist camp of
public administration theory. If Taylor is right in applying science to determine the
one best way and Simon is right in his belief that organizations and their structures
have a great deal to do with human thriving and efficiency, then Ostrom believes a
high level of predictability ought to exist enabling public administrative theorists to
exert a great deal of control over society. To put it succinctly, if one knows the good
and understands how to bring it about, then good should flourish. Ostrom challenges
these assumptions at both the level of knowing what is prudent and just for human
beings and of knowing how to bring prudence and justice into existence in human
societies (pp. 1-2).
First of all, then, is the matter of knowing what is prudent and just. Ostrom
writes, “We are . . . confronted with a substantial question of whether the bodies of
knowledge used by those who practice public administration will lead to an
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improvement in or an erosion of human welfare” (p. 3). Do those who practice it
spend time considering what is and what is not in the interest of human welfare?
What are the boundaries of human welfare and who should determine them? What is
the operational worldview of those who have determined that they should play a
leading role in determining what is in the interest of other human beings and what is
not? Ostrom writes that, although such worldviews are vitally important, they are
often the least examined aspects of theorists:
An intellectual construct is like a pair of spectacles. We see and order events
in the world by looking through our spectacles and by using intellectual
constructs to form pictures in our mind’s ‘eye’—an intellectual vision. We
are apt to neglect a critical examination of the spectacles or the constructs
themselves” (p. 18).
Theorists must know the end.
Assuming that such examinations have been done and the matter of what is
and what is not in the interest of human welfare is made clear, do public
administrative theorists, using scientific methodology and reason, understand how to
bring it about? As Ostrom puts is:
If the practice of public administration is based on a knowledge of the
organizational terms and conditions that are necessary to advance human
welfare, then those of us who teach public administration should be able to
indicate what those terms and conditions are. In short, we should be able to
specify the consequences that follow from different organizational conditions.
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. . . We should be able to indicate the conditions and consequences that derive
from the choice of alternative organizational arrangements if theories of
organization have scientific warrantability. (p. 2)
If public administration is a science that can clarify what it wants to achieve in
the interest of human welfare, it ought to be able to state the means best fitted to its
goals. Cause and effect chains, if known, can be controlled. If known and centrally
controlled by people who are prudent, just, and in government, then human beings
should have been thriving globally. Ostrom’s context, though, as noted above, was
post-Watergate when big government optimism had faded and pessimism was the
order of the day.
Ostrom borders on mocking those who believe strongly in central planning,
control, and command using medical terminology:
If we have a body of knowledge that enables us to estimate the probable
consequences evoked by different organizational arrangements, we should be
able to pursue two forms of analysis. One form uses theory to draw inferences
about consequences to be anticipated. These inferences can be used as
hypotheses to guide empirical research and test the predictive value of theory.
We can have some confidence in a theory that has predictive value for
indicating consequences that can be expected to flow from specifiable
structural conditions. A second form of analysis derives from the first. When
relationships between conditions and consequences can be specified and when
any particular set of consequences is judged to be detrimental to human
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welfare, we should then be able to specify the conditions that lead to that set
of consequences. Consequences of organizational arrangements that are
detrimental to human welfare can be viewed as social pathologies. If the
conditions leading to those pathologies can be specified, then the basis exists
for diagnosing the organizational conditions of social pathologies. If
conditions can be altered so as to evoke a different set of consequences, then
different forms of remedial action can be considered. By altering the
appropriate conditions, one set of consequences judged to be pathological
might be avoided and another set of consequences judged to be more benign
might be realized, (pp. 2-3)
It seems simple, but it is not. Human beings do not function in a laboratory
setting where most things can be controlled, known, and predicted. If it were, it
seems to Ostrom, the role of public administration theorists would be to hypothesize,
test, observe, draw conclusions, and control. Such a society would be made up of a
handful of people who understand how to manipulate the levers of government to
exert control over the rest of the citizens. Ostrom clearly rejects this proposition.
According to Ostrom, the assumptions about what is and what is not in the interest of
human welfare as well as the best means of bringing it about are wrong: “We are...
confronted with a substantial question of whether the bodies of knowledge used by
those who practice public administration will lead to an improvement in or an erosion
of human welfare” (p. 3).
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The intellectual crisis in public administration theory is not among the
practitioners. Ostrom believes that those teaching public administration are at least
partially to blame: “Dare we contemplate the possibility that the contemporary
malaise in American society may have been derived, in part, from the teachings of
public administration?” (p. 4). It is interesting that he expands the intellectual crisis
within public administration to “American society” at large. In other words, the crisis
has implications for the entire nation.
What is most troubling is that Ostrom thinks the influence of public
administration in the American society is actually increasing:
We would expect that the practice of public administration will increase in
importance as the domain of choice is extended to include an increasing range
of opportunities. I doubt that there are many who anticipate a decline in the
relative importance of the practice of public administration as long as the
opportunities exist for continued advancement in human welfare, (p. 3)
It is not clear whether he is still addressing human welfare within the United
States or whether he intends to broaden its circle of influence to a global context.
Either way, the lack of knowledge about what is and what is not in the best interest of
human thriving as well as a deficiency of understanding in how to bring it about is
disturbing. If public administration is a source of malaise because of its lack of clarity
while, at the same time, its influence is waxing, there is little optimism that the
situation will improve:
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Perhaps this is an occasion on which we should entertain an outlandish
hypothesis: that our teachings include much bad medicine. I have reached this
conclusion after considerable agonizing about the problem. I once hoped that
I could be proved wrong. I have since abandoned that hope; and I have
attempted to work my way through to alternative resolutions. I am now
persuaded that the major task in the next generation will be to lay new
foundations for the study of public administration. If these foundations are
well laid, we should see a new political science join a new economics and a
new sociology in establishing the basis for a major advance upon the frontiers
of public administration, (pp. 4-5)
The combination of political science, economics, and sociology should be
informing and molding new models of public administrative theory. All three
sciences have deeply held and sometimes completely opposite assumptions about the
nature of the human person. Are human beings, in their essence, prudent and just?
Not only would each discipline provide a different answer, but within each discipline,
various schools of thought would have widely divergent philosophical assumptions
about the human person. Ostrom believes such a search is important and necessary.
His quick review of the history of thought regarding American public
administration paints a picture of theorists who have swallowed—hook, line, and
sinker—a bureaucratic approach to public administration as the solution to virtually
all issues in American society:
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Building on the precepts in the Wilsonian paradigm, students of public
administration gradually articulated several principles of administration. Such
concepts as unity of command, span of control, chain of command,
departmentalization by major functions, and direction by single heads of
authority in subordinate units of administration are assumed to have universal
applicability. Strengthening of the government is viewed as the equivalent of
increasing the authority and powers of the chief executive. General-authority
agencies are preferred to limited-authority agencies. Large jurisdictions are
preferred to small. Centralized solutions are preferred to the disaggregation of
authority among diverse decision structures, (p. 30)
Such concepts were set in dogmatic stone by the President’s Committee on
Administration, which reported in 1937:
The principles of efficient management ‘have emerged universally wherever
men have worked together for some common purpose, whether through the
state, the church, the private association, or the commercial enterprise.’ The
committee implied that principles of efficient management apply to all
associations alike. The principles of management, summarized as ‘canons of
efficiency,’ were assumed to require, ‘the establishment of a responsible and
effective chief executive as the center of energy, direction, and administrative
management; the systemic organization of all activity in the hands of a
qualified personnel under the direction of the chief executive; and to aid him
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in this, the establishment of appropriate managerial and staff agencies, (pp.
30-31)
These assumptions became the spectacles through which all administrative reality was
viewed.
According to Ostrom, Simon could be credited with introducing the economic
measurement of efficiency and cost-benefit analysis to decision-making, but his
attempts at reform merely created a slight adjustment in older models and did not
cause the necessary revolution:
Simon’s theory was essentially cast within the same mold as the traditional
theory of administration. It was an alternative articulation of the old
theoretical paradigm. Neither is a viable alternative. Simon’s effort to
reconstruct organizational theory made a number of critical breaks with
tradition. His reconstruction gave a new emphasis to psychology of decision
making and to considerations bearing upon a model of organizational man.
His formulation of the criterion of efficiency proposed the application of a
cost calculus that would allow for an independent test of efficiency other than
presuming the efficiency of bureaucratic structure, (pp. 15-16)
Ostrom concludes that: “More than a half-century of intellectual effort in
American study of public administration was predicated upon an assumption that
perfection in the hierarchical organization of administrative arrangements is
synonymous with efficiency” (p. 36). The assumption proved to be untrue. Old
models failed as had any attempts to retool them. New models involving other
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disciplines had not yet been developed. In the midst of the transition from old to new,
Ostrom calls for humility:
The practice of a profession rests upon the validity of the knowledge it
professes. When the confidence of a profession in the essential validity of its
knowledge has been shattered, that profession should be extraordinarily
modest about the professional advice it renders while keeping up its
appearances, (p. 10)
What Ostrom seeks is a new pair of “spectacles” for public administration
theorists that will bring order to observed reality by means of “intellectual constructs”
informed by political science, economics, and sociology (p. 18). The basic building
blocks for a new perspective must be philosophical assumptions made clear and
bright. He is the first theorist considered to be explicit not only in his call for clarity
but also in putting forward his own assumptions in an unambiguous fashion. While
he assigns the following assumptions to the discipline of political economy, he clearly
embraces them as essential to public administration theory:
Work among most political economists is usually based on an explicit model
of man. They adopt a form of methodological individualism which makes
self-conscious use of the perspective of a representative individual or set of
representative individuals in the conduct of analysis.. . . Assumptions about
individuals normally include reference to (1) self-interest, (2) rationality, (3)
information, (4) law and order, and (5) the choice of a maximizing strategy.
(p. 44)
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His embrace of this set of anthropological assumptions places him squarely within the
camp of those who advocate for public choice theory. Ostrom does not discuss
alternatives to these assumptions nor does he defend them. Rather, he assumes they
will be accepted by his readers.
Ostrom does not directly address whether ethical behavior is probable or even
possible in a construct where each person utilizes his or her rationality to maximize
the self given the information available to them. It can be said that his emphasis on
“law and order” creates the boundaries within which this pursuit is to be made so that
each person plays within the laws established in a particular setting. These
boundaries are more applicable to justice than to prudence. He assumes people will
seek their own benefit through their reason using the information available to them.
To ask them to act in opposition to this is to ignore the reality of the human person.
Ostrom makes his case by beginning with the market and then moving to public
goods, the arena of the public administrator. In the market of private goods,
“Individualistic choice is characteristic and . . . occurs whenever the only requirement
is the willing consent of those individuals who freely agree or contract with one
another to exchange some good or undertake some action” (p. 49).
It is imprudent to think that human beings will change their stripes when in the
arena of non-private goods for:
If each is free to decide for oneself in the pursuit of one’s own interest
concerning a common-property resource or a public good, serious problems
will occur. Each individual will presume to maximize one’s own net welfare
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if one takes advantage of the common property or public good at a minimum
cost to oneself. In the case of a public good, the cost minimizer would have no
incentive to pay his or her share of the costs for provision, (pp. 49-50)
The failure of the commons is a failure of assumptions about the human
person. This will be true not only of private citizens who seek to take advantage of
the commons but also of those in public administration whose task it is to oversee it.
According to Ostrom, there is little possibility of escaping the self-maximizing,
rational tendencies of human nature with the commons because, “Each person will
calculate only his or her own individual costs and will ignore the social costs imposed
on others. Many individuals will. . . pursue their own advantage, and disregard the
consequences for others (p. 50). Even if attempted, plans or structures that seek to
force others to consider the common good will fail for “some individuals will be
motivated to conceal information about their intentions. Should others propose joint
action, those who conceal information may remain free to take advantage of
opportunities created by the joint actions of others” (p. 50). The last sentence is
telling in that Ostrom believes even those who claim to have clean hands and pure
hearts in seeking a prudent and just means of making use of public goods can and
probably do in order to gain an advantage.
Self-interest and competition work in the arena of private goods. Attempting
to set aside this basic characteristic of human nature when entering the public arena
will only lead to complete failure:
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Social costs will escalate to a point at which continued operations will yield an
economic loss for the community of users. Individuals in weak economic
positions will be forced out. The neighborhood effects that are generated may
include poverty, deprivation, threats, and even violence. Individualist decision
making applied to common-property resources will lead inexorably to tragedy
unless the common property can be portioned into separable private properties
or decision-making arrangements can be modified to enable persons to act
jointly in relation to a common property, (pp. 50-51)
Ostrom is not making the argument that a few bad apples will spoil the barrel for the
rest who are not primarily self-interested self-maximizers. His argument is that all
human persons function this way and to deny it is to deny the reality of the human
person. As he says, “Because of this competitive dynamic, individuals cannot be
expected to form large voluntary associations to pursue matters of common or public
interest” (p. 51). In other words, relying on the voluntary prudence and justice of
individuals is bound to fail.
The best hope for justice will be found within law and order or, as Buchanan
expresses it, “constitutional political economy” where rules exist for how people may
and may not rationally seek their own benefit and “have as their primary function the
imposition of limits or constraints on actions that might be taken” (p. 5). Constraint
on self-maximization is not found within human persons except in that they choose to
obey the law. Prudence is not about using reason to choose what it right. Instead, it is
about using the tools of rationality to bring the highest possible benefit to self in any
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given situation, whether public or private. The community or society creates the rules
by which benefits are pursued. Law determines ethics so that the question of whether
an action is prudent or just does not really apply to the individual. Instead, ethics
becomes a matter of whether something is legal.
It is the invisible hand of Adam Smith at work. Centrally planned economies
will not work because, in most cases, human beings are not asked to apply their
reason to the information that is available to them, they will not be working to
maximize what is in their own best interest, and law and order may or may not exist.
Human beings are not built to think or work this way, according to Ostrom. Even if
they were, organizations are too diverse for any single approach to be universally
applicable:
No single form of organization is presumed to be ‘good’ for all circumstances.
Rather, any organizational arrangement can generate a limited range of
preferred effects. Every organizational arrangement will be subject to
limitations...Thus any particular organizational arrangement will have certain
capabilities and will be subject to sources of weakness or failure. The
essential elements in the analysis of organizational arrangements are to (1)
anticipate the consequences that follow when (2) self-interested individuals
choose optimizing strategies within the structure of a situation that has
reference to (3) particular structures of events [goods] in the context of (5)
some shared community of understanding. The optimal choice of
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organizational arrangements would be that which minimizes the cost
associated with institutional weakness or failure, (pp. 48-49)
For this reason, the bureaucratic approach cannot be assumed to be the correct and
most fitting one for every organization. Actually, in Ostrom’s mind, it may well be
wrong for most or even all organizations.
Bureaucratic organizations rely, “upon hierarchy requiring subordinates to
defer to the commands of superiors in the selection of appropriate actions and subject
to sanctions or discipline for failure to do so” (p. 51). In doing so, they remove from
those further down the chain of command the opportunity to rationally consider the
available information and make a decision that might be in their own best interest but
not in the best interest of the organization. In acting this way, bureaucracies limit the
choice of what is in the best interest of an employee to one of two things: obedience,
which is encouraged by the promise of a carrot, and disobedience, which is
discouraged by the threat of a stick. This is exactly what Frederick Taylor envisioned
in his scientific management system. Workers either will not know or will not do
what is best for the organization. Such decisions are better left in the hands of those
who apply science to work. Simon’s system varies little from Taylor’s in that
operators are generally neither prudent nor wise. If employees are going to pull
together in a direction beneficial to the organization, their choices must be limited to
obedience and disobedience.
While perhaps functional within private enterprise, Ostrom rejects such an
approach as being workable within the public arena. With purely public goods, there
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is no way to limit those who are able to make use of them. If there were, argues
Ostrom, the good would be private:
When principles of bureaucratic organization are applied to the conditions
prevailing in the provision of public goods and services, a number of sources
for potential institutional weakness or institutional failure become apparent.
In the absence of an exclusion principle, the competitive force of a product
market will not exist for most public organizations, (p. 52)
The result of such a dynamic within public administration is that,
“entrepreneurs in such organizations will be less sensitive to diseconomies of scale
that accrue from increasing management costs as the size of a public organization
increases” (p. 52). Despite the claim of traditional theorists that increased
centralization, command and control will lead to greater efficiencies, Ostrom believes
exactly the opposite is true due to the improper anthropological assumptions utilized
by those theorists.
Incorrect thinking about human persons and their motivations not only creates
inefficiency, it also distorts information. Even if public administrators were able to
rise above their natural inclinations and attempted to act in a selfless manner designed
to contribute to the common good, the information on which they would be relying
would be skewed by those reporting to them. Ostrom uses the example o f ,
an ambitious public employee who seeks to advance his or her career
opportunities for promotions within a bureaucracy. Since career advancement
depends on favorable recommendations by one’s superiors, a career-oriented
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public servant will act so as to please his or her superiors. Favorable
information will be forwarded; unfavorable information will be repressed.
Distortion of information will diminish control and create expectations that
diverge from events generated by actions. Large-scale bureaucracies will thus
become error-prone and cumbersome in adapting to rapidly changing
conditions, (p. 53)
Self-interested, rationalizing self-maximizers are not limited to the public
sector but can be found in equal proportions within the realm of public
administration. There is no class of persons who are immune. There is no
educational system which will undo or minimize these natural inclinations. People
who choose to work in public administration are not acting for the common good of
those who use their services because their self-interest is the same as everyone else’s.
Ostrom echoes Mosher in considering that the professionalization of public
administration might actually have contributed to rather than reduced the social ills of
modem society so that, “an analyst would not be surprised to find a positive
relationship between the professionalization of the public service and the
impoverishment of ghettos in big cities” (p. 54).
This is not the end of Ostrom’s pessimistic estimation of the state of public
administration. Those who work with public goods do not face competition from
other potential suppliers of those goods, so there is little connectivity to self-interest
and self-maximization of people who work in the private sector who must provide
goods and services at ever-lower prices and with ever-greater service. There is no

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

211

motivation to increase productivity or efficiency because “producer efficiency in the
absence of consumer utility is without economic meaning” (p. 54). Furthermore,
increased demand in public goods is not met with increased supply as it would be in
the private arena where new suppliers would be created or the initial suppliers,
working in their own self-interest, would do everything possible to increase supply.
Instead:
Public goods may be subject to serious erosion or degradation as demands
change. In the absence of a capability to respond with modified supply
schedules and regulations for use, a public ‘good’ may come to be a public
‘bad’ and the tragedy of the commons can reach critical or explosive
proportions, (p. 55)
In the end, Ostrom believes that the existence of and demand for public goods
is inherently at odds with the nature of the human person, whose central interest is
self and who maximizes every opportunity using rationality and the information
available at the time within the bounds of the rule of law. Individual choices in the
public sphere will not work. Bureaucracies provide no answer. Anyone who accepts
these two premises as facts is “confronted with the task of conceptualizing alternative
institutional arrangements for the organization of collective or public enterprises” (p.
56). The old spectacles have been smashed under the boots of the nature of the
human person. Appealing to the common good or attempting to counteract the
common lack of prudence and justice in human persons through bureaucratic
structures will not work.
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Of course, not all is lost. Instead of battling the inclinations of the human
being toward self-interest and self-maximization or hoping that class or education will
overcome them, the public sector must attempt to put them to use in the same way the
private sector does, or at least as closely as is possible given the lack of competition in
the public sector. The best way to get human beings to be prudent and just is to create
a system where individuals, acting in their own self-interest, rationally decide to
operate in a just and prudent fashion that will be beneficial to all. This is no easy
task:
If the object of interest can be identified, courses of action can be examined to
determine which alternatives will enhance the welfare of that community of
individuals. If some form of joint action is available that would leave each
individual better off, provided that all members of the community were
required to contribute proportionally to that activity, each person will be
motivated to devise and agree to a set of decision rules authorizing action on
behalf of that community of individuals. Such rules would require some form
of coercion to ensure that each individual will discharge a proportionate share
of the burden, (p. 57)
Actions of persons operating in the sector of public goods will be just and prudent
only if their self-interest and the carefully defined common good intersect.
The common good will be reinforced by rules put in place by those whom
citizens have voluntarily put in authority over them. Since no market exists to reward
or punish those who make the rules:
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The constitution of public enterprises must depend instead on the development
of political mechanisms such as voting, representation, legislation, and
adjudication for people to express their interests by signaling agreements or
disagreements as the basis for ordering their relationships with one another.
(p. 58)
Voting out of office those who make unpopular laws is one way to correct
their self-interest and self-maximizing tendencies. What about unelected public
administrators? This is where Ostrom picks up Buchanan’s concept of “constitutional
choice” which:
is simply a choice of decision rules that specify the terms and conditions of
government.. . . The organization of a public agency, when viewed as a
problem in constitutional choice, is the choice of selection of an appropriate
set of decision rules to be used in allocating decision-making capabilities
among the community of people concerned with the provision of public goods
and services under reasonably optimal conditions, (p. 58)
Public administrators are held accountable by rules created by elected officials who
are held accountable by those who elected them. Such a structure, in Ostrom’s mind,
is the most effective means of countering the self-interest and self-maximization of
public administrators. Democracy and the rule of law trump self-interest. Again, it is
important to note that this is no attempt to develop the concepts of prudence and
justice as internal checks to the natural tendencies of those in the public sector. The
primary way of countering these tendencies is external.
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In addition to accountability through democracy and the rules it produces,
Ostrom advocates for the proliferation of organizations and agencies rather than the
drive for centralization and consolidation that had been the pattern for the previous
fifty years. He recognizes that “This solution is the antithesis of the proposed in the
classical public administration tradition. Instead of chaos and disorder, these political
economies perceive a pattern of ordered relationships being sustained among diverse
public enterprises” (p. 61). His is democratic administration rather than the
bureaucratic administration of Taylor, Weber, Simon, and others.
Ostrom’s defense for democratic administration is full of anthropological
assumptions, which he is more than willing to make clear and bright:
(1) an egalitarian assumption that everyone is qualified to participate in the
conduct of public affairs, (2) the reservation of all important decisions for
consideration by all members of the community and their elected
representatives, (3) restriction of the power of command to a necessary
minimum, and (4) modification of the states of administrative functionaries
from that of masters to that of public servants, (p. 71)
These assumptions reject the idea of an administrative class not only in that
every person is qualified to participate but in the more subtle rejection of the
accumulation of power. There is no Aristotelian philosopher-king who, because he is
both prudent and just, can be trusted with the reins of power. All humans are subject
to their own self-interest, reason, and tendencies to self-maximize. If this is true, then
no person is worthy of total or even substantial command. Furthermore, even if such
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a person were found or created who was neither self-interested or a self-maximizer,
centralized control would still fail for lack of information and ability: “Presumptions
of omniscience and omnicompetence cannot hold in the design of national
institutional arrangements any more than presumptions of frictionless motion can hold
in applied mechanics” (p. 109). There simply are limits to what human beings can be
expected to do: “Beyond the limits of some threshold, variable among human beings,
to do more means doing other things less well. Human beings who have not learned
this fundamental constraint in life cannot be responsible either to themselves or to
others” (p. 132).
The goal is not to raise up people through birth, class, or education who can
overcome the trappings of power for “individuals who exercise the prerogatives of
government are no more nor no less corruptible than their fellow citizens” (p. 98).
There is consistency to human nature. Rather, the goal is to diffuse power. In a
democratic administration:
Instead of a fully integrated structure of command, we would expect to find
substantial dispersion of authority with many different structures of command.
The exercise of control over the legitimate means of coercion would not be
monopolized by a single structure of authority. Democratic administration
would be characterized by polycentricity and not by monocentricity. (p. 71)
Leviathan is controlled, then, by means of overlapping circles of authority and
democratically structured means of accountability. No matter what system is in place,
‘The exercise of political authority—a necessary power to do good—will be usurped
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by those who perceive an opportunity to exploit such powers to their own advantage
and to the detriment of others” (p. 98). Systems must be in place continually to
counter this tendency of the human heart so that “authority is divided and different
authorities are so organized as to limit and control one another” (p. 99). In Ostrom’s
conception:
Fragmentation of authority among diverse decision centers with multiple veto
capabilities within any one jurisdiction and the development of multiple,
overlapping jurisdictions of widely different scales are necessary conditions
for maintaining a stable political order that can advance human welfare under
rapidly changing conditions, (p. 99)
It is interesting that recognizing that human beings tend to lack prudence and
especially justice, and putting in place structures that realistically counter these
tendencies is Ostrom’s answer to the question of how human beings who are selfinterested and self-maximizers can create a just society, political order, and the
common good.
In the end, Ostrom returns to his central theme of the intellectual crisis in
public administration. Its cause is the failure of public administration theorists and
teachers to think seriously about the nature of the human beings as they operate within
organizations:
The first priority in acquiring and teaching such skills is not management. A
prior order of skills has to do with the way that human beings constitute
themselves into mutually respectful and productive relationships.. . . This is
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the process that is constitutive of human endeavors. Persons who function as
public entrepreneurs in democratic societies can only do so when they think of
themselves as citizens working with others to build enduring patterns of
association in which the community of persons involved achieves selfgoverning capabilities. This is how democracies can develop and remain
viable over successive generations. Democratic societies cannot achieve long
term viability if democratic processes are viewed only as a struggle to win and
gain dominance over others. Administrators who conceive of themselves as
good shepherds exercising management prerogatives can create only
recalcitrant and reticent masses. Human beings are not sheep, (pp. 157-158)
The idea of an administrative class, whether created by birth, education,
specialization, science, or any other means must be rejected because such a concept is
inconsistent with human nature. As a whole, people are self-interested and selfmaximizing. According to Ostrom, those who claim they are not subject to either are
likely making the claim in the interest of gaining some advantage in acquiring,
maintaining, or extending their power. There is no person committed wholly to the
common good. His tone softens toward the end of the book where he writes:
A critical aspect turns upon the question of how observers of and participants
in self-governing societies think of and experience themselves as they relate to
other human beings: as individuals struggling for advancement to gain
positions of dominance and become masters of others; or as fellow citizens
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[colleagues, comrades] pursuing courses of inquiry in addressing and
resolving problematic situations in human societies, (p. 168)
But this comment has more to do with ending on a positive note than it does with
being consistent with what is contained in the previous 167 pages. It is not thinking
of self in communal terms that will bring about the common good.
For Ostrom, human nature is primarily concerned with self-interest and self
maximization through the use of reason applied to the information available. Placing
responsibility for the common good in the hands of such an individual is an inherently
foolish thing to do and virtually guarantees failure and corruption. The common good,
or justice, can only be achieved by placing it as far away from the individual in power
as possible. Prudence and justice are to be found in the rule of law. They are
guaranteed through the diffusion of power, not through its accumulation. They are to
be found in overlapping circles of authority and the proliferation of interest groups,
not through centralized command and control. Bureaucratic organizations are not the
answer nor are strong executives, science, or educational institutions. Limitations on
individual knowledge and ability only strengthen the argument against the
centralization of power.
On the prudence/justice scale, Ostrom believes that human beings primarily
know what is prudent for themselves. In making this determination, they make full
use of their capacity for reason. Public choice theory, based on classical economic
theory, holds that when people act in their own self-interest, the common good is the
result. Problems develop when power is accumulated in the hands of a few who,
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despite claims of concern for the common good, continue to act in ways that are selfinterested. In general, then, Ostrom believes that individuals human beings are quite
high on the prudence scale but low on the justice scale in that they do not make the
common good a central concern in exercising their reason in the face of various
choices. This, seemingly, would place Ostrom in the upper-left comer on the scale high prudence and low justice. His system, though, is more complicated than simply
one location on the scale. It is his belief that when people exercise prudence in their
own self-interest under the constraints of law with little concern for the common
good, the common good is the most likely result. Self-interested individuals belong
in the upper-left quadrant. Recognizing that this is the nature of human persons and
refraining from attempts to deny or alter this core belief will result in a society that is
both prudence and just and, therefore, belongs in the upper-right quadrant. Giving
political power to only a few or assuming that a handful of people have overcome
their inclination to self-interest results in a society that is neither prudent nor just.

Vincent Ostrom

Justice
Figure 9. Vincent Ostrom
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Amitai Etzioni’s The Spirit o f Community: Rights, Responsibilities,
and the Communitarian Agenda
The final book is Amitai Etzioni’s The Spirit of Community: Rights,
Responsibilities, and the Communitarian Agenda, first published in 1995. While not
included on the Sherwood list because it postdates the survey by five years, it is an
important book because it demonstrates further movement away from the dominant
tradition theory of the need for a strong executive and moves into the realm of
communitarian thought with an emphasis on rights and their corresponding
responsibilities. Strength is found in the community rather than in any single
individual or the government. This is a complete swing of the pendulum from
Frederick Taylor and pushes what began in Ostrom further down the road. For
Ostrom, the answer to human self-interest and its tendency toward self-maximization
is found in constitutional or democratic administration where the rule of law,
overlapping circles of authority, and the diffusion of power are pillars.
Etzioni’s approach is remarkably similar to Ostrom’s, although the connection
is not at first obvious. They share a common concern about the self-interest of the
individual human person, though Ostrom seems convinced that this cannot be
overcome while Etzioni holds out hope that the level of self-interest in American
culture has been increasing and, therefore, can also be decreased or at least mitigated
by increasing community attachment and involvement. Neither are appreciative of
central command and control and neither have much trust in elected officials or public
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administrators to make the common good their central concern. Both are strong
advocates of decentralization.
Of the five authors considered in this study, Etzioni is the theorist most
focused on ethics and morality. Whereas Simon dismissed such topics as at best
falling outside the concern of public administration, Etzioni makes them his
cornerstone. His goal, as stated in the Introduction, is to from a new moral, social,
and public order without becoming Puritanical or oppressive. He writes:
We hold that our call for increased social responsibility, a main tenet of this
book, is not a call for curbing rights. On the contrary, strong rights presume
strong responsibilities. We hold that the pursuit of self-interest can be
balanced by commitment to the community, without requiring us to lead a life
of austerity, altruism, or self-sacrifice. Furthermore, unbridled greed can be
replaced by legitimate opportunities and socially constructive expressions of
self-interest, (pp. 1- 2)
This premise is full of anthropological assumptions. Self-interest is not
necessarily negative nor is it something that needs to be overcome for the
development of a common good. Self-interested people do not necessarily lack
prudence or justice. Just and prudent people do not necessarily need to be altruistic or
self-sacrificing. In other words, self-interest is not the same as selfishness where the
only concern is personal gain. The self-interested person, in Etzioni’s mind, is not
necessarily the materialistic, power-hungry, grasping individual whose central
concern is acquisition, protection and extension of what is owned. Self-interest and a
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concern for the common good through decisions and actions that are both prudent and
just are not mutually exclusive. For Ostrom, the best weapons to counteract selfinterest and self-maximization are external to the individual and are established
through the rule of law, democratic administration, and the decentralization of power.
All of these take place outside the individual. For Etzioni, the real battle is an internal
ethical and moral one. Greed can be controlled. Self-interest can be balanced with
concern for community. Rights can be upheld while, at the same time,
responsibilities are promoted. All of these must begin internally before they can be
expressed externally to the human person:
What America needs, above all, is a change in the way we approach things,
what we value and what we devalue, a change of heart. True, some of the
matters at hand can be addressed through changes in public policy, but first
and foremost we need a change in philosophy, a new way of thinking, a
reaffirmation of a set of moral values that we may all share, (p. 18)
Considerations of prudence and justice, then, are the keys to restoration rather
than distractions from efficiency and effectiveness or unscientific metaphysical
exercises with little or no connection to public administration. Communitarians, on
whose behalf Etzioni is writing, “are dedicated to working with our fellow citizens to
bring about the changes in values, habits, and public priorities that will allow us . . . to
safeguard and enhance our future” (p. 3). While this is primarily an internal
reconstruction of the values of human persons in American society, Etzioni does not
believe it takes place in isolation. Ostrom did not believe individuals would be able
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to balance their self-interest and self-maximizing tendencies and so he turned to the
power of the state diffused among many agencies. Etzioni’s approach is to consider a
number of mediating institutions that have the capacity for balancing the common
good and self-interest. As a matter of fact, the state has the potential to add to the
problem rather than helping to solve it:
We suggest that free individuals require a community, which backs them up
against encroachment by the state and sustains morality by drawing on the
gentle prodding of kin, friends, neighbors, and other community members
rather than building on government controls or fear of authorities, (p. 15)
The problem is not mere self-interest. Instead, it is self-interest expressed in a
particular way that demonstrates a lack of balance between rights and responsibilities.
At the root of societal problems is, “a strong sense of entitlement—that is, a demand
that the community provide more services and strongly uphold rights—coupled with a
rather weak sense of obligation to the local and national community” (p. 3). The
matter is expressed external to the individual but reflects an internal problem.
Americans demand rights but refuse responsibility for upholding those rights for
others in the community. Etzioni’s prescription is as follows: “It is therefore
necessary to reiterate that sooner or later the responsibilities we load on the
government end up on our shoulders or become burdens we bequeath to our children”
(p. 4). The problem is not government itself. It is only responding to the demands
placed on it by its citizens. Etzioni believes the solution lies in balancing these
demands.
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The Communitarian agenda has four main goals. First, Etzioni calls for a
moratorium on most, if not all, rights and demands. The constant claiming of rights
in every dispute, “devalues their moral claims.” Second, the link between rights and
responsibilities must be reestablished. Third, Communitarians want citizens to
recognize that there are certain responsibilities that do not entail rights. And finally,
they want to make it clear that some rights need to be adjusted given that
circumstances change (p. 4).
The means of achieving these goals is not primarily legal nor is it
governmental. Instead, it is distinctly a moral conversation, according to Etzioni.
The 1960s and 1970s were a time of tearing down what was wrong with
traditionalism, but the destruction left a vacuum that Etzioni claims was never filled.
He writes, ‘This is where we are now: it is time to reconstruct, in the full sense of the
term—not to return to the traditional, but to return to a moral affirmation,
reconstructed but firmly held” (p. 12). For Etzioni to define the problem and suggest
the solution in primarily individual moral tones, it is necessary for him to hold tightly
to the idea that the capacity for prudence and justice are common and widely
dispersed among the human population. They cannot be limited to only a few people,
for if this were the case, the Communitarian approach would instantly collapse.
Prudence and justice are real, can be enhanced, and will form the base of a society
where self-interest and the common good are not mutually exclusive but are actually
complimentary.
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The morality of a society is a moving target in that it can wax and wane. It is
not certain that human beings will act in prudent and just ways. But what is prudent,
just, moral, decent or good, according to Etzioni, can be both known and chosen. It is
equally possible that what is unjust, immoral, indecent and evil can be known and
chosen. Different time periods are marked by different levels of morality. For
instance, ‘The eighties tried to turn vice into virtue by elevating the unbridled pursuit
of self-interest and greed to the level of social virtue” (p. 24). It isn’t self-interest that
is the problem. It is whether self-interest is bridled or unbridled. In Etzioni’s system,
morality provides the corrective boundaries. Removing or extending the boundaries
of self-interest and the potential for common good is damaged: “it has become selfevident that a society cannot functions well given such self-centered, me-istic
orientations. It requires a set of dos and don’ts, a set of moral values, that guides
people toward what is decent and encourages them to avoid what is not” (p. 24).
Since the boundaries were blurred, extended, or eliminated in the 1980s, the decade
during which Etzioni wrote required a return:
to a society in which certain actions are viewed as beyond the pale, things that
upright people would not do or even consider: to walk out on their children,
file false insurance claims, cheat on tests, empty the savings accounts of
others, or force sexual advances on unwilling employees, (p. 24)
While he does not dig deeply into it, Etzioni’s framework is built on a
variation of natural law theory where, ‘There is no need to consult clergy or a book by
Kant to determine what one’s duty i s . . . . This is what de Tocqueville and
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Communitarian sociologist Robert Bellah mean by ‘habits of the heart’: values that
command our support because they are morally compelling” (p. 24). It is not reason or
revelation that make these individual habits and values known. As a matter of fact, “It
is unrealistic to rely on individuals’ inner voices and to expect that people will
invariably do what is right completely on their own. Such a radical individualistic
view disregards our social moorings and the important role that communities play in
sustaining moral commitments” (p. 36). For Etzioni, the source of its authority is to
be found in community or in, “a climate that fosters finding agreed-upon positions
that we can favor authoritatively” (p. 25). Etzioni does not address pluralism as a
challenge to his theory nor does he make a solid defense against what kind of moral
system might be operative in a community made up of racists, Nazis, cannibals, or
those who engage in incest. On one hand, he writes that “We must reaffirm that
expressions of hate toward members of ethic or racial groups, not to mention violent
behavior, are intolerable” (p. 25). One the other, he does not say why this is
normatively true.
Etzioni’s faith in community is expressed in his belief that a community
requires, “a set of social virtues, some basic settled values, that we as a community
endorse and actively affirm” (p. 25). While internal moral formation is key to
Etzioni’s system, the content of moral precepts is largely determined by agreement
within community. The boundaries of morality are not matters of individual choice.
The role of the individual, then, is to voluntarily do what is determined by the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

227

community to be prudent and just. It is this, according to Etzioni, that determines
whether a society can survive:
No society can function well unless most of its members ‘behave’ most of the
time because they voluntarily heed their moral commitments and social
responsibilities. There can never be enough police and FBI, IRS and customs
agents, inspectors, and accountants to monitor the billions of transactions that
occur every day. (p. 30)
It is not, then, the promise of carrots or the threat of sticks that serves as the adhesive
that allows an organization to function. Etzioni prefers the boundaries to be
determined collectively but adherence to those boundaries to be a matter of individual
choice.
The vast majority of human persons within any given organization,
community, or society must voluntarily choose to comply with the standards and,
thus, are essentially ethically well-formed persons. According to Etzioni, those
lacking prudence and justice are a tiny percentage of any given gathering of human
beings. Their presence, not reflective of human nature in general, can be explained as
psychological anomalies: “The police powers of the government should be called
upon only as a last resort to deal with the small number of sociopaths and hard-core
recalcitrants, those who do not have moral commitments or sufficient impulse control
to heed those commitments” (p. 30). Sociopaths do not know what is just and
prudent as well as what is unjust and imprudent and then voluntarily choose the latter.
By definition, the sociopath does not know the difference and so, morally, is the
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equivalent of an outlier in statistical analysis in that the person exists but should not
skew the general conclusions by existence.
How, then, does Etzioni explain the lack of justice and prudence he sees in
modem America if he rejects the idea that human nature is inherently flawed? It isn’t
that human beings are incapable of making prudent and just decisions. Instead, the
current culture of greed and corruption in the United States is providing neither the
content of what is prudent and just nor the encouragement to act prudently and justly
(p. 30). The solution is that, “we must shore up our moral foundation to allow the
markets, government, and society to function properly again” (p. 30). Of course, this
begs the question of whether such a moral foundation has ever existed in the market,
the government, or society in general. Etzioni does not name the golden era when this
was the case and leaves himself open to the accusation of viewing either the recent or
distant past with too optimistic a perspective.
The need to shore up the moral foundation has come about,
mainly in instances in which there is no viable community, in which people
live in high-rise buildings and do not know one another, in some city parts in
which the social fabric is frayed, and in situations in which people move
around a lot and lose social moorings, that the social underpinnings of
morality are lost. (p. 33)
The sources, then, of false prudence and injustice are geographic,
architectural, and excessive mobility. The first fear of citizens might be that the
solution for poorly-chosen geography, architecture, and moving patterns is a centrally-
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planned government which would determine what will and what will not contribute to
the presence of prudence and justice in a society. Etzioni is careful to assure his
readers that this is not what he intends:
The best way to minimize the role of the state, especially its policing role, is to
enhance the community and its moral voice.. . . What we must try to avoid is
relying on the state to maintain social order, which can be achieved more
humanely and at less cost by the voluntary observance of those values we all
hold dear. (p. 44)
Etzioni’s anthropological assumptions assign little credit or blame for the
prudence and justice of a society to the nature of the human person. To him, the wellfunctioning human being is created in society, not bom. Apart from a community,
there is no human nature. As he writes, “Our culture wraps newborn infants in a pink
mist. Actually, those newborn ‘cute babies’ are animals with few human traits; left to
their own devices, they will crawl on all fours and bark” (p. 55). The “nature versus
nurture” argument is over for Etzioni and nurture has won hands down. People are
neither inherently prudent nor imprudent, just or unjust. Instead, they are what they
are created to be by their community. There is no class distinction other than one
class might be better situated to create prudent and just members than another. All
are equally capable of either.
With this assumption unquestioned, it is a quick and easy move to focus all
attention and resources to the creation of prudence and justice using the blank slates
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that present themselves before communities in the form of the human baby. Such
formation ought not to be overly difficult for:
We Communitarians argue that two requirements loom over all others, indeed
are at the foundation of most other needs: to develop the basic personality
traits that characterize effective individuals and to acquire core value.. . . Both
are sometimes referred to as ‘developing character’. We mean by character
the psychological muscles that allow a person to control impulses and defer
gratification, which is essential for achievement, performance, and moral
conduct. The core values, which need to be transmitted from generation to
generation, contain moral substances that whose with the proper basic
personality can learn to appreciate, adapt, and integrate into their lives: hard
work pays, even in an unfair world; treat others with the same basic dignity
with which you wish to be treated [or face the consequences]; you feel better
when you do what is right than when you evade you moral precepts, (pp. 9091)
Communities that have lost their formative power over the lives of their
members must be restored. At first, it appears that Etzioni is going to propose the
expansion of community involvement and volunteerism as the solutions to society’s
woes and, indeed, this is where he begins. He encourages people to not only donate
to charities but also to get involved. Start a neighborhood supper club. Do something
with a social purpose. Keep space available in buildings for elderly people with
special physical needs (p. 128).
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And yet, encouraging communities and their members to expand their
volunteerism is not going to be enough:
So much has been written about Tocqueville’s America, the land of voluntary
associations and activities, that the notion that Americans are much more
active Communitarians than Europeans has become a sociological cliche.
Indeed, in America there are many tens of thousands of associations that
promote block parties, baby-sitting pools, lodges, and clubs. One is tempted
to bless them, saying, ‘May they grow, flourish, and multiply,’ and let them
be. (p. 130)
But Etzioni does not succumb to this temptation. So is big government the
answer? Etzioni is clear that he does not accept this as a solution:
It is widely recognized that communities provide the social base of the
mediating institutions that stand between the individual and the state,
protecting the individual from excessive encroachment by the state. For these
mediating institutions to be able to discharge this important functions, they
themselves need to be shielded from the government. Such protection is high
on the agenda of the Communitarian movement, (p. 136)
If individuals have no built-in guidelines for prudence and justice and so
cannot be relied on to be moral, and if current communities cannot provide such
guidance because of current architecture, geographical, or mobility practices, and if
big government is not the solution and may actually contribute to a further breakdown
of community, what is the solution? Etzioni believes the solution is government but a
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particular kind of government that is local and controlled by citizens: “Each city
should have a civilian review board whose duty is would be to review the city’s
procedures to check whether they enhance or hinder the Communitarian nexus” (p
137). Through community policing, neighborhood watch groups, and other
communal involvement, Etzioni believes that government must be brought “closer to
people” (p. 140).
Much of what Etzioni lays out in the first half of his book is contradicted in
the second half. On page 144, Etzioni articulates what he calls the “Communitarian
position on social justice.” He begins with the philosophical precepts, addresses the
core problems with government, discusses the meaning of public interest, and makes
recommendations for the changes that he believes must occur. It is as if two separate
and competing perspectives have merged and been presented as one text. Etzioni’s
philosophical anchors in the second half of the book closely resemble what is
commonly referred to as the “principle of subsidiarity” in Catholic social thought. In
a 1931 encyclical, Pius XI provided a clear statement of the principle:
Just as it is wrong to withdraw from the individual and commit to a group
what private initiative and effort can accomplish, so too it is an injustice for a
larger and higher association to arrogate to itself functions which can be
performed efficiently by smaller and lower associations. This is a
fundamental principle. In its very nature the true aim of all social activity
should be to help members of a social body, and never to destroy or absorb
them, (as quoted in Gregg, p. 11)
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Subsidiarity can be portrayed as a series of circles within circles with the
individual human person at the center. If the individual at the center cannot provide
what is needed, the circle closest to the individual bears responsibility for that
individual. If that circle is unable to provide what is needed, responsibility is
transferred out to the next larger circle. No larger circle should take from a smaller
circle their responsibility unless the smaller circle is unable to meet its
responsibilities.
In Etzioni’s philosophical definition of social justice, “First, people have a
moral responsibility to help themselves as best they can.. . . It is respectful of human
dignity to encourage people to control their fate the best they can—under the
circumstances” (p. 144). If the individual cannot control their fate, “The second line
of responsibility lies with those closest to the person, including kin, friends,
neighbors, and other community members” (p. 144). The justification for their
involvement is that “they know best what the genuine needs are [they are much less
likely to be cheated than are welfare bureaucrats] and are able to tailor the help to
what is required” (p. 144).
In instances where those closest to the individual cannot provide the kind or
amount of help that is necessary, “as a rule every community ought to be expected to
do the best it can to take care of its own” because “attending to welfare is the
responsibility of the local community” (p. 146). In instances where this is not
possible, “societies [which are nothing but communities of communities] must help
those communities whose ability to help their members is severely limited” (p. 146).
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The Catholic system of subsidiarity is built on a presumption about human
persons vital to such a system functioning properly. It assumes that most people are
able to know and are willing to do what it prudent and just. Individuals, who bear the
primary responsibility for themselves, can determine what the right thing for them to
do is. If they are unable to provide for themselves, the assumption is that those
closest to them will both know and do what is prudent and just. At each level up the
chain of provision, it must be assumed that those who are in that level can and will act
in accordance with prudence and justice. In the Catholic system, both knowing and
doing what is prudent and just are possible because of natural law which is accessible
to human beings through the use of their reason. Human beings innately can know
and can choose to do what is prudent and just.
This is where Etzioni’s system is at odds with his previous statements on the
nature of the human person. If human beings lack this innate ability to determine
what is prudent and just and only learn these through what their community impresses
upon them, when they are lost there is little possibility they can be regained. Those
are not capable on their own of knowing their societal duties through the use of reason
and are not taught to consider justice or prudence by their communities will not even
contemplate let alone commit themselves to acting in ways that are prudent or just on
behalf of themselves or others.
Etzioni rejects the idea that large governmental agencies can contribute
anything to the common good primarily because they are controlled by the Congress
of the United States who, in turn, are entirely controlled by special interests. Even
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good faith attempts became fiascos as “policies that were clearly designed to serve the
public interest were twisted beyond recognition by the time they were processed by
the prevailing political system” (p. 213). The primary role of Congress has become
“the selling of legislation to special interests” (p. 213). Because this is the case, “the
nation cannot face a problem and expect that it will be met with a reasonable,
workable public policy that is in the public interest” (p. 216).
Several inconsistencies appear in Etzioni’s consideration of the U.S.
Congress. First of all, Congress itself qualifies as a community, but it is not
considered as a candidate for reform. It appears that members of Congress are
morally incapable of acting in accordance with what is prudent and just because of the
dollars with which they are dealing.
Second, Etzioni’s anthropology in the first half of the book eliminates the
possibility that prudence and justice can either be assigned to a particular community
or class or be completely missing from a community or class. All members of
Congress are members not only of the congressional community but also of their own
local communities, places of worship, neighborhoods, and families. But it appears
that for them, these closest of communities have lost their power to mold and shape
congressional members who belong to them so that those in the House or Senate are
all morally adrift in a sea of cash and influence peddling.
The real villains are not the members of congress, actually. The true villains
are lobbyists and members of special interest groups. Etzioni’s comments on this
topic are illuminating: .
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Because three of four interest groups have no ideological commitments, but
are interested only in lining the pockets of their constituents, they sink their
hooks into both political parties, making effective opposition often impossible
and undermining an essential feature of democratic government

Next time

you find an opposition party oddly refusing to discharge its duties, under our
democratic form of government, check out who is underwriting the
opposition. You will soon discover the major reason our political system is
hobbled: special interests tie it up in knots, (p. 216-217)
One must ask whether these special interest groups actually represent
communities whose bond is a particular interest, whether geographic, ideological, or
economic. Etzioni lists unions and big oil firms as the most egregious examples of
special interest groups that are a corrosive element in national public policy
development, but even these represent groupings of people who are often connected
to a geographical region.
One must also ask how various geographic, ideological, or economic interest
groups could advocate on behalf of the members of their community apart from their
lobbying efforts and how legislators would learn about the needs of a particular
interest without a lobbying arm making their concerns known. Etzioni is aware of
these criticisms and attacks them directly:
Some political scientists argue that special-interest group representation adds
to the democratic process. As they see it, each community is made up of
groups, each of which has its particular interests that it holds dear: farmers
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and city dwellers; industrialists, workers, and consumers; and so on. The act
of satisfying this assemblage of groups, referred to as ‘pluralism,’ is a way to
serve the community as a whole, (p. 217)
But Etzioni does not accept this argument as valid:
As I see it, there are two kinds of pluralism: the kind that is unbounded and
unwholesome, and pluralism-within-unity. In the former, each group is out to
gain all it can, with little concern for the shared needs of the community. In
the latter, groups vie with one another yet voluntarily limit themselves when
they impinge on common interests, (p. 217)
Again, his perspective is inconsistent with what is in the first part of the book.
He explicitly states that individuals cannot self-limit their appetites. The community
to which an individual belongs determines what is and what is not moral behavior.
The community also functions to alert its members “that their inclinations violate
fundamental values we share as a community of communities, as a society. And if
moral suasion does not suffice, legal procedures are available to challenge local
policies that violate overarching values to which the whole society is committed” (p.
52). While perhaps admirable, it is difficult to believe that those leading the
community or representing its interests are going to “limit themselves when they
impinge on common interests” (p. 217). Who will serve in this capacity? Who is
morally formed to such an extent that they are able to not only know the common
good but also to realize that when their interests run up against those of society at
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large, their interests should be withdrawn in the interest of the common good? It
would require the Aristotelian philosopher-king, a concept that Etzioni rejects.
Furthermore, what happens when a community within a society of
communities decides to ignore what is in the best interest of the society as a whole
and act only in a fashion consistent with its own interests. The problem of the
“commons” as described by Ostrom can also be applied to communities themselves:
If each is free to decide for oneself in the pursuit of one’s own interest
concerning a common-property resource or a public good, serious problems
will occur. Each individual will presume to maximize one’s own net welfare
if one takes advantage of the common property or public good at a minimum
cost to oneself. In the case of a public good, the cost minimizer would have no
incentive to pay his or her share of the costs for provision, (pp. 49-50)
Communities will compete for public goods and services, and it is difficult to imagine
that individuals, who do not have the capacity to self-limit, will make up a community
whose self-interest will be checked by a concern for the common good. The parts
will, no doubt, have an impact on the nature of the whole.
Etzioni realizes this conflict exists within his system and attempts to address
the question of who decides what is and what is not in the public interest or, put
another way, what is and what is not prudent and just. He notes that:
An ideology has developed, supported by some social scientists and
intellectuals, that claims there is no such thing as communitywide [or
“public”] interest, only the give and take of particular interests. The actions of
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the interest groups are said not to be detrimental; on the contrary, they are part
of normal politics through which the ‘community’ benefits by servicing its
various constituencies: long live unbounded pluralism, (p. 218)
It is his fear that such “unbounded pluralism” will create a situation where the
majority will always dominate the minority because there will not be parity as to the
relative strength of various interests within society as a whole for, “not all interest
groups are created equal in economic and political power” (p. 219).
How can it be known whether a group’s chief concern is the true common
good or whether it is a narrowly focused group that seeks its own benefit at the
expense of others? Etzioni writes:
The criterion I recommend to one and all is to ask: Who benefits? If the
answer is mainly members of the group that is lobbying, then we have the
general article: a true special interest group [of which we currently have more
than you can shake a stick at]. If the main beneficiary is the society at large,
then we have found a relatively rare specimen and treasure: a group that
serves the public interest. In my judgment, the Sierra Club is such a jewel
because its main concern is to conserve the wilderness for us all and not to
ensure untrampled ski slopes for its members, (p. 219)
There are multiple concerns with this approach. Is the Sierra Club the source
of what is prudent and just regarding stewardship of natural resources? Who in the
Sierra Club has the knowledge and lacks the self-interest to determine what is and
what is not prudent or just when it comes to concern for the environment? Or is the
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Sierra Club simply one group with its own set of interests? The petroleum industry
might argue that their concern is providing inexpensive power to help control the rate
of inflation and spur on economic growth. The ski industry might argue that their
concern is providing a health and recreational activity for people who love mountains
covered with snow. If the Sierra Club is given complete control over natural
resources and is not required to balance its own interests with those of others, it seems
likely that those whose interests are inconsistent with the Sierra Club’s would make it
their goal to influence or even capture control of the Sierra Club.
Etzioni struggles with whether the problem with special interest groups is that
they represent only a few very wealthy people and industries, like petroleum, or
whether they are unions with huge membership roles but whose members have little
control over what is said and done on their behalf. On the one hand:
The issue is whether small groups of well-heeled citizens should be allowed to
use their deep pockets to in effect buy legislation—and to twist the arms of
elected representatives to serve them, while the same representatives
shortchange the rest of the constituents, the overwhelming majority, (p. 228)
On the other, the problem with most special interest groups is that while their
members are required to contribute resources to make their lobbying possible, its
members have no say over how the money is spent: ‘Their members rarely, if ever,
meet, reason, or vote about the course the PAC follows, how its monies are used, or
anything else” (p. 228). In other words, a handful of people within the special interest
group have total control over the resources and, ultimately, the voices they are
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supposed to represent. Because this is the case, “even special interest groups that
have thousands or even millions of members are not genuine avenues for public
participation” (p. 229). Etzioni does not consider that those in control are not nearly
as free to act as he portrays them to be. If the National Rifle Association began to
support handgun control or the American Association of Retired Persons supported
lowering social security payments while raising the retirement age or the leaders of a
trade union came out in favor of the Central American Free Trade agreement, it is
reasonable to assume that their members would revolt and their funds would dry up.
It seems, then, that according to Etzioni, small but powerless interest groups will not
be heard, small but powerful groups will dominate, and groups with a significant
number of members will be dominated by a small number who control their financial
resources.
In the end, Etzioni does not consider how his system might manifest itself in
political reality. Legislators are incapable of considering prudence or justice as they
fashion the laws of the United States. A handful of very powerful and well-funded
special interest groups dominate the landscape in the capitol, led by people who have
no concern for the common good but are entirely focused only on benefits to those
they represent. In doing so, they silence the voices of society as a whole and
specifically the smaller communities which make up society:
As corporations, labor unions, trade associations, and other economic and
social groups penetrate the realm of politics, they overpower the basic
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democratic precept of “one person, one vote” that aims to make the
government equally responsive to all members of the community, (p. 226)
Etzioni’s diagnosis is that “the main reason American democracy is hobbled is
that special interests, drawing on the deep-pocketed PACs, have gained ever more
power since the mid-seventies” (p. 225). His prescription for improvement is a kind
of gentle revolution: “The public at large, those who care about the whole and not
merely the parts, must get back into the act. They must recapture politics for the
community” (p. 225). Those engaged in this revolution must build “a consensus
powerful enough to unlock their grip on our legislators” (p. 221). This will require a
mobilization of “the great underrepresented majorities” (p. 227).
For Etzioni, this revolution must occur through what he calls a “multilogue”
which will be led by a “steady core of leaders” who will “draw on strong shared
values and molding symbols” and will “command cadres that mobilize the rank and
file to whatever social action is called for” (p. 230). At first glance, such a system has
inherent flaws in that similar structures led to some of the greatest atrocities of the
20th century. In addition, those who are the core leaders must be people of
tremendous moral fortitude lest they become the equivalent to union leaders, as
Etzioni sees them, who control the flow of finances and put their own good before the
good of the society and even their own membership. Etzioni’s goal is to “protect our
democracy from demagogues,” but it appears that a handful of people who might lead
such a majority might simply replace one set of demagogues with another.
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Building such multilogue coalitions is only one side of the solution. The
other, according to Etzioni, is the limitation of the power and finances of other special
interest groups. Most of his solutions aim not at the interest groups themselves but at
the elected officials whom they seek to influence. His list of needed reforms is as
follows:
1. “Finance congressional elections with public funds such as we already do
for presidential elections.”
2. “Curb the flow of private money into the coffers of members of Congress”
by imposing “a ban on all PACs. Limit individual contributions to $250 per
person. Allow no ‘bundling.’”
3. “Reduce the cost of running for office. Provide free time for all bona fide
candidates on radio and TV.”
4. “Promote disclosure of the political process” by recording every time a
lobbyist visits anyone in the legislative or executive branch.
5. “Enhance the enforcement of all rules, new and old.”
6. “Enhance the role of political parties” by channeling all “campaign
contributions [if any are allowed] through political parties rather than directly
to individual candidates, or provide the parties with public funds.”
7. “Restore honest debates among the candidates to reduce the effect of sound
bites, of what is called teledemocracy.” (pp. 234—238)
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There is a lack of political realism in these suggestions and some introductory
questions flesh this out. For example, could just anyone run and receive federal
money? Who would monitor how that money is spent? Which parties would receive
it? Who would pay for radio and television time if the candidates do not? Who
would monitor how political parties distribute the money, and isn’t it possible that
this would make political parties even more susceptible to corruption than they
already are?
In summary, Etzioni’s communitarianism is really about changing the morality
of individuals through the enhanced activity and involvement of the community. As
he writes, “Change of heart is the most basic [part of Communitarianism]. Without
stronger moral voices, public authorities are overburdened and markets don’t work.
Without moral commitments, people act without any consideration for one another”
(p. 247). It is hard to imagine that many would argue with such a statement and yet
Etzioni’s solutions are grounded upon a philosophical anthropology that is a moving
target throughout his book. On the one hand, human beings at birth are the moral
equivalent of animals and lack the capacity to determine what is and what is not
prudent or just on their own. They are avaricious as any other living organism and
lack internal checks to their own appetites. They cannot determine what is right or
wrong. Considering the just claims of others simply isn’t part of their makeup as
originally equipped.
The only check to endless consumption that will take into consideration the
just claims of others is the community where persons are formed and molded into the
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moral beings they become. The community determines what is and is not moral and
the community enforces their definition of morality through social suasion and, if
need be, coercion. Etzioni lacks Ostrom’s emphasis on the rule of law where by
citizens are subject to a written and clear code equally applied to all. They are free to
act in their own self-interest as long as they adhere to what is legally acceptable and
refrain from what it illegal. The law, as it functions in American society, has a
community aspect to it in that many laws are passed at the local level. Those not in
accordance with federal law are trumped by that federal law, which ultimately is
connected to the Constitution of the United States. It is a standard by which all the
nation’s laws can be judged as applied by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Etzioni locates this function not in the rule of law but in the morality to be
found in and determined by the community. Somehow, in a way Etzioni does not
make clear, communities form society and the collective society determines what is
and what is not prudent or just. There is no sense of how society might exercise its
influence on a particular community that operated outside of what society at large
considered to be deviant behavior. Large agencies cannot be trusted. Congressional
members are for sale to the highest bidder. But neither can individuals be trusted to
determine what is and what is not prudent and just because of their dominating selfinterest, although this is not true for all individuals, as some will lead a majority
special interest group or oligarchy in a multilogue which will determine morality. In
Etzioni’s thinking, it is clear that a community forms and molds its individual
members in its own image. It is not clear that, conversely, individuals shape their
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communities in their image in accordance to their wants, needs, and interests. It is
this disconnect which makes Etzioni’s concept logically untenable.
Are human beings prudent? Are they generally just or unjust? The answer,
according to Etzioni, is that it depends on the community in which they have been
raised. Communities are prudent or imprudent, just or unjust. Individual persons are
morally formless at their genesis, essentially lacking the ability to be either until they
are acted upon by their community. The answer to the question is that it depends on
the community.

Amitai Etzioni

Justice
Figure 10. Amitai Etzioni
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CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

In 1972, David K. Hart stated in an article in Public Administration Review:
“It is now time for a generation of ‘public administration philosophers’ who will
address themselves to the resolution of extremely difficult normative questions that
plague nearly every book and article” (p. 617). The most serious problem facing
public administrative theorists and practioners, according to Hart, was the “absence of
such metaphysical speculation” (p. 617).
This project argues that every article and book written on public
administration is written—whether consciously or unconsciously, implicitly or
explicitly, examined or left unexamined, consistently or inconsistently applied—from
a certain philosophical anthropological perspective. Addressing human society means
saying something about the nature of the human person.
All five major theorists examined in this study have implied philosophical
anthropologies that say something about what they believe to be the level of prudence
and justice in the general population. Some theorists directly address their
assumptions about the human person while others do not. Some apply a consistent
theory of human nature, even if the assumption is that no such thing exists, while
others attribute certain traits to some subgroups of the general human species but not
to others.
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This study is certainly not exhaustive and can be expanded in at least five
ways. First, the primary books of additional authors and theorists could and should be
considered as regards to their view of human beings pertaining to prudence and
justice. Frank Sherwood’s list of the 70 most influential books is a good place to
begin. The consideration of books like Functions of the Executive by Chester
Barnard, The Administrative State by Dwight Waldo, The Politics o f the Budgetary
Process by Aaron Wildavsky, and Papers on the Science o f Administration, edited by
Luther Gullick and Lyndall Urwick may provide deeper insight into how these leading
theorists and others thought about human nature and its capacity for prudence and
justice.
Secondly, it would be helpful to study all the writings of a particular theorist
to determine if he or she is consistent in thinking regarding human nature or whether
some development occurred as time passed. For instance, how do the early writings
of Peter Drucker compare to the later expressions of his thinking about leadership and
public administration? Did some evolution of thought take place? Did he hold to a
consistent position regarding his understanding of human nature which he applied to
different circumstances throughout his theoretical life?
A third potential arena for additional research is in changing or adding to the
classical virtues considered. What would be the results if, instead of prudence and
justice, the virtues of temperance and fortitude were considered? Or kindness and
honesty? The list of virtues and their corresponding vices to be considered is lengthy
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and might provide greater illumination about the functional anthropologies that
undergird the thinking of various theorists.
Fourthly, this project focused exclusively on American theorists. If the same
virtues of prudence and justice were considered but a comparison between theorists
from the United States and from Europe were done, would the results yield any
insight into the causes of some of the variation between the American and the French
view of bureaucracy, the role of the government, and the utility of public
administration? What might be the results of comparing two leading Western
theorists with two leading Eastern theorists?
Finally, a comparison of the philosophical anthropological perspectives
regarding the distribution of prudence and justice as human traits could be done
between leading theorists of different eras. This study could serve as a beginning as
the theorists are considered in chronological order and span most of the 20th century.
The argument is not being made here that each theorist speaks for a school of thought.
It is possible, however, to bundle similar theorists into schools representing different
eras and then consider how their views of prudence and justice play a role in the
foundations of their theories.
While not the focus of this study, there does seem to be some development
over time along a continuum regarding the broadness or narrowness of prudence and
justice in the population at large. It is possible that this development is only an
apparition determined by the theorists included in this study. Examining different
theorists from the same decades could lead to a different conclusion. But it appears
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that assumptions among the theorists as to the disbursement of prudence and justice
change over time.
Taylor and Simon, the earliest theorists considered, limit both prudence and
justice to a handful of people. For Taylor, it is the scientific managers who are the
keepers and builders of prudence and justice. For Simon, it is the administrators. For
both, hierarchical organizations are good and add to prudence and justice by
demanding compliance from those who would not be capable of discovering or doing
either. Mosher, Ostrom, and Etzioni attribute prudence and justice to much more
broad and diverse populations. To them, hierarchical organizations are not the
keepers of prudence and justice. For Mosher, the problem is not the person but the
professionalization and unionization of public administrators who serve to put their
own concerns above the common good. For Ostrom, prudence and justice are part
and parcel of almost all human beings in that they operate from self-interest and are
moral as long as they abide by the rule of law. For Etzioni, prudence and justice can
be found among a small number of individuals, rarely in the government, and never
among special interest groups or lobbyists. Instead, morality is kept by and
transmitted through community.
Perhaps this shift from thinking that prudence and justice are narrowly
disbursed to the assumption that they are common is a result of sociological and
political changes that have occurred as the percentage of those who could participate
in American democracy has increased in the recently ended century. It is not clear if
public administration theory is merely reflecting changes that are occurring in
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American culture or if it is leading these changes. The goal of this project is not to
determine which of these might be true but rather to note that assumptions about
human nature are present in and have a powerful impact on the kinds of theories that
are developed and operative with public administrative systems. The point is that
underlying anthropological assumptions have been operative among PA theorists,
whether or not they acknowledge them, and that the various schools of thought about
both the theory and practice of public administration is greatly influenced by these
assumptions.
In conclusion, part of this study must be a call for theorists to give serious
consideration to their own anthropological assumptions as part of their work of
theorizing. Their assumptions should be made plain and defended at the beginning of
their work. Not only is this beneficial to the reader so that, through full disclosure,
these assumptions can be known, it is also beneficial for public administration
theorists and practitioners to give serious consideration to their own assumptions
pertaining to the human beings about whom they write and for whom they work.
At the recommendation of the dissertation committee, a few, very broad
suggestions toward the formation of an operative philosophical anthropology for
public administration theory will function as the concluding comments. This is not
meant to be a full-orbed or completed recommendation and really is the equivalent of
some initial wonderings.
It seems that those considering a potential anthropology for public
administration should make full use of the cultural connections that have been made
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possible by the expansion of globalization. Increased speed in communication and
the interconnectedness developing between various cultures and nations because of
expanded international commerce may lead to a deeper and more global
understanding of the nature or natures of human beings. Examining the similarities
and differences expressed in non-American cultures could provide fertile soil for
consideration. Is the self-interest that is at the core of American public choice theory
found in other cultures? If not, why not? Are the variations or similarities caused by
differences or consistencies in educational systems or religious beliefs or societal
expectations? Exploring the human person by examining global examples might
yield some benefit.
Secondly, it would be helpful to explore the thoughts of American founders
during the period of the Revolutionary War and the framing of the U.S. Constitution.
An examination of the anthropological assumptions in the thought of Alexander
Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson would, at the very least, bring greater clarity to some
of the intellectual roots of American thinking about the nature of the human person.
It is likely that Hamilton’s view of the individual is not particularly rosy, given his
more elitist approach. His view is likely to be stark contrast with Jefferson, who at
least in appearance, seemed to be more comfortable with power resting in the hands
of citizens. Even their definitions of who is counted and who is not counted as a
citizen in a democracy would be illuminating.
Furthermore, the intellectual roots of the Declaration of Independence hold the
potential for some clarity as to the nature of human beings. A discussion of the
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origins of concepts like the inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness would be profitable as would some consideration of their roots in English
common law and philosophical nature law. If rights are inalienable, then what is their
source? If everyone has them, what are the corresponding responsibilities that come
along with these rights and what capabilities are assumed so that people can live up to
these responsibilities?
Finally, it would be interesting and perhaps enlightening to compare the
constitutions of various nations to see what assumptions about human beings are
common to them all. If freedom of speech, for example, is an explicit right contained
in a large percentage of constitutions, what does this assume regarding human ability
to be rational in thought and expression? The comparison would benefit from the
inclusion of various United Nation statements regarding human rights.
Human beings are complex things and everyone holds certain truths about
them to be self-evident. A solid examination into these assumptions and their relation
to society, political structures, and specifically public administration theory and
practice may finally begin to end the wandering in the wilderness that is too
commonly found in public administration. It may even lead to a public administrative
structure that more truly aligns with being of the people, by the people, and for the
people.
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